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Abstract
The effects of monetary policy on financial markets are less understood in emerging
markets than in advanced economies. This dissertation analyzes the effects of foreign
and domestic monetary policies on asset prices in emerging markets.
The first chapter documents the channels through which U.S. monetary policy impacts
the sovereign bond yields of emerging markets. Unlike traditional decompositions of
sovereign yields that rely on a default-free assumption, I propose to decompose the yields
of 15 emerging markets into average expected future short-term interest rates, a term
premium and compensation for credit risk. I find that the response of emerging market
yields to U.S. monetary policy surprises identified with intraday data is economically
significant, yet delayed over days. U.S. target, forward guidance and asset purchase
surprises lead to a reassessment of policy rate expectations and a repricing of interest
and credit risks in emerging markets.
In the second chapter, I use a new dataset of intraday changes in asset prices around
policy events to estimate the impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate and the yield
curve in Mexico. I find that an unanticipated increase in the policy rate appreciates the
currency and flattens the yield curve, in line with the evidence for advanced economies.
I show that the existing evidence for emerging markets in which the response of the
exchange rate to monetary policy is small, nonexistent or inconsistent with standard
open economy models is the result of wide event windows when measuring changes in the
exchange rate with daily data.
The last chapter studies the effects of monetary policy actions and statements on the
exchange rate, the yield curve and portfolio flows in Mexico. I show that bond yields and
ii
portfolio flows respond significantly to surprises about the current policy rate and about
its future path communicated via statements; both surprises are identified using intraday
data around monetary policy announcements. Domestic and foreign investors rebalance
their portfolios over time following monetary policy decisions; for domestic investors, the
rebalancing depends on their business model. Meanwhile, the exchange rate only reacts
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Chapter 1
Term Premia and Credit Risk in
Emerging Markets: The Role of U.S.
Monetary Policy
This chapter characterizes how U.S. monetary policy spills over to the sovereign bond
yields of emerging markets.
1.1 Introduction
U.S. monetary policy has worldwide consequences, yet the channels through which it
affects the sovereign bond yields of emerging markets are not well understood. Since
sovereign yields are the benchmark to price other domestic assets, the ability of emerging
markets to mitigate any undesired impact from U.S. monetary policy relies on under-
standing those channels. Decomposing the yields and analyzing how the components
respond is a sensible approach, but traditional two-part decompositions are not suitable
for the yields of emerging markets because they are assumed to be free of credit risk.
The main contribution of this paper is to empirically quantify the transmission chan-
nels of U.S. monetary policy to the sovereign yields of emerging markets. To achieve this,
the paper first proposes a novel three-part decomposition of the yields that accounts for
credit risk, and then asks how U.S. monetary policy transmits to those components.
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Investors holding local currency bonds of emerging markets bear two major risks.
One is the risk of not receiving the promised payments. Although emerging markets
have increasingly borrowed in local currency over the last two decades (IMF-WB, 2020),
they remain prone to default (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011; Jeanneret et al., 2014; Beers
et al., 2020).1 The other is the risk that inflation erodes the real value of bond payments.
The compensation for this risk is the standard term premium. Thus, compensation for
credit risk addresses the risk of not receiving the promised payments, whereas the term
premium compensates investors for bearing interest rate risk.
To account for credit risk, I construct default-free yields in local currency by essentially
swapping the U.S. yield curve into a local currency one using cross-currency swaps. Those
synthetic yields can be seen as the borrowing rates paid by a hypothetical local currency
bond issuer with no credit risk,2 and so traditional decompositions can be applied to
them. I use a standard affine term structure model augmented with survey data to
obtain robust decompositions of the synthetic yields.3 Such yields have been widely used
to study deviations from covered interest rate parity (CIP) but, instead of concentrating
on the CIP deviations, I focus on the synthetic yields themselves.4 To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first application of affine term structure models to synthetic yields.
This paper decomposes the nominal (or actual) yields of 15 emerging markets from
2000 to 2019 into three parts. The first two components come from the decomposition
of synthetic yields, namely an average expected future short rate and a term premium.
The third component is the spread between the nominal and the synthetic yields, which
captures the compensation for credit risk in the local currency debt of emerging markets
1Before 2000, several emerging markets issued bonds at short maturities and in foreign currency.
Nowadays, they mostly issue bonds with longer maturities and in local currency. There have been more
than 30 default episodes in LC since 1996 (Jeanneret et al., 2014); examples include Barbados (2018),
Jamaica (2013, 2010), Nicaragua (2008, 2003), Argentina (2001), Turkey (1999) and Russia (1998).
2Under this approach, the U.S. yield curve serves as a default-free benchmark for other countries.
Although Augustin et al. (2019) argue that U.S. sovereign default risk is not zero, it is not volatile
enough to affect the results for emerging markets.
3Guimarães (2014) shows that affine term structure models augmented with survey data provide
robust decompositions of the U.S. and U.K. (nominal) yield curves.
4Du et al. (2018b) show that persistent and systematic deviations from CIP reflect a higher regulatory
burden for financial intermediaries. Du et al. (2018a) argue that CIP deviations reflect a convenience
yield in advanced economies, whereas Du and Schreger (2016) show that they capture a local currency
credit spread for emerging markets, which is used by Hofmann et al. (2019) to explain the link between
currency appreciations and the compression of the sovereign yield spreads of emerging markets.
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(Du and Schreger, 2016).5 This decomposition gives reasonable estimates for the com-
ponents. Across emerging markets, average expected short rates, the term premium and
the credit risk compensation in the 10-year nominal yield represent on average 4.2, 2.2
and 0.9%, respectively. Although credit risk is an important component, the literature
on term structures of emerging market yields has not examined it systematically.6 By
explicitly accounting for credit risk, the second component is a genuine term premium.
I show that this term premium compensates investors for bearing inflation uncertainty,
consistent with the evidence for advanced economies (Wright, 2011) and with inflation in
emerging markets being more volatile than in advanced economies (Ha et al., 2019).
The characterization of the transmission channels of U.S. monetary policy needs both
the three-part yield decomposition and the identification of unanticipated policy decisions
by the Fed. I distinguish between target, forward guidance and asset purchase surprises
following the literature (Gürkaynak et al., 2005; Swanson, 2018). These monetary policy
surprises are identified using intraday data around Fed’s monetary policy announcements.
This is by now a well-established strategy to overcome endogeneity concerns because it
isolates the surprise component of monetary policy decisions.
Three main findings summarize the transmission channels of U.S. monetary policy
surprises to emerging market yields. First, the responses to target, forward guidance
and asset purchase surprises are economically significant but sluggish, and amplify over
the month following the surprise. This delayed response is consistent with the evidence
for the U.S. and other advanced economies, which Brooks et al. (2019) attribute to a
portfolio rebalancing channel and slow-moving capital. Moreover, the effects of asset
purchase surprises last longer in emerging market yields than in U.S. yields. Portfolio
rebalancing involving emerging market bonds following asset purchases is thus slower.
Second, monetary policy surprises spill over to all yield components, so that unan-
5Credit risk here is broadly defined including, for example, (selective) default risk, currency convert-
ibility risk, regulation risk, capital controls, and jurisdiction risk, so compensation for any of these risks
is considered as compensation for credit risk even if the country does not default per se.
6The analysis of sovereign credit risk traditionally focuses on bonds denominated in foreign currency.
For instance, Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) report the relevance of domestic factors to explain sovereign
credit risk, while Longstaff et al. (2011) document the importance of global factors. Bostanci and Yilmaz
(2020) study the connectedness of the network of sovereign credit default swaps.
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ticipated Fed policy decisions give rise to a reassessment of policy rate expectations and
a repricing of risks in emerging markets. Investors expect monetary authorities in those
countries to eventually follow the Fed’s monetary stance rather than counteract it, given
that average expected future short rates decline following target, forward guidance and as-
set purchase easing surprises. In addition, Fed’s unconventional monetary policies aimed
at reducing the U.S. term premium, namely forward guidance and asset purchases, ulti-
mately also decrease the term premia in emerging markets. Lastly, long-term credit risk
compensation increases following target and forward guidance easing surprises. Loose
financial conditions abroad trigger a ‘reach for yield’ behavior among investors (Haus-
man and Wongswan, 2011) that can incentivize more borrowing in emerging markets by
sovereigns in local currency (Bigio et al., 2018) and by corporates in foreign currency7. In
either case, the price of default risk (not necessarily the risk itself) increases. This effect
can be seen as the fiscal implications in emerging markets of Fed’s monetary policies,
something that has not been discussed so far in the literature.
Third, since the global financial crisis, U.S. monetary policy has spilled over to emerg-
ing markets through a yield curve channel. I show that among emerging markets long-
term yields are more interconnected than short-term ones, so the global financial cycle is
more relevant for the long end of their curves; equivalently, their monetary autonomy is
stronger at the front end of their yield curves (Obstfeld, 2015). U.S. unconventional mon-
etary policies aimed at influencing long-term yields thus limit the monetary autonomy of
emerging markets along their yield curves. The effects transmit, in particular, through
the expected future short rate as argued by Kalemli-Özcan (2019) as well as via the term
premium as suggested by Turner (2014) and Kolasa and Weso lowski (2020). Global risks
hit emerging markets even when borrowing in local currency (Carstens and Shin, 2019).
A growing literature analyzes the spillover effects of U.S. monetary policy to the
local currency sovereign bond yields of emerging markets. Hausman and Wongswan
(2011) report significant spillovers, while Bowman et al. (2015) compare the effects of
conventional and unconventional monetary policies. The present paper is nonetheless
7Du and Schreger (2017) show that higher reliance on foreign currency borrowing by corporates
increases sovereign default risk in emerging markets.
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more closely related to the work of Curcuru et al. (2018), Adrian et al. (2019) and
Albagli et al. (2019), who decompose the yields to analyze the transmission channels of
such spillovers, but it differs in a number of dimensions. Most importantly, this paper
explicitly accounts for the credit risk embedded in emerging market yields, and analyzes
the effects of different types of monetary policy surprises identified with intraday data.8
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 explains how to construct the
local currency yield curves. Section 1.3 presents the affine term structure model used to
decompose the yields. Section 1.4 assesses the yield decompositions. Section 1.5 analyzes
the U.S. monetary policy spillovers to emerging market yields. The last section concludes.
1.2 Local Currency Yield Curves
This section explains how to construct the nominal and synthetic local currency (LC)
yield curves of emerging markets, and explains that the spread between the two is a
model-free measure of the compensation for credit risk. In the next section, the synthetic
yield curve will be decomposed into average expected future short-term interest rates and
a term premium. The three components of the nominal yield curve will then be used to
characterize the response of emerging market yields to U.S. monetary policy.
1.2.1 Construction of Synthetic Yield Curves
The main idea to construct the synthetic LC yield curves is to use the U.S. yield curve as
the benchmark for all other countries and to swap it into LC by adding a foreign exchange
forward premium at each maturity. The forward premium compensates investors for the
expected depreciation of the currency. In this paper the exchange rate is expressed in LC
per U.S. dollar (USD), so a currency depreciates when the exchange rate increases. This
approach assumes frictionless financial markets; in particular, it assumes that (i) uncon-
strained arbitrageurs have access to U.S. and LC bonds, (ii) the derivatives contracts
8Rogers et al. (2014) and Rogers et al. (2018) analyze the spillovers on bond yields using surprises
identified with intraday data but they focus on advanced economies. Gilchrist et al. (2019) study the
effects for advanced and emerging countries but for debt denominated in foreign currency.
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used to construct the forward premium have no counterparty risk, and (iii) U.S. yields
are free of default risk.9 Du and Schreger (2016) show that this is a useful benchmark to
quantify credit risk in the LC debt of emerging markets.
The zero-coupon synthetic LC yield for an n-period bond at time t, ỹLCt,n , is defined as
ỹLCt,n = y
US
t,n + ρt,n. (1.1)
in which yUSt,n denotes the zero-coupon yield for an n-period U.S. Treasury security at time
t, and ρt,n is the n-period forward premium from USD to LC at time t. The calculation of
the forward premium depends on the maturity. For maturities shorter than one year, the
forward premium is calculated as the annualized difference between the forward and the
spot exchange rates. For maturities equal or larger than one year, the forward premium
is calculated using cross-currency swaps because outright forwards are less liquid. Since
fixed-for-fixed cross-currency swap rates are rarely observed in the market directly, they
are constructed using cross-currency basis swaps and interest rate swaps. The idea is to
exchange cash flows in the two currencies, USD and LC. Start by swapping fixed payments
in LC into floating-rate cash flows in USD using cross-currency basis swaps (referenced
to the Libor—London interbank offered rate—in USD), which are then swapped into
fixed-rate cash flows in USD using interest rate swaps. Both types of swaps are liquid,
marked to market and collateralized instruments, so the bilateral counterparty risk in
cross-currency swaps is small.
Since the construction of synthetic yields relies on the U.S. yield curve and currency
derivatives, it does not require information about the nominal yields.10 By contrast, the
nominal zero-coupon yield, yLCt,n , is constructed directly from quotes of LC bonds actually
traded in the market.
According to the CIP condition, the nominal (direct) and the synthetic (indirect) LC
interest rates should be equal. Essentially, CIP implies that an issuer should be able to
borrow directly or indirectly (synthetically) in LC at the same yield. Du et al. (2018b)
9Augustin et al. (2019) argue that U.S. sovereign default risk is not zero. Nevertheless, it is not
volatile enough to affect the results in this paper.
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show, however, that there are persistent and systematic deviations from CIP. Indeed, the
spread between the nominal and synthetic yields (yLCt,n − ỹLCt,n ) measures CIP deviations
in sovereign yields. For advanced economies, Du et al. (2018a) argue that CIP deviations
measure the difference in the convenience yield of U.S. Treasuries relative to that of the
sovereign bonds of other advanced economies. By contrast, Du and Schreger (2016) point
out that CIP deviations have a different interpretation for emerging markets.
The nominal-synthetic spread is a model-free measure of the compensation for credit
risk in the LC yields of emerging markets. Whereas the nominal yields of advanced
economies are usually considered free of credit risk, the nominal yields of emerging mar-
kets include a credit risk compensation given the possibility of default (Du and Schreger,
2016, 2017). Since credit risk in the components of the synthetic yields (equation (1.1))
is small, a synthetic yield can be seen as the borrowing rate paid by a hypothetical issuer
in LC with no credit risk.
Du and Schreger (2016) show that the nominal-synthetic spread is highly correlated
with the rates of credit default swaps (CDS)—financial derivatives aimed to protect
investors against default by a bond issuer. However, the nominal-synthetic spread ad-
equately measures credit risk on LC debt, whereas CDS are suitable for studying the
sovereign risk in bonds denominated in foreign currency (see, for example, Longstaff
et al., 2011). Indeed, according to the International Swaps and Derivatives Associa-
tion (ISDA), LC bonds governed under domestic law do not trigger CDS payouts.11 In
addition, a credit event for a CDS contract is not always clearly defined.
1.2.2 Construction of Nominal Yield Curves
The construction of the nominal yield curve, yLCt,n , uses the Bloomberg Fair Value
(BFV) curves. These curves report coupon-equivalent par yields. I convert them into
continuously-compounded yields to obtain implied zero-coupon curves (see Gürkaynak
et al., 2007).12 For Brazil and Israel, Bloomberg does not provide BFV curves but zero-
11See the ISDA credit derivatives physical settlement matrix.
12As a robustness check, I estimate the nominal yield curves from actual prices for some of the countries
in the sample using the Nelson–Siegel model. They closely follow the curves reported by Bloomberg.
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coupon yields with coupon-equivalent compounding, known as IYC curves, which I also
convert into continuously-compounded yields.13
The resulting continuously-compounded zero-coupon curve for each country is what
this paper refers to as the nominal yield curve yLCt,n .
1.2.3 Yield Curve Data
Nominal and synthetic yield curves are constructed for the 15 emerging markets originally
studied by Du and Schreger (2016) and, to compare the results, for the 10 advanced
economies considered by Du et al. (2018a).14 All emerging markets in the sample, except
Malaysia, have adopted an inflation targeting regime.15 Some of them adopted it during
the sample period.16
The data for nominal and synthetic yields is available daily. The sample starts in
January 2000 and ends in January 2019. The starting dates, however, vary by country.
All the yields for advanced economies start no later than September 2001. The sample
sizes for emerging markets are generally smaller. The nominal yields of 9 and the synthetic
yields of 7 emerging markets start before March 2004; both types of yields for the rest
of the countries start no later than June 2007. There are thus at least 10 years of data
for most of the emerging markets in the sample.17 In principle, this is a reasonable time
period for the estimation of the affine term structure model presented in section 1.3.1, but
in practice there may be too few interest rate cycles per country. Surveys of professional
forecasters help to address this small sample problem, as discussed in section 1.3.3.
The yields have maturities of 3 and 6 months, and 1 through 10 years, ranging from
13For some emerging markets, Bloomberg reports both BFV and IYC curves. BFV curves are preferred
for several reasons: their history is longer, IYC curves are not available for advanced economies—the
benchmark for some of the results reported later—and, compared to the BFV curves, the short end of
the IYC curves seems disconnected from the rest of the curve at some dates for a few countries.
14Emerging markets: Brazil, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the
Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey. Advanced economies: Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Germany (based on the euro), Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K.
15Malaysia, however, has several characteristics that are aligned with an inflation targeting regime.
16Hungary in June 2001, the Philippines in January 2002, Indonesia in July 2005, Turkey in January
2006 and Russia in 2014. Hungary and Poland were accepted to join the European Union in April 2003.
17For Turkey, the nominal yields with a maturity of up to 10 years start on June 2010, although its
synthetic yields start on May 2005. For Russia, data on both types of yields start in 2007 but due to
low liquidity at the beginning of the sample, here it starts in July 2009.
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a minimum of nine to a maximum of twelve maturities per country.18 The maximum
maturity considered for the analysis is 10 years because bonds and swaps with larger
maturities have less history and are less liquid, especially for emerging markets who do
not issue longer-term bonds as often as advanced economies.
The construction of LC synthetic yield curves involves data from the U.S. yield curve
and the forward premium for different maturities, as explained in section 1.2.1. Data for
the U.S. zero-coupon yield curve comes from two sources. For maturities of 1 through 10
years, the yields come from the dataset constructed by Gürkaynak et al. (2007), who only
consider Treasury securities with coupons. Since Treasury securities with less than one
year to maturity behave differently—partly because they are less actively traded than
longer-maturity ones—I follow Duffee (2010) and use the estimates from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), which are robust at the short end of the curve.
Specifically, the 3- and 6-month yields are the annualized 13- and 26-week rates (bid/ask
average) in the CRSP Risk-Free Rates series.19
The data to compute the forward premium also comes from two sources. For maturi-
ties of less than one year, I use data on the spot exchange rate along with 3- and 6-month
forwards from Bloomberg for all countries but Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, for
which the data comes from Datastream. To construct the cross-currency swap rates, I
use data on cross-currency basis swaps and interest rate swaps for each available maturity
from 1 through 10 years. The data for the swap curves comes from Bloomberg.20
Table 1.1 reports descriptive statistics for different tenors of the nominal and synthetic
yield curves for the emerging and advanced economies in the sample. The yield curves
exhibit standard properties such as an upward slope. At the same time, the table pro-
vides information on how the curves of emerging markets differ from those of advanced
economies. For instance, the level and the volatility (measured by the standard devia-
18All countries have data for maturities from 3 months to 5 years and for 10 years. All countries except
Brazil have data for the 7-year maturity. Data for 6, 8 and 9 years vary per country.
19The 3- and 6-month yields implied by the fitted model of Gürkaynak et al. (2007) are highly correlated
with CRSP yields (0.9985 and 0.9995) but are on average (16 and 10 basis points) higher since 1983.
20A spreadsheet with the tickers used in the construction of the forward premiums and in the estimation
of the nominal yield curves is available upon request. The file consolidates and expands (with tenors and
tickers) similar files kindly posted online in Wenxin Du and Jesse Schreger’s websites.
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Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics of Yield Curves
3M 6M 1Y 2Y 5Y 10Y
Nominal
Emerging Markets
Average 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.7 6.3 6.8
Std. D. 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.9
Advanced Economies
Average 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.7 3.2
Std. D. 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8
Synthetic
Emerging Markets
Average 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.8 6.3
Std. D. 4.3 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.2
Advanced Economies
Average 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.2
Std. D. 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0
Notes: This table reports the average and the standard deviation using end-of-month data for dif-
ferent tenors of the nominal and synthetic yields of the emerging markets and advanced economies
in the sample. All figures are expressed in annualized percentage points.
tion) of their curves are larger than those of advanced economies. Also, the short end of
their curves is more volatile than the long end, particularly so for the synthetic curve.
Lastly, the spread between the nominal and the synthetic yields suggests that the credit
risk compensation is on average positive.
Timing
The parameters of the affine term structure models are estimated using end-of-month
data, as explained in section 1.3.3. Since the U.S. yield curve is the benchmark to
construct the synthetic yield curves, the end-of-month dates are the last business days of
each month according to the U.S. calendar.
Getting the timing right is key to adequately measure the responses of emerging mar-
ket yields to surprises in Fed’s policy decisions. The analysis of monetary policy spillovers
in section 1.5.3 uses daily changes in nominal and synthetic yields. Since the closing
prices in non-Western Hemisphere countries happen before the Fed’s monetary policy
announcements, their nominal yields are shifted one day back so that their daily changes
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adequately capture surprises in the announcements. The credit risk compensation for
those countries is calculated using the shifted nominal yields.
1.3 Methodology
This section describes the affine term structure model used to decompose the yield curve
of each country in the sample, and discusses the difficulties in estimating the parameters
of the model. It then explains how survey data helps in the estimation. Among the many
applications of the decomposition, this paper exploits it to analyze the transmission
channels of U.S. monetary policy to the yields of emerging markets.
1.3.1 Affine Term Structure Model
Let Pt,n be the price at time t of a zero-coupon risk-free bond with maturity n. The
continuously compounded yield on that bond is then yt,n = − lnPt,n/n. In particular,
the one-period continuously compounded risk-free rate is it = yt,1 = − lnPt,1.
If there is no arbitrage, there exists a strictly positive stochastic discount factor that
prices all nominal bonds. Let Mt+1 be the nominal stochastic discount factor. Accord-
ingly, the bond price today is recursively defined as follows
Pt,n = E
P
t [Mt+1Pt+1,n−1] , (1.2)
in which EPt [·] denotes the conditional expectation at time t taken using the actual or
physical probability measure, P, that generates the data. The existence of the stochastic
discount factor also implies that there exists a theoretical risk-neutral or risk-adjusted
pricing measure Q—different from the P measure—that is defined as follows
Pt,n = E
Q
t [exp (−it)Pt+1,n−1] , (1.3)
in which EQt [·] also denotes conditional expectation but taken under the Q measure.
A discrete-time affine term structure model assumes that the dynamics of a K × 1
vector of unobserved pricing factors or state variables, Xt, follow a first-order vector
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autoregression, VAR(1), under the risk-neutral measure Q
Xt+1 = µ
Q + ΦQXt + Σν
Q
t+1, (1.4)
in which µQ is a K× 1 vector and ΦQ is a K×K transition matrix, Σ is a K×K lower
triangular matrix with positive diagonal elements, and νQt+1 is a K × 1 independent and
identically distributed, normal vector with zero mean and covariance equal to the identity
matrix conditional on the pricing factors, that is νQt+1|Xt ∼ NK (0, I).
The pricing factors drive the dynamics of the one-period interest rate as follows
it = δ0 + δ
′
1Xt, (1.5)
in which δ0 is a scalar and δ1 is a K× 1 vector of parameters.
These assumptions imply that the bond price is an exponentially affine function of
the pricing factors
Pt,n = exp (An +BnXt) ,
such that the corresponding continuously compounded yield of the bond is an affine






in which AQn = − 1nAn, B
Q
n = − 1nBn, where in turn the scalar An = A(δ0, δ1, µ
Q,ΦQ,Σ, n)
and the 1×K vector Bn = B(δ1,ΦQ, n) are loadings that satisfy the recursive equations




′Bn, A0 = 0, (1.7)
Bn+1 = −δ1 + ΦQ′Bn, B0 = 0. (1.8)
The yields yQt,n are the model’s fitted yields, which means that the risk-neutral measure
Q is sufficient for pricing bonds. However, to be able to decompose the yields into an
average expected future short-term interest rate and a term premium, the model needs
to specify the dynamics for the market prices of risk, which control the transformation
between the Q and P measures. In this sense, the stochastic discount factor is assumed
12
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in which λt is a K × 1 vector of market prices of risk. And, following Duffee (2002), it
is also assumed to be an affine function of the pricing factors
λt = λ0 + λ1Xt, (1.10)
in which λ0 is a K× 1 vector and λ1 is a K×K matrix of parameters.
A well-known implication of this structure for the market prices of risk is that the
dynamics of the pricing factors under the physical measure P can also be described by a
VAR(1) as follows21
Xt+1 = µ
P + ΦPXt + Σν
P
t+1, (1.11)
in which µQ = µP−Σλ0 , ΦQ = ΦP−Σλ1 , νPt+1|Xt ∼ NK (0, I). Note that the covariance
matrix of the shocks is the same under both measures; that is, it is measure independent.
The yields consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the yield curve—as if in-






in which APn = − 1nAn, B
P
n = − 1nBn, and the loadings An = A(δ0, δ1, µ
P,ΦP,Σ, n) and
Bn = B(δ1,ΦP, n) satisfy the same recursions as those above but using the parameters of
the law of motion of the pricing factors under the P rather than the Q measure.22
The term premium for maturity n at time t, τt,n, is then estimated as the difference
between the yields obtained under the Q and P measures23
τt,n = y
Q
t,n − yPt,n. (1.12)
21The stochastic discount factor in equation (1.9) and the law of motion of the vector of pricing
factors in equation (1.11) can be formalized separately or jointly. For instance, in a utility maximization
framework, the stochastic discount factor is usually interpreted as the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution.
22The loadings are obtained recursively after combining the no-arbitrage condition and the functional
form for bond prices. See the appendices in Lloyd (2020) for derivations under both measures.
23Note that the term premium is also an affine function of the pricing factors since τt,n can be written
as (AQn −APn) + (BQn −BPn)Xt.
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A key assumption behind this model is that the yield yt,n is free of credit risk, a
reasonable assumption for advanced but not for emerging countries for which investors
require to be compensated for credit risk (Du and Schreger, 2016, 2017). Thus, while the
nominal yield curve yLCt,n is adequate for advanced economies, the synthetic yield curve
ỹLCt,n better aligns with the risk-free assumption in the case of emerging markets.
Finally, to ensure that the decomposition of nominal yields adds up, the credit risk






Notice that the credit risk compensation equals the spread between the nominal and the
fitted (yQt,n), rather than the synthetic (ỹ
LC
t,n ), yields. However, since the model fits the
synthetic yields reasonably well, the credit risk compensation here is largely similar to
the LC credit spread reported by Du and Schreger (2016).
Although the unconditional mean of the credit risk compensation in the data is posi-
tive, there have been episodes in which it turns negative. These situations are unrealistic
and can reflect financial market frictions (Du and Schreger, 2016), including market seg-
mentation and short selling constraints. Thus, the nominal-synthetic spread is a valid
measure of credit risk that is far from perfect, but definitely better than ignoring it. Oth-
erwise, estimates of the term premium would be contaminated with credit risk. Given the
unrealistic nature of being negative, for the analysis the credit risk compensation is set
to zero when it turns negative in the data. In general, those episodes are brief and rare,
so the conclusions from the analysis remain the same as if it is allowed to be negative.
Weak Identification
The estimation of the parameters in the affine term structure model only requires zero-
coupon yields as an input. While this data provides sufficient information to identify the
pricing coefficients under the Q measure, {µQ,ΦQ}, it is not enough to accurately identify
the parameters under the P measure, {µP,ΦP}. This information imbalance is relevant
for the estimation of the term premium (see equation (1.12)). Indeed, poorly identi-
fied parameters under the P measure result in unstable yield decompositions. Different
14
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solutions have been proposed in the literature to address this instability.24
Survey data provides additional information on the P dynamics. Guimarães (2014) ar-
gues that surveys anchor the long-run mean of interest rates and shows that incorporating
survey data on interest rate forecasts in the estimation provides robust decompositions of
the U.S. and U.K. yield curves.25 Since bond yields are highly persistent, the additional
information from surveys is particularly relevant when sample sizes are small, in which
case there might be too few interest rate cycles in the data. This is precisely the case
with emerging markets, so including survey data in the estimation of the term structure
model is especially important to obtain robust decompositions of their yields. On top
of that, surveys allow for model-free estimates of the term premium, which serve as a
robustness check for the model-implied term premium.
1.3.2 Survey Data
Long-term forecasts are particularly helpful to pin down the parameters of the model
under the P measure, {µP,ΦP}. Twice a year Consensus Economics provides 5-year
ahead and long-term (between 6 and 10 years ahead) forecasts for consumer inflation and
real GDP growth for most of the emerging countries in the sample; the data is available
from March 2001 to October 2017.26 Figure 1.1 plots the inflation forecasts. With the
exception of Brazil and Turkey, inflation expectations in emerging markets have been
stable or even declining, and are generally within the upper and lower bounds for their
inflation target.
Although there is no source for long-term forecasts for the short rate of emerging
markets, they can be inferred from existing data by considering those countries as small
open economies and using the Fisher equation. Specifically, the implied forecast for the
24Solutions include restrictions on parameters (Duffee, 2010), bias-corrected estimators (Bauer et al.,
2012) and complementing bond yield data with survey forecasts of future interest rates (Kim and Wright,
2005; Kim and Orphanides, 2012).
25He finds that the term premium estimated with the aid of surveys remains essentially the same after
varying the number of pricing factors (from 3 to 5) and the sample periods, even with a sample starting
in 1972, which includes the U.S. Great Inflation period.
26Data availability varies by country; for example, data for the Philippines starts in 2009, whereas
it ends in October 2013 for Latin American countries. Although there is no survey data on long-term














Figure 1.1. Long-Horizon Forecasts of Inflation









































































































Long Term 5 Years Ahead
Notes: This figure plots the 5-years ahead (dashed line) and the 5- to 10-years ahead or long-term (solid line) average consumer price inflation
forecasts against the survey date. For Israel and South Africa, the figure shows the inflation trend, see appendix 1.A. The figure also includes
the upper and lower bounds for the domestic inflation target, where applicable. The upper and lower bounds are the most recent ones for each




nominal short rate (isurveyt,n ) equals an expected real interest rate over the same horizon
(r∗t,n) plus the expected average inflation reported by Consensus Economics (π
CEsurvey
t,n ).
The first term is in turn equal to the expected global real interest rate in USD plus a real
foreign exchange forward premium, akin to equation (1.1) but in real terms. The U.S.
real interest rate serves as a proxy for the global real interest rate and is inferred by a
combination of survey forecasts of future short-term U.S. Treasury bill yields (iSPFsurveyt,n )
and future U.S. inflation (πSPFsurveyt,n ). Finally, the real forward premium is the residual of
regressing the forward premium computed as explained in section 1.2.1 on the expected
average inflation from Consensus Economics. Thus, the implied forecast for the nominal











+ ρ⊥t,n + π
CEsurvey
t,n . (1.14)
The required U.S. data is available quarterly from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
I use the 5- and 10-year CPI inflation forecasts and, for the T-bill rate, the 10-year forecast
and the second longest available one27—since there is no 5-year forecast for the T-bill
rate—to calculate the implied forecast for the domestic short rate To assess the implied
forecasts for the U.S. real rate obtained from surveys, they are compared against the 5-
and 10-year zero-coupon real yields constructed by Gürkaynak et al. (2010) who use data
from the U.S. TIPS market. The levels of the two series are comparable. TIPS yields are
not the benchmark, however, because they are more volatile (their term premium is time
varying) and suffer from liquidity problems.
Figure 1.2 shows that the implied long-term forecasts for the short rates are sensible,
their level is in line with the synthetic 10-year yield in each country. An alternative way
to infer the embedded expectations is to use Taylor rule-type regressions for the policy
rate.28 Both approaches yield similar values for the implied forecasts of the short rates.
27The specific series are CPI5YR, CPI10, BILL10 and TBILLD. The BILL10 series is only released
in the first-quarter of a year, so I use linear interpolation for the second to fourth quarters. Consensus
Economics forecasts are considered at the end of the month in which they are published, at that time
the most recent value for the U.S. real interest rate forecast is used in equation (1.14).
28I regress the policy rate on its lag, the year-on-year consumer price inflation and the year-on-year
real GDP growth for all the countries except Israel and South Africa. The coefficient for the lag of the
policy rate is a smoothing parameter that improves the fit of the model to the data. I assume that
the estimated parameters for inflation and real GDP growth apply at each of the survey maturities.














Figure 1.2. 10-Year Synthetic Yields and Long-Horizon Implied Forecasts of the Short Rate




















































































10-Year Synthetic Yield Implied Long-Term Forecast of Short Rate
Notes: This figure plots the long-horizon implied forecast of the domestic nominal short-term interest rate (dashed line) and the 10-year synthetic
yield (solid line). The implied forecast of the short rate is equal to the forecast of the U.S. real short-term interest rate corrected for a real
forward premium plus the domestic consumer price inflation forecast, see text for details. The forecast of the U.S. real short-term rate is equal
to the difference between the forecast of the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate and the forecast of the U.S. consumer price inflation.
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I assume that the 5-year ahead (implied) forecast for the short rate of each emerging













in which Aen = − 1nAn, B
e
n = − 1nBn, where in turn An = A(δ0, δ1, µ
P,ΦP, 0, n) and
Bn = B(δ1,ΦP, n); that is, Aen and Ben also satisfy the recursions under the P measure but
with Σ = 0 (see appendix C of Guimarães (2014)).29
Long-term (implied) forecasts are in turn aligned with the 5-year forward rate starting
5 years hence. In the model, the forward rate from n to m periods hence given by













in which Aen|m = (mA
e
m − nAen) / (m− n) and Ben|m = (mBem − nBen) / (m− n).
1.3.3 Estimation
The convergence to the global optimum in affine term structure models estimated by
maximum likelihood has been traditionally subject to computational challenges and mul-
tiple local optima. Joslin et al. (2011) propose a normalization of the affine model that
improves the convergence to the global optimum of the likelihood function.
The Joslin et al. (2011) normalization allows for the near separation of the model’s
likelihood function into the product of the P and Q likelihood functions, and reduces
the dimension of the parameter space from (δ0, δ1, µ
Q,ΦQ,Σ) to (iQ∞, λ
Q,Σ), where iQ∞ is
the short rate under Q in the long-run and λQ is a K × 1 vector of ordered eigenvalues
of ΦQ. It is common to assume that K linear combinations of the N observed bond
yields are measured without error, K < N, so that N − K linear combinations of yields
policy rate for the previous forecast horizon. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume stationarity for
the long-term forecasts (5 and 10 years), in which case only survey data for inflation and GDP growth
are needed after dividing their coefficients by 1 minus the coefficient for the lag of the policy rate (due
to stationarity). Data for the dependent variable comes from the policy rate statistics of the Bank for
International Settlements.
29The difference between yPt,n and y
e
t,n is a convexity term due to Jensen’s inequality, which increases
with maturity. In practice, however, this term usually becomes relevant for maturities beyond ten years.
Further, the term is constant across maturities in homoskedastic models like the ones used in this paper.
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are measured with error. Following Joslin et al. (2011), I consider that the first three
principal components—usually referred to as the level, slope and curvature—of the yield
curve in each country are the linear combinations of yields measured without error.30
The estimation of the affine model uses the Joslin et al. (2011) normalization and
follows a two-step procedure. First, the P parameters are estimated by OLS of the VAR
in equation (1.11) using the K principal components as pricing factors. This step provides
initial values for the maximum likelihood estimation of the matrix Σ. Then, taking µ̂P
and Φ̂P as given, the Q parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood.
The estimation uses end-of-month data on risk-free yield curves; that is, synthetic
yields (ỹLCt,n ) for emerging markets and nominal yields (y
LC
t,n ) for advanced economies.
Only yield data is available for advanced economies, whereas for emerging markets the
model is augmented with survey data on the last day of the month for which the surveys
were published.31 Since survey data is available twice a year (whereas yield data for the
estimation is monthly), it is regarded as missing in non-release dates.
Survey-Augmented Model
The Kalman filter is well-suited to handle missing data. The transition equation is the
law of motion of the pricing factors under the P measure given in equation (1.11). The
dimension of the observation equation varies depending on the availability of survey data.
On months in which there is no data on survey expectations, the observation equation
adds measurement error to the fitted yields in equation (1.6) for each of the N maturities
yt = A + BXt + ΣY ut, (1.15)
in which yt is an N×1 vector of observed bond yields, A is an N×1 vector with elements
30On average, the first three principal components explain more than 99.5% of the variation in the
synthetic yields of emerging markets and 99.9% in the nominal yields of advanced economies.
31From 2001 to 2014, data is available in March and September for countries covered in the Eastern
European release; starting in October 2014, it is released on April and October. For the rest of emerging
markets, forecasts have always been released on April and October. I do not have access to survey
data for advanced economies. They are, however, not the main focus of this paper, the affine model is
estimated for them just for comparison purposes. Moreover, the results reported later for them are more
comparable with other studies that do not use survey data. Finally, there are less concerns about small
sample sizes for advanced economies.
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AQn , B is an N × K matrix with rows equal to BQn for n = 1, . . . ,N, ut ∼ NN(0, I) and
ΣY is a lower triangular N× N matrix with positive elements on the diagonal.
On months when survey data is available, the observation equation increases by the














in which ySt is an S × 1 vector of survey forecasts with elements i
survey
t,n , A
S is an S × 1
vector with elements Aen or A
e
n|m, B
S is an S×K matrix with rows equal to Ben or Ben|m
for n = 1, . . . , S, uSt ∼ NS(0, I) and ΣS is a lower triangular S × S matrix with positive
elements on the diagonal.
To estimate the survey-augmented model, I follow Guimarães (2014) and Lloyd (2020)
in two aspects. First, I use the estimated parameters from the Joslin et al. (2011) normal-
ization as initial values for the Kalman filter. Second, I assume homoskedasticity in the
errors of yields and surveys, so that ΣY = σyIN and ΣS = σsIS, in which IN and IS are
N× N and S× S identity matrices, reducing the number of parameters to be estimated.
It is important to acknowledge that although surveys contain useful information,
have good forecasting properties and help to anchor the model to reality, they are not a
panacea. For instance, surveys might not represent market expectations nor the expec-
tations of the marginal investor,32 they might also be subject to measurement error, and
relying too much on them can be counterproductive as it may lead to overfitting. Thus,
I consider them as imperfect or ‘noisy’ measures of expectations. Accordingly, I follow
Kim and Orphanides (2012) by fixing σs at a conservative level of 75 basis points.
Estimating Daily Pricing Factors
The parameters estimated with monthly data can be used to estimate the pricing factors
at the daily frequency (Adrian et al., 2013). The model is not estimated directly at the
32Notwithstanding, in the case of the U.S., when comparing the 5-year ahead CPI inflation median
forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters against the Survey of Primary Dealers and the
Survey of Market Participants, the absolute difference over 2015:I and 2020:II is on average 5 and 13
basis points, respectively.
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daily frequency because there is noise that can undermine the estimation.
The Kalman filter maximum likelihood setup explained above gives estimates for both
the parameters and the pricing factors. I regress the estimated monthly pricing factors
on the end-of-month observed yields to obtain the matrix of loadings implied by those
pricing factors, and an intercept. The matrix of loadings multiplied by the daily yields,
plus the intercept, gives an estimate of the daily pricing factors. Finally, the estimated
parameters (with monthly data) along with the estimated daily pricing factors are used
to fit—and decompose—the yields at the daily frequency.
1.4 Decomposing the Yields of Emerging Markets
This section shows that the decompositions of the sovereign yields of emerging markets
obtained with the survey-augmented model are sensible. It highlights the benefits of
using synthetic curves and survey data when analyzing those yields. Among the many
potential applications of the decompositions, the next section applies them to characterize
the response of emerging market yields to U.S. monetary policy.
1.4.1 Model Fit
Figure 1.3 illustrates the fit of the model for the synthetic yields. The focus is on the
10-year maturity for the sake of brevity. In general, the model fits the data reasonably
well. The squared root of the average (across months and maturities) squared difference
between the actual and the fitted yields is commonly used to summarize the fitting errors.
The average fitting error for the synthetic yields of emerging markets is 16 basis points,
a reasonable fit. For reference, the average fitting error for the nominal yields of the
advanced economies in the sample is 5 basis points, in line with previous studies (Wright,
2011). The dynamics of emerging market yields are thus relatively harder to capture.33
33Notwithstanding, it is important to keep in mind that for some countries, large fitting errors might





































Figure 1.3. Model Fit: 10-Year Synthetic Yields of Emerging Markets




















































































Notes: This figure plots the fitted (dashed line) and the actual (solid line) 10-year synthetic yields. The fitted yield is obtained after estimating
the survey-augmented affine term structure model.
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1.4.2 Robustness
The estimated model is used to decompose the yields, but the extent to which any
application provides valuable insights hinges on the reliability of the decomposition. To
assess its robustness, I compute the standard errors for each component using the delta
method. Specifically, since each yield component Ψ is a function of the parameters θ in






d−→ N (0, Γ Ω Γ′) ,
in which Ω is the asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimator θ̂ and Γ is the Jacobian
matrix of partial derivatives calculated numerically. Ω is estimated using the sample
Hessian estimator Ω̂ = Ĥθ
−1
, for which the second derivative matrix of the log-likelihood
function evaluated at the optimum, Ĥθ, is also calculated numerically.
Although there is uncertainty in both the parameters and the pricing factors after the
estimation, the effect of uncertainty associated with the pricing factors on each component
is usually small.34 Therefore, when applying the delta method, I assume that the pricing
factors are known with certainty. Figures 1.D.1 and 1.D.2 in the appendix display the
term premium and the credit risk compensation along with their confidence bands. The
bands seem reasonable and illustrate the benefits of using survey data. Specifically,
surveys help in obtaining robust yield decompositions for emerging markets, consistent
with the findings of Guimarães (2014) for the U.S. and the U.K.
1.4.3 Decomposition Assessment
Table 1.2 summarizes the decomposition of the nominal yields of emerging markets.35
Average expected short rates explain most of the variability in nominal yields. Mean-
while, the relevance of the term premium increases with maturity, whereas the credit
34To verify this, at each period, I compute the standard errors by pre- and post-multiplying the variance
of the pricing factors (generated by the Kalman filter) by the respective factor loadings for the fitted
yields, the average expected future short rate and the term premium. In all cases, the average standard
error (over time and across countries) is less than 9 basis points for emerging markets, and less than 3
basis points for advanced economies.
35The decompositions for advanced economies are not displayed for two reasons. First, they have
already been studied before, see for instance Wright (2011) and Adrian et al. (2019). Second, the dataset
does not include survey data for advanced economies and so their decompositions may not be robust.
They are nonetheless a useful benchmark to assess some results (e.g. average fitting errors above).
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Table 1.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Decomposition of Emerging Market Yields
3M 6M 1Y 2Y 5Y 10Y
Expected Short Rate
Average 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.2
S. Dev. 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.5 2.1
Term Premium
Average 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.1 2.2
S. Dev. 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 2.0
Credit Risk Compensation
Average 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9
S. Dev. 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Notes: This table reports the average and the standard deviation using end-of-month data for dif-
ferent tenors of the components of the emerging market nominal yields. All figures are expressed
in annualized percentage points.
risk compensation is broadly stable. On average, the three parts respectively represent
around 58, 30 and 12% of the 10-year nominal yields of emerging markets.
Figure 1.4 shows the decomposition of the 10-year yield for each country, from which
two patterns emerge. First, the term premium and the credit risk compensation are
time-varying and both play an important role in the dynamics of yields. Although their
relative importance varies by country, the term premium plays a relatively bigger role,
in general. Second, there is a downward trend in the expected future short rate and the
term premium of several countries, consistent with the evidence for advanced economies
(Wright, 2011; Adrian et al., 2019).
In addition, the results for individual countries are consistent with their particular
circumstances. For instance, the expected short rate in Mexico increased during the
tightening cycle that started following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, after which
market participants expected a deterioration in the bilateral relation. The credit risk
compensation for Hungary increased after 2010, when the current populist government
came into power. Also, the term premium in Poland declined after the global financial
crisis as in other European countries in response to the unconventional monetary policies





































Figure 1.4. Decomposition of the 10-Year Nominal Yields of Emerging Markets















































































Expected Short Rate Term Premium Credit Risk Compensation
Notes: This figure plots the components of the 10-year nominal yields of emerging markets. The yields are decomposed into an average expected
future short-term interest rate (solid line), a term premium (dash-dotted line) and a credit risk compensation (dashed line).
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Expected Future Short Rate
Figure 1.5 shows that the 10-year expected future short rate agrees with the (inferred)
long-term forecasts for the short rate reasonably well, even though the model does not
rely too much on them given the conservative value of 75 basis points used for σs. When
σs is allowed to be estimated, its average value across all emerging markets is 31 basis
points. Yet the results are based on the conservative value as discussed in section 1.3.3.
Term Premium
While the (bond) risk premium is usually associated with the term premium in advanced
economies, the two concepts are different in emerging markets. The purpose of leveraging
on synthetic yields (and surveys) is to estimate a genuine term premium, clean of credit
risk. This subsection assesses the sensibility of this ‘clean’ term premium.
The survey-based term premium serves as a robustness check for the model-implied
term premium. It is a model-free measure that equals the difference between the syn-
thetic yield and the short rate forecast over the same horizon. Since the model-implied
expectations track the short rate forecasts closely (see figure 1.5), the two measures of
term premia comove positively, with a correlation of 0.52 across countries.
Wright (2011) documents a downward trend in the term premia of advanced economies
and argues that it owes in part to a reduction in inflation uncertainty. Since inflation in
emerging markets tends to be higher and more volatile than in advanced economies (Ha
et al., 2019), it is reasonable to assume that the relationship between the term premia and
inflation uncertainty is particularly relevant in emerging markets. To test this hypothesis,
I run the following panel regressions
τi,t = αi + β1σ
π
i,t + β2GDPi,t + ui,t, (1.17)
in which αi are country fixed effects, σ
π
i,t is a measure of inflation uncertainty, GDPi,t
is the domestic real GDP growth to control for the business cycle, and ui,t is the error
term. The dependent variable τi,t is the model-implied term premium at different ma-





































Figure 1.5. Long Horizon Forecasts vs Model-Implied 10-Year Expected Future Short Rate





















































































Notes: This figure plots the long-horizon forecast of the domestic short-term interest rate (asterisk) and the 10-year expected future short-term
interest rate implied by the model (solid line).
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deviation of the permanent component of inflation based on the Stock–Watson unob-
served components stochastic volatility (UCSV) model, estimated using quarterly data
for each country.36 To test for significance, I use the Driscoll–Kraay estimator that allows
the errors to be correlated across countries and over time.37
Table 1.3 shows that the response of the term premium to the standard deviation of
the permanent component is significant and increases with maturity. The result becomes
stronger after controlling for the business cycle. Even though the specification might
be subject to econometric problems since it involves persistent variables and ignores
measurement error, the results are aligned with the view that term premia compensate
investors for bearing inflation uncertainty also in emerging markets.
Finally, a term premium becomes negative when investors see bonds as hedges and are
therefore willing to give up some investment return. This phenomenon has been reported
for advanced economies before, especially after the global financial crisis. Figure 1.D.3 in
the appendix shows that negative term premia is not an advanced economy phenomenon.
In Asia, the demand for LC bonds has increased since 2011 due to strong macroeconomic
fundamentals (IMF-WB, 2020), which partly explains the negative term premia seen for
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Moreover, figure 1.D.3 in the appendix
also shows that some countries experience negative term premia only at the short end of
their yield curves, suggesting that investors in LC bonds have a particular preference for
short-term LC bonds, especially after the global financial crisis.38
Credit Risk Compensation
The role of the credit risk compensation in explaining yield variation is non-negligible (see
table 1.2), and thus it matters which curve is used (nominal or synthetic) for decomposing
the yields of emerging markets. Unlike the term premium, no clear trend is visible for
the credit risk compensation, nor a pattern is detected when looking across maturities.
36The UCSV model assumes that inflation has permanent and transitory components subject to un-
correlated shocks that vary over time.
37The Pesaran test of cross-sectional independence is rejected in all cases at the 1% significance level.
38Notice that in figure 1.D.3 term premia increase with maturity, indicating that long-term bonds are





































Table 1.3. Term Premia and Inflation Volatility
6 Months 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years
UCSV-Perm 79.8* 81.1* 78.8** 93.0** 84.4*** 105.2*** 98.3*** 128.7*** 118.3*** 159.3***
(30.3) (34.0) (23.2) (32.6) (20.2) (27.5) (18.1) (25.3) (18.4) (27.0)
GDP Growth -0.49 0.021 1.35 1.66 -0.11
(2.26) (2.64) (1.95) (1.41) (2.62)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lags 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
No. Countries 15 14 15 14 15 14 15 14 15 14
Observations 870 796 870 796 870 796 870 796 870 796
R2 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.18
Notes: This table reports the slope coefficients of panel data regressions of the model-implied term premia for different maturities on the standard devi-
ation of the permanent component of inflation according to the UCSV model (UCSV-Perm) and GDP growth. The sample includes quarterly data for
15 countries starting in 2000:I and ending in 2018:IV. The term premia is expressed in basis points. GDP growth is expressed in percent. Driscoll–Kraay
standard errors are in parenthesis; lag length up to which the residuals may be autocorrelated is indicated. *, **, *** asterisks respectively indicate sig-
nificance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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The dynamics are in line with the results reported by Du and Schreger (2016) who, in
particular, show that it is highly correlated with the CDS of the respective country.
Given that both the term premium and the credit risk compensation help explain yield
variation in emerging markets, a natural question is whether and how they are related.
However, while the term premium compensates investors for bearing the uncertainty that
interest rates might suddenly increase, the credit risk compensation actually rewards them
for two things. One is a compensation for the expected loss owing to default, whereas
the other compensates them for bearing the uncertainty that defaults might be larger
than expected. Attempting to isolate those two parts is beyond the scope of this paper.
Therefore, interpreting any potential correlation between the term premium and the
credit risk compensation is not straightforward. For several countries, the term premium
and the credit risk compensation are negatively correlated in the data as is the case
between the average expected future short rates and the credit risk compensation, which
suggests that the expected component of the credit risk compensation is empirically more
relevant.39 Intuitively, inflating away the debt would reduce the need to default. Galli
(2020) shows that inflation and default are indeed substitutes in models of debt dilution,
although he argues for a positive correlation between inflation and default.40
1.5 U.S. Monetary Policy Spillovers
This section applies the decomposition described in previous sections to analyze the
transmission channels of U.S. monetary policy to emerging market yields. It documents
a strong and persistent response of emerging market yields to U.S. monetary policy
surprises, and provides evidence of a yield curve channel for the U.S. monetary policy.
39One the one hand, the term premium and the uncertainty component of the credit risk compensation
are likely to move in the same direction. On the other hand, the average expected future short rates and
the expected component of the credit risk compensation are likely to move in opposite directions.
40Alternatively, market segmentation can also explain the negative correlation. For instance, if only
certain investors require to be compensated for bearing risks, synthetic yields could increase (potentially
due to a higher term premium) but not nominal yields, reducing the spread between the two.
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1.5.1 The Yield Curve Channel
Under the traditional Mundell-Fleming trilemma—the impossibility of combining free
capital flows, a fixed exchange rate and an independent monetary policy—a flexible ex-
change rate helps to insulate a financially-open economy from shocks abroad. Rey (2013)
argues that a flexible exchange rate does not fully offset those shocks because there
is a global financial cycle—mainly driven by U.S. monetary policy—operating through
channels other than the exchange rate, like the comovement of global asset prices and
cross-border bank lending. The cycle thus drives portfolio flows in or out of emerging
markets, influencing their domestic financial conditions.
The literature describes different mechanisms—that can be collectively referred to as
the yield curve channel—through which the global financial cycle in general and U.S.
monetary policy in particular influence the yields of emerging markets. Central banks in
those countries can independently exert control over the short end of their yield curves,
but are less powerful swaying the long end because long-term yields are more influenced
by global forces than short-term yields (Obstfeld, 2015). Therefore, the global financial
cycle has larger effects at the long end than at the short end of the yield curve, limiting the
effectiveness of domestic monetary policy to steer the economy since the entire yield curve
is relevant for the spending decisions of households and firms. In particular, monetary
policy decisions in advanced economies aimed at affecting long-term yields (particularly
the term premium), like forward guidance and quantitative easing, spill over to emerging
market yields via the term premium (Turner, 2014; Kolasa and Weso lowski, 2020),41 as
well as through the expected future short rate, particularly at the short end due to risk
spillovers (Kalemli-Özcan, 2019). Thus, emerging markets remain subject to global risks
even when borrowing in local currency (Carstens and Shin, 2019).
41Adrian et al. (2019) find that the correlation of the term premia in long-term yields has increased
after the global financial crisis. Turner (2014) argues that changes in the U.S. term premium spill over
into the term premia of emerging markets.
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Comovement of Yields
To assess whether different sections of the yield curves of emerging markets comove
more than others, I use one-year rolling correlations of daily yield changes for different
maturities.42 Figure 1.6 displays the results.
The long-term yields of emerging markets are indeed more connected than short-term
ones, although local factors remain relevant. Figure 1.6a shows that the long-term yields
of emerging markets became more connected after the global financial crisis, and more so
since the taper tantrum episode of 2013. For advanced economies, their long-term yields
have been more connected among themselves since the beginning of the sample period (see
figure 1.6b). On average, the correlation among the long-term yields of emerging markets
is less than half that of the yields of advanced economies, suggesting that local investors
are relevant holders of medium- and long-term bonds issued by emerging markets. Indeed,
even though the share of foreign investors in the LC bonds of emerging markets has
increased over time (from 10% in 2008 to 25% in 2019 according to Kolasa and Weso lowski
(2020)), the next section shows that local factors are still important drivers for the long
end of their yield curves.
Drivers of Yields
The yield curve channel requires one to distinguish between interest rates at different
maturities and calls attention to the role of the U.S. term premium. Here, I assess the
role of the components of U.S. yields (the average expected future short rate and the
term premium) in explaining emerging market yields and their components at different
maturities. In fact, the assessment of the yield curve channel would be limited without the
decomposition of U.S. and emerging market yields. For this purpose, I run the following
panel regressions








i,t + ui,t, (1.18)
42Appendix 1.B reports essentially the same patterns but using the connectedness index of Diebold
and Yilmaz (2014) rather than rolling correlations. It also compares the comovement of nominal and
synthetic yields, and analyzes the comovement among the components of emerging market yields.
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Figure 1.6. Comovement of Yield Curves: Rolling Correlations































Notes: This figure plots one-year rolling correlation coefficients of daily changes in the nominal
yields of emerging markets and advanced economies averaged across all country pairs for the
for 10-year (solid line), 5-year (dash-dotted line), 1-year (dashed line), and 3-month (dotted
line) maturities.
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in which αi are country fixed effects, z
1
i,t is a vector containing the components of the
U.S. yield curve, z2i,t is a vector of global and domestic variables that potentially drive
the yields, and ui,t is the error term. The dependent variables yi,t are the nominal yields
and their three components for the 10- and 2-year maturities.43 As before, I use Driscoll–
Kraay standard errors to test for significance.44
The explanatory variables of interest are the components of U.S. yields, which come
from the model of Kim and Wright (2005), who address the small sample problem us-
ing survey forecasts of future short rates. I control for the monetary stance and local
macroeconomic conditions using the policy rate reported by each country to the Bank
for International Settlements, as well as domestic inflation and unemployment rates. Rey
(2013) highlights the role of the Cboe Volatility Index (VIX) as an important driver of
the global financial cycle, which reflects the implied volatility in stock option prices and is
usually seen as a measure of risk aversion and economic uncertainty.45 Baker et al. (2016)
construct a news-based economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index that serves as the basis
for the global and U.S. versions,46 which are used as alternative, and arguably exoge-
nous, measures of global uncertainty. The index of global economic activity proposed
by Hamilton (2019) captures real variables. Finally, the exchange rate (LC per USD) is
included to rule out explanations of changes in yields based on currency movements; the
exchange rate is standardized for each country over the sample period.
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 report the results. The evidence is in line with the yield curve
channel.47 First, the response of the average expected future short rates of emerging
markets to the domestic policy rate decreases with maturity and is positively associated
with its U.S. counterpart only at the long end, both results are in line with the argument
43Kalemli-Özcan (2019) focuses on yields with maturities of 1 year or less. Here, I focus on the 2-year
yield because is a benchmark commonly used by market participants. The conclusions based on the 10-
and 2-year maturities carry on for the 5- and 1-year maturities, which are reported in appendix 1.C. The
1-year maturity is the shortest one for which the decomposition of U.S. yields used here is available.
44The Pesaran test of cross-sectional independence is rejected in all cases at the 1% significance level.
45Given the sudden spikes in the index, it is common to use it in logs. For consistency, the other
uncertainty indexes are also used in logs.
46Although the EPU index has been replicated for different countries, it is only available for five of
the emerging markets in the sample: Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Russia and South Korea.
47The tables report the estimates for the full specification of the model. The results are robust to
specifications of the model that progressively include the regressors for each dependent variable.
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that monetary autonomy is stronger at the short end than at the long end of the curve.
Second, the response of the term premia of emerging markets to the U.S. term premium
increases with maturity and is positively associated with the VIX only at the long end,
both results align with the claim that the U.S. term premium, and the global financial
cycle in general, is more relevant for the long end than for the short end of the curve.
Third, the U.S. term premium not only influences the yields in emerging markets through
its effect on their term premia but through the other components too. In particular, I
can directly test the hypothesis of Kalemli-Özcan (2019) regarding risk spillovers to the
short rate thanks to the yield decompositions. Risk spillovers to the average expected
future short rates of emerging markets indeed decrease with maturity and operate mainly
through the U.S. term premium than via the VIX. These conclusions would be different if
one fails to account for credit risk given that the term premium and credit risk components
would be mixed together.
A glimpse on the drivers of the yields of emerging markets is a byproduct of the
analysis on the yield curve channel. For instance, inflation and unemployment are key
domestic variables. In particular, the term premium and the credit risk compensation
are countercyclical, investors demand higher compensations during recessions, when the
unemployment rate increases. Moreover, the positive association between inflation and
the term premium conforms with the idea that inflation erodes the value of nominal
bonds and so, in periods of rising inflation investors expect the central bank to tighten
its monetary stance going forward, demanding a higher term premium. As expected for
measures of risk and uncertainty, shifts in the VIX are positively associated with the term
premium and credit risk compensation. Also, higher global economic uncertainty induces
a flight to quality, whereas higher U.S. economic uncertainty leads to a reduction in the
perceived credit quality.48 Lastly, there is evidence supporting the risk-taking channel
of exchange rates,49 according to which a currency appreciation is associated with easier
financial conditions (and compressed sovereign bond spreads) due to balance sheet effects.
48The coefficient for the EPU Global index in the expected short rate column is negative, while the
coefficient for the U.S. EPU index in the credit risk compensation column is positive.
49According to the standard trade-channel effect, an appreciation is contractionary because it discour-
ages exports and stimulates imports, reducing the trade balance.
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Table 1.4. Drivers of the Emerging Market 10-Year Nominal Yield and Its Components
Nominal E. Short Rate Term Premium Credit Risk
U.S. Term Premium 0.97*** 0.66*** 0.73*** -0.37***
(0.14) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10)
U.S. E. Short Rate 0.17 0.13* 0.21*** -0.21***
(0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Local Policy Rate 0.24*** 0.50*** -0.20*** -0.03*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Inflation 15.26*** -1.24 10.01*** 5.69***
(2.27) (2.70) (1.99) (1.48)
Unemployment 23.88*** -1.43 13.16*** 10.93***
(3.43) (2.74) (1.25) (2.11)
LC per USD (Std.) 41.58*** 45.82*** 9.60*** -10.02**
(5.74) (5.04) (2.25) (3.27)
Log(Vix) 49.95*** -28.79** 37.61*** 41.64***
(12.63) (10.24) (8.12) (8.96)
Log(EPU U.S.) 7.08 -4.34 0.22 10.64**
(5.58) (3.82) (2.93) (3.74)
Log(EPU Global) -61.04** -37.16** -21.37* -7.44
(20.51) (11.88) (8.89) (9.62)
Global Ind. Prod. 1.16 -0.09 0.71* 0.73
(1.13) (0.84) (0.36) (0.86)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lags 4 4 4 4
No. Countries 15 15 15 15
Observations 2194 2194 2194 2194
R2 0.68 0.72 0.48 0.24
Notes: This table reports the estimated slope coefficients of panel data regressions of the 10-year
nominal yield and its components (expected short rate, term premium and credit risk compensa-
tion) on selected explanatory variables. The sample includes monthly data for 15 emerging markets
starting in 2000:1 and ending in 2019:1. The dependent variables are expressed in basis points.
The explanatory variables are the U.S. term premium and the U.S. expected short rate according
to Kim and Wright (2005) with the same maturity as the dependent variables, the policy rate, do-
mestic inflation and unemployment, the standardized exchange rate (local currency per USD), the
log of the Vix, the log of the U.S. and global economic policy uncertainty indexes based on Baker
et al. (2016), the global economic activity index of Hamilton (2019). Driscoll–Kraay standard er-
rors in parenthesis; lag length up to which the residuals may be autocorrelated is indicated. *, **,
*** asterisks respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 1.5. Drivers of the Emerging Market 2-Year Nominal Yield and Its Components
Nominal E. Short Rate Term Premium Credit Risk
U.S. Term Premium 1.59*** 1.57*** 0.70*** -0.67***
(0.22) (0.22) (0.13) (0.19)
U.S. E. Short Rate -0.03 -0.05 0.08*** -0.08*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Local Policy Rate 0.64*** 0.72*** -0.03 -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Inflation 8.91*** -0.76 7.97*** 3.21
(2.25) (3.61) (2.16) (1.92)
Unemployment 9.39** -5.52 4.99** 9.20***
(2.91) (2.93) (1.54) (1.73)
LC per USD (Std.) 27.18*** 38.28*** 5.04 -8.47*
(4.84) (5.44) (2.92) (3.86)
Log(Vix) 46.41*** -28.91* 0.39 76.84***
(8.16) (12.45) (7.85) (10.79)
Log(EPU U.S.) 8.42* -2.56 -5.16 13.09***
(3.82) (5.04) (3.00) (3.74)
Log(EPU Global) -60.39*** -48.37*** -6.33 -4.15
(13.69) (12.20) (7.54) (9.71)
Global Ind. Prod. 2.61*** -0.72 -0.01 3.03***
(0.68) (0.88) (0.51) (0.67)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lags 4 4 4 4
No. Countries 15 15 15 15
Observations 2194 2194 2194 2194
R2 0.80 0.74 0.22 0.34
Notes: This table reports the estimated slope coefficients of panel data regressions of the 2-year
nominal yield and its components (expected short rate, term premium and credit risk compensa-
tion) on selected explanatory variables. The sample includes monthly data for 15 emerging markets
starting in 2000:1 and ending in 2019:1. The dependent variables are expressed in basis points.
The explanatory variables are the U.S. term premium and the U.S. expected short rate according
to Kim and Wright (2005) with the same maturity as the dependent variables, the policy rate, do-
mestic inflation and unemployment, the standardized exchange rate (local currency per USD), the
log of the Vix, the log of the U.S. and global economic policy uncertainty indexes based on Baker
et al. (2016), the global economic activity index of Hamilton (2019). Driscoll–Kraay standard er-
rors in parenthesis; lag length up to which the residuals may be autocorrelated is indicated. *, **,
*** asterisks respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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However, here it works through the expected future short rate and the term premium
rather than through the credit risk compensation as reported by Hofmann et al. (2019).
So far, the yield decompositions have been valuable to assess the validity of the yield
curve channel and understand the driving forces behind the sovereign yields of emerging
markets. Yet the specification in equation (1.18) may suffer from econometric problems
such as persistent variables, reverse causality and omitted variables. Moreover, the mea-
sures of comovement are unconditional, so not specifically driven by monetary policy
surprises.
1.5.2 Identification of Monetary Policy Surprises
Surprises in monetary policy decisions are identified using intraday data on asset prices
around Fed’s monetary policy announcements in order to capture changes in the infor-
mation set of market participants. Asset price changes are calculated from 15 minutes
before to 1 hour and 45 minutes after each Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
meeting since 2000 giving a total of 162 events.50 The surprises are set to zero in non-
announcement days. Neither minute releases nor speeches by Fed officials are included.
Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and Swanson (2018) show that monetary policy has more
than one dimension. Asset prices respond to different types of news about monetary
policy. Following Rogers et al. (2018), I consider three separate types of U.S. monetary
policy surprises, referred to hereinafter as target, forward guidance and asset purchase
surprises. Target surprises are equal to the change in the yield on the current- or next-
month federal funds futures contracts, as proposed by Kuttner (2001). Forward guidance
surprises are equal to the residual from regressing the yield change for the 8-quarters
ahead Eurodollar futures contract onto the target surprise.51 Asset purchase surprises
are equal to the residual from regressing the yield change in the 10-year Treasury futures
contract onto the target and forward guidance surprises. By construction, the three types
of surprises are uncorrelated. Positive values in any of the surprises represent a tightening
50Following Gürkaynak et al. (2005), I exclude the meeting of September 2001.
51The 4-quarters ahead Eurodollar futures contract could also be used, but intraday changes in that
contract were essentially zero after 2011 since market participants expected no change in the policy rate
for at least a year. Eurodollar futures contracts are bets on the future level of 3-month interest rates.
39
1.5. U.S. MONETARY POLICY SPILLOVERS
of the monetary policy stance, and vice versa.
The relevance of the surprises has varied over time. After 2008, there were no changes
in the current policy rate until December 2015, so target surprises were essentially zero
during that period. Meanwhile, asset purchase surprises are considered starting in Octo-
ber 2008 because their meaning is unclear before that date. Forward guidance surprises
have nevertheless been relevant before and after the global financial crisis. Table 1.C.3
in the appendix reports descriptive statistics for the three types of surprises. In general,
the Fed has been more aggressive in stimulating than in contracting the U.S. economy,
since easing surprises are larger on average and more common than tightening surprises.
1.5.3 The Effects on Emerging Market Yields
The transmission of U.S. monetary policy to the yields of emerging markets is assessed
using panel local projections for the daily changes in the yields.52 While event studies
report the response of the variables on the day of a surprise, local projections addi-
tionally provide the responses over subsequent periods. It is important to be able to
capture the persistence in the response of emerging market yields given the pervasive
post-announcement drift in the bond markets of advanced economies documented by
Brooks et al. (2019). In addition, I leverage on the yield decompositions at the daily
frequency to better understand the transmission of Fed’s decisions to the yields.
Specifically, I run the following panel local projections:





t + γh∆yi,t−1 + ηhsi,t−1 + ui,t+h, (1.19)
in which h indicates the horizon (in days) with h = 0, 1, . . . , 45 and each εjt represents one
of the three types of monetary policy surprises.53 The regressions include country fixed
effects αh,i, a lag of the dependent variable,
54 and a lag of the exchange rate si,t−1. The
52Jordà (2005) advocates the use of local projections as an alternative to VAR models in order to
generate impulse responses that are robust to misspecification. See Hofmann et al. (2019) and Adrian
et al. (2019) for recent applications of panel local projections.
53There is no need to control for past or future surprises since, by definition, they are unanticipated
by the market. On the other hand, even though the types of surprises are uncorrelated by construction,
the estimation is more efficient when all the surprises are included simultaneously.
54As argued by Hofmann et al. (2019), the large number of daily observations reduces the potential for
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regressions are ran for the 10- and 2-year nominal yields and each of their components.
The confidence bands are constructed using Driscoll–Kraay standard errors, which allow
for time and cross-sectional dependence.
The parameters of interest, βjh, measure the average response of the nominal yield (or
its components) to monetary policy surprise j at horizon h. The contemporaneous effects
(when h = 0) are indicated with an arrow in the figures below. All responses are assessed
relative to a one basis point reduction (an easing) in any of the surprises, since the Fed
has been more aggressive in that direction over the sample period.
The response of U.S. yields and their components to the three surprises serves as a
benchmark to assess the responses of the yields of emerging markets. As before, U.S.
yields come from the dataset of Gürkaynak et al. (2007), and the components come from
the decomposition proposed by Kim and Wright (2005). The responses are reported in
figures 1.D.4 to 1.D.7 in the appendix. They are consistent with the findings in the
existing literature. For instance, target easing surprises reduce yields, mainly driven by
a decline in the average expected future short rates; while forward guidance and asset
purchase easing surprises decrease yields, in part due to a reduction in the term premium.
Target Surprises
Figure 1.7 shows the response of emerging market yields to a target easing surprise.
Although the magnitude of the contemporaneous yield response is lower than in the U.S.,
it builds over time. This delayed response is documented by Brooks et al. (2019) for the
U.S. and by Adrian et al. (2019) for a sample comprised mostly of advanced economies,55
which they attribute to a portfolio rebalancing channel. Moreover, the reaction to forward
guidance and asset purchase surprises is also sluggish, as discussed later. Therefore, slow-
moving capital is also present in the bonds of emerging markets.56
Nickell bias that arises by including a lagged dependent variable in panel regressions with fixed effects
and small time dimensions. Indeed, the impulse responses reported here are essentially the same when
the lag of the dependent variable is excluded.
55It is also seen in the responses of U.S. yields reported in appendix D. Although the U.S. Treasuries
market is deep and liquid, some players like pension funds and foreign investors might respond gradually.
56Figure 1.D.10 in the appendix shows that the delayed responses are not driven by the response of









































































































Notes: This figure shows the response following Jordà (2005) of the 10- and 2-year emerging market nominal yields and their components to a target easing
surprise of 1 basis point. Nominal yields are decomposed into an expected future short-term interest rate, a term premium and credit risk compensation, see
section 1.4 for details. Target surprises are identified using intraday data around Fed’s monetary policy announcements, see section 1.5.2 for details. An arrow






































































































Notes: This figure shows the response following Jordà (2005) of the 10- and 2-year emerging market nominal yields and their components to a forward guidance
easing surprise of 1 basis point. Nominal yields are decomposed into an expected future short-term interest rate, a term premium and credit risk compensation,
see section 1.4 for details. Forward guidance surprises are identified using intraday data around Fed’s monetary policy announcements, see section 1.5.2 for















































































































Notes: This figure shows the response following Jordà (2005) of the 10- and 2-year emerging market nominal yields and their components to a forward guidance
easing surprise of 1 basis point. Nominal yields are decomposed into an expected future short-term interest rate, a term premium and credit risk compensation,
see section 1.4 for details. Forward guidance surprises are identified using intraday data around Fed’s monetary policy announcements, see section 1.5.2 for














































































































Notes: This figure shows the response following Jordà (2005) of the 10- and 2-year emerging market nominal yields and their components to an asset purchase
easing surprise of 1 basis point. Nominal yields are decomposed into an expected future short-term interest rate, a term premium and credit risk compensation,
see section 1.4 for details. Asset purchase surprises are identified using intraday data around Fed’s monetary policy announcements, see section 1.5.2 for details.
An arrow indicates the contemporaneous (h = 0) effect. The 90% confidence bands are based on Driscoll–Kraay standard errors.
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Looking at the effects of a target easing surprise on the yield components in figure 1.7,
investors expect central banks in emerging markets to follow the monetary stance of the
Fed as can be seen in the decline of the expected future short rate, particularly at the short
end; in fact, most of the effect is reflected on that component. Note that there is no effect
on the credit risk compensation at the short end and there is essentially no effect on the
term premia. However, the credit risk compensation at the long end increases one month
after the surprise. Mechanically, both the nominal and synthetic yield curves steepen
(since short rates decline) but in a way that the long end of the synthetic yield curve
declines by more than the nominal one, and so borrowing (long-term) synthetically in LC
becomes cheaper; equivalently, the opportunity cost of lending (long-term) directly in LC
increases. As a result, the nominal-synthetic spread at the long end rises (by almost one-
to-one) in the month following the surprise. Intuitively, loose financial conditions abroad
trigger a ‘reach for yield’ behavior among investors (Hausman and Wongswan, 2011)
that can incentivize more borrowing in emerging markets by sovereigns in local currency
(Bigio et al., 2018) and by corporates in foreign currency57. In either case, the price of
default risk (not necessarily the risk itself) increases. This effect can be seen as a fiscal
implication in emerging markets of Fed’s monetary policies. Credit risk compensation
is thus an important factor to understand the transmission of U.S. monetary policy to
emerging market yields.
In sum, economically significant spillovers from target easing surprises build over
time reducing the expected future short rate and increasing the long term credit risk
compensation of emerging markets, so U.S. monetary policy spillovers do not need to
involve the term premium. So far, the potential fiscal implications for emerging markets
of Fed’s monetary policies have not been discussed in the literature.
Forward Guidance Surprises
Since U.S. monetary policy spillovers to long-term yields increased after the global fi-
nancial crisis (Albagli et al., 2019), figures 1.8 and 1.9 display the responses of emerging
57Du and Schreger (2017) show that higher reliance on foreign currency borrowing by corporates
increases sovereign default risk in emerging markets.
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market yields to a forward guidance easing surprise before and after October 2008, re-
spectively.
Before the global financial crisis, a forward guidance easing surprise led to a downward
parallel shift in the yield curves of emerging markets in the month following the surprise.
The effect on emerging market yields lasted longer than on U.S. yields, and was generally
driven by a decline in all three components; at the long end, it was especially through a
decline in the expected short rate and the term premium. In this sense, investors expected
central banks in emerging markets to follow the Fed’s monetary stance.
After the global financial crisis, the transmission of forward guidance easing surprises
changed. The decline in the nominal yields of emerging markets at the long end lasts less
than in long-term U.S. yields. Therefore, the nominal yield curve in emerging markets
steepens relative to the U.S. yield curve in the month following the surprise, so the
nominal-synthetic spread in emerging market yields widens at the long end. The intuition
is similar to the one for target surprises above. A loose future path of the U.S. policy rate
trigger a ‘reach for yield’ behavior among investors and might incentivize more borrwing
in emerging markets by sovereigns in local currency and/or by corporates in foreign
currency, which increases the price of default risk.
Moreover, the response of the term premia at the long end is similar in emerging
markets than in the U.S. By making announcements about the future path of the federal
funds rate, the Fed attempts to reduce long-term U.S. yields mainly by reducing the term
premium (see figure 1.D.6). Figure 1.9 shows that those announcements also reduce the
term premia in emerging market yields at the long end. This is where accounting for
credit risk pays off because if it were to be ignored, one would incorrectly conclude that
forward guidance does not affect the term premia in emerging markets. The reason is
that the ‘clean’ term premium and the credit risk compensation components respond in
opposite directions with magnitudes that almost offset each other, so there is no net effect
in the term premium contaminated with credit risk.
In relation to the yield curve channel, a forward guidance easing surprise not only
reduces the term premia at the long end but also the expectation for the policy rate at
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the short end, which supports the risk spillovers mechanism in Kalemli-Özcan (2019).
Asset Purchase Surprises
Figure 1.10 shows that an asset purchase easing surprise flattens the yield curve in emerg-
ing markets, similar to the effect on the U.S. yield curve (see figure 1.D.7). In both cases,
the effect at the long end is larger than at the short end. The on-impact response of U.S.
yields is larger, whereas the response of the nominal yields of emerging markets lasts
longer. These two effects in turn explain the response of the credit risk compensation at
the long end, which initially increases followed by a sluggish and considerable decline. The
counterintuitive initial increase is more a reflection of the response in the U.S. Treasuries
market than on the bond markets in emerging economies. Indeed, an asset purchase eas-
ing surprise triggers a strong investor reaction in the U.S. Treasuries market, leading to
a more than one-to-one on-impact decline in the long-term U.S. yield (see figure 1.D.7a).
The eventual decline in the credit risk compensation as well as the reduction in the term
premium reflect a relaxation of global financial conditions, so investors are more willing
to buy the long-term debt of emerging markets.
In terms of the yield curve channel, an asset purchase easing surprise reduces the
term premia at the long end and the expectation for the policy rate at the short end,
similar to the effect of a forward guidance easing surprise after 2008. These results show
up in figures 1.9 and 1.10 but not in figures 1.7 and 1.8, so the yield curve channel is a
relatively recent phenomenon that coincides with the implementation of unconventional
monetary policies by the Fed after the global financial crisis. Those policies transmit to
emerging market yields through their different components, thus limiting the influence
central banks in emerging markets can exert over their domestic yield curves.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper decomposes the sovereign yields of 15 emerging markets taking into account
the credit risk embedded in them, and empirically quantifies the transmission channels
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of U.S. monetary policy to them. Emerging market nominal yields are decomposed into
average expected future short rates, a term premium and compensation for credit risk.
The responses to target, forward guidance and asset purchase surprises are sluggish
but amplify over time. In addition, surprises in Fed’s policy decisions lead to a reassess-
ment of policy rate expectations and a repricing of interest rate risk as well as of credit
risk in emerging markets. The effect on credit risk has not been explored before and it is
a prospective area for future research. Lastly, since the global financial crisis, U.S. mon-
etary policy has spilled over to emerging markets through a yield curve channel, which
limits their monetary autonomy along their yield curves. The results in this paper show
that, in order to adequately characterize the transmission channels of U.S. monetary
policy, it is important to explicitly account for credit risk in the local currency debt of
emerging markets and to examine the effects at different maturities.
The results presented here can be extended in several directions. The proposed three-
part decomposition of emerging market yields has many applications, such as analyzing
the transmission of monetary policy domestically and further decomposing each part (e.g.
average expected short rates can be split into inflation and real interest rate expectations).
The results might also inform theoretical models for pricing sovereign defaultable bonds.
Finally, surprises from other central banks in advanced economies can be included in the
analysis of monetary policy spillovers.
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Appendix 1.A A Proxy for Long-Term Inflation
Forecasts
An advantage of the small open economy approach to infer long-term forecasts for the
short rate is that, for emerging markets, it only requires data on inflation forecasts, or
a proxy in the case of countries with no long-term forecasts available as is the case for
Israel and South Africa.
Inflation expectations are hoped to match measures of inflation that exclude unex-
pected shocks and better reflect the inflation environment. Different measures of core
inflation exist. I use the inflation trend obtained by applying the Hodrick–Prescott filter
to the series of realized inflation of each country.
There are two main concerns for using this approach. Namely, the filter is sensitive
to the sample period used and the resulting trend can be outside of the target inflation
band due to the innate dynamics of the series, which would be at odds with survey data
(see figure 1.1). In the case of Israel and South Africa, however, there is no marked
upward or downward trend in their inflation during the sample period. Therefore, for
both countries, trend inflation is calculated for the whole period for which survey data is
available for the rest of the countries in the sample, and as long as the resulting trend is
within the respective inflation target band.
Figure 1.A.1 shows the realized and trend inflation for Israel and South Africa along
with those of Malaysia and Thailand, two countries with a similar pattern for inflation
(i.e. no marked upward or downward trend) and for which survey data is available. The
figure shows that trend inflation seems to be a good proxy for the long-term inflation
forecasts in Malaysia and Thailand. Also, as can be seen in the main text (figure 1.1),
5-year and long-term inflation forecasts follow each other closely, therefore trend inflation
is used as the proxy for both the 5-year and the long-term inflation forecasts in the case





































Figure 1.A.1. Inflation Trend and Long-Horizon Forecast for Inflation




























Notes: This figure plots consumer price inflation (solid line), inflation trend based on the Hodrick–Prescott filter (dash-dotted line) and long-term
inflation forecast (dashed line). The figure also includes the upper and lower bounds for the domestic inflation target. The upper and lower
bounds are the most recent ones for each country.
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Appendix 1.B Connectedness of Yields
An alternative approach to rolling correlations for assessing the comovement of yields
is the connectedness index of Diebold and Yilmaz (2014). The index assesses shares of
forecast error variation in a country’s bond market due to shocks arising elsewhere.58
Higher numbers (between 0 and 100%) indicate a higher degree of comovement. Figure
1.B.1 exhibits the same patterns as those reported in figure 1.6 using rolling correlations.
Figure 1.B.2a compares the index for the nominal and synthetic yields of emerging
markets with the nominal yields of advanced economies. The relatively low connectedness
among the yields of emerging markets supports estimating the term structure models for
their yield curves separately rather than jointly. More generally, the evidence of highly
connected yields in advanced economies and low connected yields in emerging markets
is consistent with global bond markets operating under a core-periphery structure, in
which the bond markets of advanced economies constitute the (highly interconnected)
core and those of emerging markets represent the (less connected) periphery who are
in turn connected to the network mainly through countries in the core.59 According to
this view, shocks to emerging market yields are mainly idiosyncratic—reflected in less
comovement among themselves—so what matters for them are not spillovers originating
in other emerging markets but in advanced economies.
Figure 1.B.2b shows the connectedness index for the components of emerging market
yields. From all three components of emerging market yields, the term premium has been
slightly more connected since the taper tantrum in 2013 with the expected future short
rate becoming more connected towards the end of the sample.60 Meanwhile, the credit
risk compensation has been essentially the least connected component. Figure 1.B.2a
shows that the level of the index for synthetic yields tends to be higher than that for
nominal yields, which supports that the credit risk component is more idiosyncratic.
58Following Adrian et al. (2019) and Bostanci and Yilmaz (2020), I compute the index using a VAR(1),
with a forecast horizon of 10 days and a rolling window of 150 days for the daily changes of yields.
59The core-periphery structure has been shown to be a good description of different networks in
economics and finance. Craig and von Peter (2014), for example, show that the interbank market
operates under such a structure.
60Adrian et al. (2019) show that the increase in the connectedness among the yields of advanced
economies has been driven by an increase in the connectedness of their term premia.
52
1.B. CONNECTEDNESS OF YIELDS
Figure 1.B.1. Comovement of Yield Curves: Connectedness Index































Notes: This figure plots the connectedness index of Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) for the nominal
yields of emerging markets and advanced economies for different maturities: 10 years (solid
line), 5 years (dash-dotted line), 1 year (dashed line), and 3 months (dotted line). The index
is obtained using a vector autoregression of order 1, with a forecast horizon of 10 days and a
rolling window of 150 days for the daily changes of the nominal yields at each maturity.
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Figure 1.B.2. Connectedness of 10-Year Yields and Components









Emerging Markets - Nominal
Emerging Markets - Synthetic
Advanced Countries - Nominal
(a) Nominal and Synthetic Yields











(b) Nominal Yield Components
Notes: This figure plots the connectedness index of Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) for 10-year
yields. Panel (a) compares the connectedness index of nominal (solid line) and synthetic
(dash-dotted line) yields of emerging markets and the nominal (dashed line) yields of advanced
economies. Panel (b) compares the connectedness index of each component of the nominal
yields of emerging markets: the expected future short rate (solid line), the term premium
(dash-dotted line) and the credit risk compensation (dashed line). The index is obtained
using a vector autoregression of order 1, with a forecast horizon of 10 days and a rolling
window of 150 days for the daily changes of the 10-year yields and their components. The
index for some components has a shorter history because its computation requires a balanced
panel and the components do not start on the same date (e.g. the construction of the synthetic
curves does not involve nominal yields).
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Appendix 1.C Supplementary Tables
Table 1.C.1. Drivers of the Emerging Market 5-Year Nominal Yield and Its Components
Nominal E. Short Rate Term Premium Credit Risk
U.S. Term Premium 1.27*** 1.03*** 0.77*** -0.53***
(0.17) (0.13) (0.06) (0.13)
U.S. E. Short Rate 0.04 0.03 0.11** -0.12***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Local Policy Rate 0.41*** 0.60*** -0.15*** -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Inflation 12.34*** -0.93 8.69*** 4.41**
(2.33) (3.20) (1.93) (1.61)
Unemployment 18.56*** -3.62 10.57*** 11.10***
(3.11) (2.81) (1.28) (2.05)
LC per USD (Std.) 33.70*** 40.88*** 4.06 -8.17*
(5.28) (5.06) (2.52) (3.28)
Log(Vix) 57.66*** -29.44* 25.78*** 61.95***
(9.95) (11.34) (7.19) (9.69)
Log(EPU U.S.) 8.97 -3.58 -0.13 10.86**
(4.88) (4.27) (2.92) (3.58)
Log(EPU Global) -66.11*** -40.05*** -19.45* -8.35
(16.52) (11.80) (8.06) (9.52)
Global Ind. Prod. 2.32** -0.41 0.90* 1.86*
(0.84) (0.83) (0.38) (0.75)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lags 4 4 4 4
No. Countries 15 15 15 15
Observations 2194 2194 2194 2194
R2 0.74 0.73 0.37 0.30
Notes: This table reports the estimated slope coefficients of panel data regressions of the 5-year
nominal yield and its components (expected short rate, term premium and credit risk compensa-
tion) on selected explanatory variables. The sample includes monthly data for 15 emerging markets
starting in 2000:1 and ending in 2019:1. The dependent variables are expressed in basis points.
The explanatory variables are the U.S. term premium and the U.S. expected short rate according
to Kim and Wright (2005) with the same maturity as the dependent variables, the policy rate, do-
mestic inflation and unemployment, the standardized exchange rate (local currency per USD), the
log of the Vix, the log of the U.S. and global economic policy uncertainty indexes based on Baker
et al. (2016), the global economic activity index of Hamilton (2019). Driscoll–Kraay standard er-
rors in parenthesis; lag length up to which the residuals may be autocorrelated is indicated. *, **,
*** asterisks respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 1.C.2. Drivers of the Emerging Market 1-Year Nominal Yield and Its Components
Nominal E. Short Rate Term Premium Credit Risk
U.S. Term Premium 1.87*** 2.06*** 0.54** -0.73*
(0.38) (0.41) (0.20) (0.31)
U.S. E. Short Rate -0.01 -0.04 0.07*** -0.07*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Local Policy Rate 0.73*** 0.80*** 0.02 -0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Inflation 7.48** -0.92 7.75*** 3.83*
(2.30) (3.78) (2.20) (1.67)
Unemployment 4.98 -6.51* 1.47 8.29***
(2.81) (3.03) (1.75) (1.42)
LC per USD (Std.) 28.41*** 38.98*** 7.24* -7.46
(4.61) (5.64) (3.20) (4.08)
Log(Vix) 33.84*** -29.80* -8.86 80.67***
(7.50) (12.81) (7.83) (11.03)
Log(EPU U.S.) 4.71 -3.02 -8.54** 12.41**
(3.36) (5.84) (2.69) (3.99)
Log(EPU Global) -50.90*** -47.85*** 3.45 -5.26
(12.55) (12.57) (7.40) (9.52)
Global Ind. Prod. 2.28** -1.21 -1.10* 3.47***
(0.77) (1.00) (0.53) (0.63)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lags 4 4 4 4
No. Countries 15 15 15 15
Observations 2194 2194 2194 2194
R2 0.82 0.74 0.20 0.31
Notes: This table reports the estimated slope coefficients of panel data regressions of the 1-year
nominal yield and its components (expected short rate, term premium and credit risk compensa-
tion) on selected explanatory variables. The sample includes monthly data for 15 emerging markets
starting in 2000:1 and ending in 2019:1. The dependent variables are expressed in basis points.
The explanatory variables are the U.S. term premium and the U.S. expected short rate according
to Kim and Wright (2005) with the same maturity as the dependent variables, the policy rate, do-
mestic inflation and unemployment, the standardized exchange rate (local currency per USD), the
log of the Vix, the log of the U.S. and global economic policy uncertainty indexes based on Baker
et al. (2016), the global economic activity index of Hamilton (2019). Driscoll–Kraay standard er-
rors in parenthesis; lag length up to which the residuals may be autocorrelated is indicated. *, **,
*** asterisks respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Target Surprises (abs. values) 2.6 6.7 0.0 46.5 162
Target Surprises > 0 3.8 3.9 0.0 14.4 33
Target Surprises < 0 -6.2 11.0 -46.5 -0.3 47
Forward Guidance Surprises (abs. values) 6.0 6.5 0.0 54.6 162
Forward Guidance Surprises > 0 5.4 4.9 0.0 24.9 89
Forward Guidance Surprises < 0 -6.7 8.0 -54.6 -0.0 73
Asset Purchase Surprises (abs. values) 2.2 3.5 0.1 29.9 86
Asset Purchase Surprises > 0 1.9 2.2 0.1 10.3 41
Asset Purchase Surprises < 0 -2.5 4.4 -29.9 -0.1 45
Notes: This table reports the average, the standard deviation, the minimum and the maximum
values on monetary policy announcement days for the target, forward guidance and asset purchase
surprises, see section 1.5.2 for details. Target surprises are zero between January 2009 to Novem-
ber 2015. Forward guidance surprises span the whole sample period from January 2000 to January
2019. Asset purchase surprises are considered from October 2008 onwards.























Figure 1.D.1. The 10-Year Term Premium of Emerging Markets
















































































Term Premium Confidence Bands
Notes: This figure plots the model-implied 10-year term premium (solid line) along with 2-standard-error confidence intervals (dashed lines).
The standard errors are estimated using the delta method. The covariance matrix is estimated using the sample Hessian estimator calculated























Figure 1.D.2. The 10-Year Credit Risk Compensation of Emerging Markets


















































































Credit Risk Compensation Confidence Bands
Notes: This figure plots the model-implied 10-year credit risk compensation (solid line) along with 2-standard-error confidence intervals (dashed
lines). The standard errors are estimated using the delta method. The covariance matrix is estimated using the sample Hessian estimator























Figure 1.D.3. Term Structure of Term Premia
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Notes: This figure shows the response following Jordà (2005) of the 10- and 2-year U.S. yields and their components to a target easing surprise of 1 basis point.
U.S. yields are zero-coupon yields from Gürkaynak et al. (2007), and are decomposed into an expected future short-term interest rate and a term premium
following Kim and Wright (2005). Target surprises are identified using intraday data around Fed’s monetary policy announcements, see section 1.5.2 for details.



























































































Notes: This figure shows the response following Jordà (2005) of the 10- and 2-year U.S. yields and their components to a forward guidance easing surprise of 1
basis point. U.S. yields are zero-coupon yields from Gürkaynak et al. (2007), and are decomposed into an expected future short-term interest rate and a term
premium following Kim and Wright (2005). Forward guidance surprises are identified using intraday data around Fed’s monetary policy announcements, see
























































































Notes: This figure shows the response following Jordà (2005) of the 10- and 2-year U.S. yields and their components to a forward guidance easing surprise of 1
basis point. U.S. yields are zero-coupon yields from Gürkaynak et al. (2007), and are decomposed into an expected future short-term interest rate and a term
premium following Kim and Wright (2005). Forward guidance surprises are identified using intraday data around Fed’s monetary policy announcements, see

















































































Notes: This figure shows the response following Jordà (2005) of the 10- and 2-year U.S. yields and their components to an asset purchase easing surprise of 1
basis point. U.S. yields are zero-coupon yields from Gürkaynak et al. (2007), and are decomposed into an expected future short-term interest rate and a term
premium following Kim and Wright (2005). Asset purchase surprises are identified using intraday data around Fed’s monetary policy announcements, see section





















































































Notes: This figure shows the response following Jordà (2005) of the 10- and 2-year U.S. yields and their components to a forward guidance easing surprise of 1
basis point. U.S. yields are zero-coupon yields from Gürkaynak et al. (2007), and are decomposed into an expected future short-term interest rate and a term
premium following Kim and Wright (2005). Forward guidance surprises are identified using intraday data around Fed’s monetary policy announcements, see
































































































Notes: This figure shows the response following Jordà (2005) of the 10- and 2-year emerging market nominal yields and their components to a forward guidance
easing surprise of 1 basis point. Nominal yields are decomposed into an expected future short-term interest rate, a term premium and credit risk compensation,
see section 1.4 for details. Forward guidance surprises are identified using intraday data around Fed’s monetary policy announcements, see section 1.5.2 for
details. An arrow indicates the contemporaneous (h = 0) effect. The 90% confidence bands are based on Driscoll–Kraay standard errors.
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(c) Asset Purchase Surprise: 2009-2019
Notes: This figure shows the response following Jordà (2005) of the 10- and 2-year foreign exchange
forward premium of emerging markets to easing surprises in U.S. monetary policy of 1 basis point.
The forward premium is calculated using cross-currency swaps, which are in turn constructed using
cross-currency basis swaps and interest rate swaps, see section 1.2.1 for details. The target, forward
guidance and asset purchase surprises are identified using intraday data around Fed’s monetary policy
announcements, see section 1.5.2 for details. An arrow indicates the contemporaneous (h = 0) effect.
The 90% confidence bands are based on Driscoll–Kraay standard errors.
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Chapter 2
Does the Exchange Rate Respond to
Monetary Policy in Emerging
Markets? Evidence from Mexico
This paper quantifies the effects of monetary policy on the exchange rate and bond yields
in Mexico and solves the ‘high-frequency’ exchange rate puzzle in emerging markets.
2.1 Introduction
The exchange rate response to monetary policy in emerging markets has so far been an
unsolved puzzle. Standard open economy models suggest that an increase in the policy
rate leads to an immediate appreciation of the currency (Dornbusch, 1976). Contrary to
this prediction, earlier evidence for advanced economies (Grilli and Roubini, 1995), and
recently for emerging markets (Kim and Lim, 2016), found that contractionary mone-
tary policy leads to a currency depreciation, commonly referred to as the exchange rate
puzzle. These results, however, can be attributed to the assumptions made to identify
the monetary policy surprises (Zettelmeyer, 2004); for instance, monetary policy actions
could in fact be reacting to changes in the exchange rate. Using more robust identi-
fication methods, subsequent studies for advanced economies report that a policy rate
hike indeed leads to an appreciation of the currency (Kearns and Manners, 2006; Faust
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et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the same methods applied to emerging markets show that the
currency response to monetary policy is low or nonexistent (Aktaş et al., 2009; Duran
et al., 2012; Kohlscheen, 2014; Pennings et al., 2015), leading to a stronger version of the
puzzle (Kohlscheen, 2014).
The exchange rate puzzle in emerging markets raises the question of whether their
central banks can actually exert an influence on their own currencies. This question is
particularly relevant for three reasons. First, the transmission of monetary policy via the
exchange rate is vital for open economies. Second, the sensitivity of the currencies in
advanced economies to monetary policy increased since the global financial crisis (Ferrari
et al., 2017), even in countries who continued to use conventional tools—like Australia and
Canada—and so it would be striking if emerging market currencies remained insensitive
to monetary policy. Third, the currencies of emerging markets do respond to foreign
monetary policy surprises (Hausman and Wongswan, 2011; Kearns et al., 2018).
This paper studies whether and how the exchange rate responds to monetary policy
in a representative emerging economy, and compares the results with the response of the
yield curve. This requires one to consider small open economies with relatively liquid
financial assets, a market-based exchange rate, and a credible inflation targeting regime
(Kearns and Manners, 2006; Pennings et al., 2015). Mexico meets all these criteria. I
use an event study methodology and a new dataset of intraday and daily changes in
asset prices bracketing monetary policy announcements in Mexico from 2011 to 2019. In
particular, changes in swap rates are used to systematically measure surprises in the policy
rate, independent of any model.1 By now, event studies with high-frequency data are
a well-established strategy in macro-finance to overcome endogeneity concerns because
they isolate the surprise component of policy decisions (Gürkaynak and Wright, 2013;
Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018).2 Nevertheless, they have rarely been applied to study
the monetary policy transmission to asset prices in Mexico.3
1The traditional approach to identify monetary policy surprises is to estimate a vector autoregression
model using a recursive assumption, see Christiano et al. (1999). The exchange rate puzzle is a well-
known feature of this approach, which Zettelmeyer (2004) attributes to a problem of reverse causality.
2It is reasonable to assume that surprises in monetary policy decisions on announcement days are
exogenous and so one can give a causal interpretation from policy decisions to asset price responses.
3For the Mexican case, the event study methodology has been applied to analyze the effects of foreign
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This paper documents significant responses of the exchange rate and the yield curve
to policy rate surprises in Mexico. First, an unanticipated increase in the policy rate
appreciates the currency; specifically, a 25 basis point increase in the rate leads to an
appreciation of close to 50 basis points. This provides evidence against the exchange
rate puzzle in emerging markets and thus shows that their currencies are no different
to those in advanced economies in terms of their responsiveness to the domestic policy
rate. Second, a contractionary monetary policy raises bond yields in a way that flattens
the yield curve, also in line with the evidence for advanced economies. Moreover, policy
rate surprises have a larger influence on the yield curve in Mexico than U.S. policy rate
surprises have on the U.S. yield curve, potentially reflecting a relatively higher degree of
long-term inflation uncertainty in Mexico.
The main contribution of the paper is to solve the exchange rate puzzle in emerging
markets. Kohlscheen (2014) shows that the currencies of emerging markets do not respond
to monetary policy using daily event studies and refers to it as the ‘high-frequency’
exchange rate puzzle. In contrast, the literature shows that the currencies of advanced
economies react to monetary policy even using daily data, although the precision decreases
relative to intraday data (Wright, 2012; Ferrari et al., 2017). I exploit the availability of
two lengths for the event window (intraday and daily) in a validation study (Bound et al.,
1994) to understand the puzzle.4 The analysis reveals that the exchange rate response
is sensitive to data frequency as it can only be perceived using intraday data. This
sensitivity, however, is characteristic of the exchange rate since the effect of the policy
rate on the yield curve can still be observed with daily data. The puzzle is thus the result
of wide event windows when measuring the changes in the exchange rate, giving rise to
a standard omitted variable bias. Intuitively, a lot of factors other than monetary policy
decisions affect the exchange rate that even a daily frequency is not enough to prevent
monetary policy on asset prices (Borensztein et al., 2001; Rosa, 2011a; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011;
Kearns et al., 2018) and portfolio flows (Hernandez Vega, 2018), whereas De Pooter et al. (2014) use
it to study whether inflation expectations are well-anchored. The only exception is Kohlscheen (2014),
who studies the exchange rate response to monetary policy as in this paper, but he does not use intraday
data nor swaps to measure surprises in the policy rate.
4To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper studying the effects of monetary policy in
emerging markets that highlights the differences between intraday and daily changes in asset prices.
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their influence. Using intraday data—at least for the exchange rate—avoids this problem.
An early interpretation of the exchange rate puzzle is that some countries—
particularly emerging markets—have a preference for smooth currency fluctuations or,
equivalently, that they fear large currency swings (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). This ‘fear
of floating’ would make the central bank adjust its policies—including changes in the pol-
icy rate and foreign exchange interventions—so as to keep the currency from experiencing
large swings. This, however, is unrelated to the question of whether an unanticipated
change in the policy rate affects the currency. In fact, by focusing on the effects of policy
rate surprises, this paper is neutral on how monetary policy expectations are determined.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes how policy rate surprises are
measured, and section 2.3 discusses their effects on the exchange rate and the yield
curve. Section 2.4 addresses the high-frequency exchange rate puzzle. The last section
concludes.
2.2 Identification of Policy Rate Surprises
This section briefly reviews the institutional developments in Mexico that are relevant
for the identification of policy rate surprises. It then describes how to measure them.
2.2.1 Monetary Policy in Mexico
The Bank of Mexico, also known as Banxico, is an independent central bank that im-
plements monetary policy through a five-member Governing Board. The governor of
Banxico is the chair of the Board, the other four members are deputy governors.
Analyses of the policy rate with daily data can arguably start in 2004 based on the
following. When Banxico was granted autonomy in 1994, inflation was 7%. Less than
a year later, the Mexican peso crisis started (in December 1994). As a result, inflation
peaked at 52% and a floating exchange rate system was adopted (Carstens and Werner,
1999). During 1999, inflation decreased from 19 to 12%, and Banxico announced that
inflation should decrease to 3% by the end of 2003. In line with this goal, inflation
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targeting was formally adopted in 2001 and one year later, the official target for inflation
was set at 3% with respective upper and lower bounds of 4 and 2%. Since 2003, Banxico
follows a calendar of monetary policy meetings which is publicly announced ahead of time.
The transition period for the adoption of Banxico’s current monetary policy instrument,
the overnight interbank interest rate, started in 2004 and concluded in 2008.5
After the adoption of the overnight policy rate, two major institutional changes were
made. First, although monetary policy statements have accompanied every policy deci-
sion since 2000, Banxico started releasing minutes of its monetary policy meetings two
weeks after the date of the respective policy decision in 2011. Second, the timing of the
announcements was modified in 2015. Up until 2014, the announcements were made at
9 a.m. local time on the scheduled day, usually Fridays. Since 2015, announcements are
now made at 1 p.m. local time on the scheduled day, usually Thursdays.6
The regularity and scheduled timing of these announcements allow me to study the
effects of policy decisions on asset prices using an event study methodology. Appendix
2.A contains a list of the dates and times of Banxico’s monetary policy announcements
since 2004, along with relevant macroeconomic data from Mexico and the U.S. released
on the same days. From 2004 to 2019, there were 155 regularly scheduled monetary policy
announcements, and 72 between 2011 and 2019.7 On average, Banxico’s Governing Board
met monthly between 2004 and 2010, and every six weeks since 2011.
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of the policy rate along with the changes in the rate
since it was adopted. After the global financial crisis intensified, Banxico cut its policy
rate by 3.75% in 7 months. More stimulus started in March 2013 via an unanticipated
50 basis point reduction in the rate.8 Since then, the first increase in the rate occurred in
December 2015, a day after the first hike in the U.S. policy rate since the Great Recession.
The tightening cycle intensified in the second half of 2016 due to inflation concerns linked
5Before 2008, Banxico used a quantitative target, ‘el corto’, which indirectly influenced interest rates.
Sidaoui and Ramos-Francia (2008) review the transmission of monetary policy in Mexico since the 1994-
95 currency crisis until the adoption of the current policy rate.
6According to Banxico’s governor at the time, the new timing gives market participants more time
to react to policy decisions before the weekend.
7Appendix 2.B explains the reasons for excluding an extraordinary meeting on February 2016.
8A basis point is equal to one hundredth of one percent.
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the level (solid line) and the raw change (dashed
line) of the overnight interbank interest rate, the policy rate in Mexico, from January 2008 to
December 2019.
to a deprecation of the currency and the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Timing of the Announcements
To correctly measure intraday policy rate surprises, it is crucial to have the time of the
announcements right. In particular, one needs to consider both the change in the timing
of Banxico’s announcements of 2015 and the usage of Daylight Saving Time (DST).
Due to the 2015 change in the timing of Banxico’s policy announcements, there are
two relevant times: 9 a.m. up until 2014 and 1 p.m. afterwards, both expressed in
the Central Time zone used in Mexico’s capital. The data, however, is recorded in
the Eastern Time (ET) zone used in the U.S. capital. The time zone matters because
the usual one-hour time difference between the two cities widens to two hours during
non-overlapping DST days since 2007, when the U.S. extended its usage of DST time
unlike Mexico. The relevant ET times for Banxico’s policy decisions are then as follows.
All announcements before 2007 happened at 10 a.m. ET. Between 2007 and 2014, the
announcements occurred at 10 a.m. ET most of the time, except on non-overlapping
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DST days in which they occurred at 11 a.m. ET. Finally, since 2015 the announcements
take place at 2 p.m. ET most of the time, except on non-overlapping DST days in which
they occurred at 3 p.m. ET. Further details are in appendix 2.A.
2.2.2 Measuring Policy Rate Surprises
It is important to focus on ‘surprises’ in policy decisions. The raw change in the policy
rate can be decomposed into an expected and an unexpected part. Kuttner (2001) shows
that asset prices only respond to unexpected changes, since the expected part is already
reflected in prices by the time of the announcement. The unanticipated part is thus the
relevant component of policy decisions, usually referred to as the ‘surprise’ or the ‘shock’.9
One can think of policy rate surprises as the difference between the raw change in the
policy rate and the expected one. Surveys of professional forecasters are one source of
expectations about monetary policy decisions. Alternatively, financial market prices can
be used to obtain a market-based measure of those expectations.10
This paper uses swap rates to measure surprises in the policy rate. An overnight in-
dexed swap (OIS) referencing the policy rate would be an ideal candidate.11 Instead, the
swap market in Mexico references an interbank interest rate denominated in local cur-
rency that closely follows the policy rate, the 28-day interbank interest rate (TIIE28D).12
Banxico calculates the TIIE28D once a day based on quotes it receives from commercial
banks, it is the benchmark rate for banking loans in Mexico. The most liquid swap with
the shortest maturity and the longest history is the 3-month swap; it is indeed the main
local derivative.13 Importantly, unlike the TIIE28D itself, the 3-month swap trades within
the day, which allows me to calculate differences in the swap rate in intraday windows.14
Even though the 3-month swap might capture more than one policy meeting ahead, it is
still a good measure of the monetary stance in the short run.
9Leaving the policy rate unchanged can still be a surprise if market participants expected a move. For
instance, a zero raw change can be a loosening surprise if the market expected a 25 basis point increase.
10Kuttner (2001), for instance, uses futures on the federal funds rate for the U.S.
11As an alternative to the U.S.-specific futures contracts of the policy rate, Lloyd (2018) shows that
OIS can be used to measure monetary policy surprises in Germany, Japan, the U.S. and the U.K.
12The average difference between the TIIE28D and the overnight policy rate is around 30 basis points.
13Currently, a 1-month swap is also traded in the market but is not as liquid and has a shorter history.
14Appendix 2.C discusses relevant considerations if TIIE28D were to be used to measure the surprises.
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Policy rate surprises are equal to the difference in swap rates around windows con-
taining monetary policy announcements. The difference is model-free and represent a
change in the information set of market participants, the surprise. A positive surprise
refers to a tightening of the monetary stance, while a negative value represents an easing.
The difference in swap rates captures the change in expectations for the policy rate
around the announcements. Even though swap rates can be decomposed into an expec-
tation for the policy rate and a risk premium,15 the premium is not a problem to how
the surprises are measured as long as it does not change over the length of the window, a
reasonable assumption given that risk premia vary at business-cycle frequencies (Piazzesi
and Swanson, 2008; Garćıa-Verdú et al., 2019).16 In fact, Piazzesi and Swanson (2008)
document that monetary policy surprises based on the change in the derivatives rate
over small windows around the announcements are robust to the presence of risk premia.
Moreover, Garćıa-Verdú et al. (2019) show that the risk premium in TIIE28D swap rates
is relevant at medium but not at short horizons—the 3-month swap in particular.
A Dataset of Asset Price Changes
The preferred measure of policy rate surprises in this paper is the difference in the 3-
month swap rate in 30-minute windows bracketing monetary policy announcements.17
The windows start 10 minutes before and end 20 minutes after each monetary policy
announcement.18 Similarly, differences over the same intraday windows are also calculated
for the exchange rate (expressed in pesos per U.S. dollar) and for yields of bonds issued
by the Mexican government with maturities of 2, 5, 10 and 30 years.19
Given that access to intraday data in emerging markets is not as common as for
advanced economies, daily changes for all the assets are also used, calculated as the one-
15A risk premium compensates investors in case their policy rate expectations turned out to be wrong.
16Also notice that the change in the swap rate differences out any constant risk premium.
17An alternative measure, used by De Pooter et al. (2014), is the difference between the actual policy
rate change and the average of survey expectations. The correlation between the two measures is 0.92.
18Wider 50-minute windows, starting 20 minutes before and ending 30 minutes after each announce-
ment, were used in robustness checks. All the results with tight windows hold using wider windows.
19When no data is available at any of those times, the next available quote is used to compute the
changes. In extreme cases, in which there are no quotes in wider windows for a day, the open and close
quotes are used to compute the change in the rates. This only happens for the swaps on a few days.
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the policy rate surprises (solid line) and the raw
change in the policy rate (dashed line). Policy rate surprises are equal to the change in the
3-month swap rate in 30-minute windows bracketing monetary policy announcements. The
events are all regular monetary policy announcements from January 2011 to December 2019.
day change in the price around monetary policy announcements. The comparison of the
results using intraday versus daily data receives special attention in the rest of the paper,
playing a key role in section 2.4 on the high-frequency exchange rate puzzle.
All the data for the analysis comes from Bloomberg. The information to calculate the
intraday change for the swap rates and the exchange rate is available since 2011, since
December 2014 for the 5-year yield and since 2013 for the other yields. Daily changes
start in 2004, except for the 30-year yield for which they start in October 2006.
Figure 2.2 plots the raw changes in the policy rate along with the (intraday) policy
rate surprises. The difference between the two is the anticipated change in the policy
rate. Notice that surprises are generally smaller than the raw changes, indicating that
most of the policy rate decisions of Banxico are anticipated by market participants.
Table 2.1 shows summary statistics for the intraday and daily changes in asset prices.
According to the policy rate surprises identified using intraday data, there was no surprise
in 12 out of the 72 regularly scheduled meetings between 2011 and 2019. Moreover, several
of the insights documented formally in the next two sections can already be seen in
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Table 2.1. Summary Statistics for Asset Price Changes
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Intraday
PRS -0.5 7.9 -45.8 16.0 72
PRS > 0 4.0 4.0 0.3 16.0 31
PRS < 0 -5.5 9.7 -45.8 -0.3 29
FX -9.4 33.4 -165.4 55.3 72
2Y Yield -0.4 6.7 -37.7 10.7 56
5Y Yield -0.0 3.9 -15.4 9.4 41
10Y Yield -0.6 5.0 -25.8 10.9 56
30Y Yield -0.8 4.4 -19.8 8.2 56
Daily
PRS -0.5 8.1 -45.8 16.0 72
PRS > 0 4.3 4.6 0.2 16.0 30
PRS < 0 -5.3 9.5 -45.8 -0.2 31
FX -7.0 65.4 -167.6 142.2 72
2Y Yield -1.2 7.6 -32.6 13.3 72
5Y Yield -1.8 8.5 -41.1 12.9 72
10Y Yield -1.8 7.7 -34.8 10.4 72
30Y Yield -2.0 7.0 -28.1 12.6 72
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for intraday and daily
changes in the 3-month swap rate (the policy rate surprises or
PRS), changes in bond yields and exchange rate returns (FX). In-
traday changes are calculated starting 10 minutes before to 20 min-
utes after a monetary policy announcement. Figures in decimals
are expressed in basis points. The sample period is from January
2011 to December 2019.
table 2.1. There is no much difference between the policy rate surprises calculated using
intraday and daily data. Changes in bond yields using the two frequencies also have
similar characteristics, although they vary slightly more using daily data. In contrast,
the standard deviation of the exchange rate returns almost doubles (from 33 to 65 basis
points) when the frequency goes from intraday to daily.
2.3 The Effects of Policy Rate Surprises on Asset
Prices
This section documents that the response of asset prices to policy rate surprises is sta-
tistically and economically significant. It also shows that the comparison of the results
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from intraday and daily data turns out to be relevant for the exchange rate.
2.3.1 Methodology
The analysis of the response of the exchange rate and bond yields to policy rate surprises
uses the following event-study regression:
∆yt = β0 + β1∆xt + εt, (2.1)
in which ∆yt is the change in the variable of interest (exchange rate or bond yields)
and ∆xt is the policy rate surprise (i.e. the change in the 3-month swap rate), both
computed over the same window around monetary policy announcements. Whenever in-
terest rates are used, the changes are calculated directly using quotes before and after the
announcements; for the exchange rate, 100 times log differences are used to approximate
the percentage change (or return) over the window. All variables are expressed in basis
points. Finally, the error term εt captures variations in the dependent variable unrelated
to shocks in the policy rate.
The parameter of interest in equation (2.1) is the slope coefficient β1, it measures the
response of asset prices to policy rate surprises.20 The classical assumption to identify β1
is that εt is orthogonal to ∆xt, which is equivalent to say that ∆xt is exogenous.
The frequency at which asset price changes are calculated is crucial to satisfy the exo-
geneity assumption. When ∆xt is measured as the intraday change in the 3-month swap
rate around monetary policy announcements—conceptually the policy rate surprise—the
exogeneity assumption is plausible. It is unlikely that, during such small windows, other
variables influence asset prices in a systematic fashion or that monetary policy reacts to
events happening minutes before the announcements are released. One can then give a
causal interpretation from policy decisions to asset price responses on the days of mone-
tary policy announcements (Gürkaynak and Wright, 2013).
The variable of interest starts to be measured with ‘noise’ when wider windows are
used to calculate the changes in asset prices. The wider the window, the larger the noise.
20The intercept β0 is generally dropped because the asset price is not expected to change when there
is no surprise in the policy rate in small windows.
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Such noise, or measurement error, opens the door for other variables to play a role in the
relationship between asset prices and policy rate surprises. For example, since asset prices
and the policy rate are both forward-looking variables, the estimation of equation (2.1)
using quarterly or monthly data is plagued with endogeneity problems (e.g. simultaneity,
omitted variables). Daily data mitigates those problems. Nevertheless, even with daily
data, the noise can blur the relationship between the variables of interest in certain
situations, as is discussed in section 2.4.
2.3.2 Results
The sign of β1 depends on the dependent variable. Regarding the exchange rate, uncov-
ered interest rate parity implies that the interest rate differential between Mexico and
the U.S. should equal the expected change in the exchange rate. Other things equal, an
increase in the interest rate in Mexico should lead to a contemporaneous appreciation of
the peso, i.e. a fall in the exchange rate.21 Thus, β1 is expected to be negative for the
exchange rate. Regarding bond yields, Kuttner (2001) shows that a monetary tightening
leads to higher yields at all maturities due to upward expectations for the policy rate.
As such, β1 is expected to be positive for the yield curve.
Intraday Data
Table 2.2 presents the results of estimating equation (2.1) using intraday data. The first
column for each of the dependent variables reports the estimate of β1. In all cases, the
estimates have the expected sign and are highly significant.
A 25 basis point increase in the policy rate leads to an appreciation of the currency of
close to 50 basis points. For comparison, the currencies of advanced economies responded
around two times the magnitude of the policy rate surprise before the global financial
crisis (Rosa, 2011b) and up to five times afterwards (Wright, 2012; Ferrari et al., 2017).
Table 2.2 thus provides evidence against the exchange rate puzzle in emerging markets,
21Uncovered interest rate parity also implies that a contemporaneous appreciation of the peso generates












































Table 2.2. The Response of Asset Prices to Policy Rate Surprises: Intraday Data
FX 2Y-Yield 5Y-Yield 10Y-Yield 30Y-Yield
PR Surprise -1.85** -1.79** 0.67*** 0.68*** 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.30*** 0.32***
(0.89) (0.85) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)
PR Expected -0.20 -0.04 -0.04* -0.05 -0.06**
(0.34) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 72 72 56 56 41 41 56 56 56 56
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.79 0.81 0.23 0.27 0.53 0.56 0.35 0.42
Notes: The first column for each dependent variable shows the coefficient estimates in regressions of intraday yield changes or exchange rate returns (FX) on
intraday changes in the 3-month swap rate (PR Surprise). The second column adds the expected component of the raw change in the policy rate (PR Expected)
as a regressor, calculated as the difference between the raw change and the policy rate surprise. Intraday changes are calculated starting 10 minutes before to 20
minutes after a monetary policy announcement. The events are all regular monetary policy announcements from January 2011 to December 2019. The sample
for the exchange rate is from January 2011 to December 2019; for 2- 10- and 30-year yields, from January 2013 to December 2019; and for 5-year yields, from
December 2014 to December 2019. Figures are expressed in basis points. No constant is included in the regressions. Robust standard errors are shown in paren-
theses. *, **, *** asterisks respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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it shows that their currencies are no different to those in advanced economies in terms of
their responsiveness to the policy rate.
A contractionary monetary policy also flattens the yield curve. Following a 25 basis
point hike in the policy rate, 2- 5- 10- and 30-year bond yields increase by approximately
17, 9, 11, and 8 basis points, respectively; as such, the spread between the 10- and 2-year
yields—the term spread—narrows by 6 basis points.22 These results are in line with the
evidence for the U.S. in a comparable period, i.e. when its policy rate was not constrained
by the effective lower bound (Kuttner, 2001; Gürkaynak et al., 2005). However, it is worth
pointing out two differences. First, the magnitude of the yields’ response in Mexico is
larger than in the U.S. For instance, a 1/4 percentage point increase in the policy rate
raises 2- 5- and 10-year yields by approximately 11, 7 and 3 basis points in the U.S.
according to the estimates in Gürkaynak et al. (2005). Second, policy rate surprises
in Mexico explain a larger fraction of the variability in bond yields (measured by the
R2 statistic) than in the U.S. Specifically, the surprises are the most important factor
influencing 2- and 10-year yields in Mexico, with an R2 of 0.79 and 0.53 versus 0.4 and
0.08 in the U.S., respectively.
The larger influence of policy rate surprises on the yield curve in Mexico compared
to the U.S. likely reflects a relatively higher degree of long-term inflation uncertainty in
Mexico. Bond yields can be decomposed into an average expected future short rate and
a risk premium, which are partly driven respectively by expected inflation and inflation
uncertainty (Abrahams et al., 2016)—together referred to as inflation compensation. De
Pooter et al. (2014) argue that inflation expectations in Mexico have become anchored
since Banxico adopted an inflation targeting regime. Nonetheless, in their Table 9 they
show that surprises in the policy rate can sometimes influence long-term inflation com-
pensation, which suggests that inflation expectations in Mexico are less firmly anchored
than in the U.S. With relatively higher long-term inflation uncertainty, the effect of policy
rate surprises on long-term yields will be bigger in Mexico relative to the U.S.23
22The effect on bond yields seems to be non-monotonic since the response of the 5-year yield is lower
than for the 2- and 10-year yields. Nonetheless, this is less pronounced with daily data (see table 2.3).
23Soĺıs (2021b) shows that inflation uncertainty is an important driver for the long-term yields of
emerging markets.
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The second column for each dependent variable in table 2.2 reports the responses of
asset prices to the two components of the raw changes in the policy rate, the anticipated
and unanticipated parts.24 Similar to the findings in Kuttner (2001) for the U.S., asset
prices in Mexico respond to surprises but not to anticipated changes in the policy rate.25
This highlights the importance of focusing on policy rate surprises in emerging markets
as well. Indeed, if raw changes were being used instead, one would incorrectly conclude
that monetary policy has no effect on neither the currency nor the yield curve.26
Summing up, there is a statistically and economically significant response of the ex-
change rate and the yield curve to policy rate surprises.
Daily Data
Table 2.3 reports the results of estimating equation (2.1) using daily, instead of intraday,
data. Remember that although intraday changes in swap rates and the exchange rate are
available since 2011 (and somewhat later for bond yields), daily data is available much
earlier for all assets. Thus, the first column for each dependent variable in table 2.3
reports the results over the same sample period as in table 2.2, while the second column
shows the results since 2004.
The first column of table 2.3 illustrates the exchange rate puzzle identified by
Kohlscheen (2014); that is, the exchange rate does not respond to policy rate surprises
when the changes are calculated using daily windows. This is discussed in detail in section
2.4.
Unlike the exchange rate, the significance of the effects on the yield curve remains
high. The results are broadly similar even with a larger sample size.27 In addition, there
are gains in the precision of the coefficient estimates and in terms of explanatory power
(measured by R2) when going from daily to intraday data. The largest gains, however,
can be seen in the long end of the curve, where the standard error is half as large and
24The expected part equals the difference between the raw change and the surprise in the policy rate.
25The statistically significant effects of the anticipated part are economically small.
26In unreported regressions of intraday asset price changes on raw changes in the policy rate, the slope
coefficient is not significant. These regressions suffer from an error-in-variables problem because the raw
change is a noisy measure of the surprise component, which leads to attenuation bias (Kuttner, 2001).












































Table 2.3. The Response of Asset Prices to Policy Rate Surprises: Daily Data
FX 2Y-Yield 5Y-Yield 10Y-Yield 30Y-Yield
PR Surprise -0.08 0.08 0.65*** 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.50*** 0.55*** 0.44*** 0.35** 0.39***
(1.34) (0.52) (0.09) (0.07) (0.15) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.17) (0.09)
Obs. since 2011 72 56 41 56 56
Obs. since 2004 155 155 155 155 120
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.41 0.19 0.35 0.42 0.25 0.18 0.22
Notes: This table shows the coefficient estimates in regressions of daily yield changes or exchange rate returns (FX) on daily changes in the 3-month swap rate
(PR Surprise). Daily changes are calculated around monetary policy announcements. The first column for each dependent variable uses the same sample period
as Table 2.2: for the exchange rate from January 2011 to December 2019, for 2- 10- and 30-year yields from January 2013 to December 2019, and for 5-year yields
from December 2014 to December 2019. The second column uses a larger sample period, it includes all regular monetary policy announcements from January
2004 to December 2019. Figures are expressed in basis points. No constant is included in the regressions. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *,
**, *** asterisks respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Notes: This figure plots the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the response
of the exchange rate return to policy rate surprises. Returns are calculated from close of day
t− 1 to day t+k, where t is a day with a monetary policy announcement and k = 0, 1, . . . , 10.
The announcements are always more than ten days apart from each other, see appendix
2.A. The sample includes all regular monetary policy announcements from January 2011 to
December 2019.
the R2 almost doubles when intraday data is used.
The main conclusion from comparing tables 2.2 and 2.3 is that intraday data is key
to identify the currency response to the policy rate.
Persistence
In addition to the initial reaction of asset prices to policy rate surprises, policymakers are
interested in the persistence of the response. One way to address this issue, and assess
the robustness of the results, is to re-estimate equation (2.1) but with the change in the
dependent variable calculated over subsequent days after a monetary policy announce-
ment.28 Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the persistence of the exchange rate and the yield curve,
respectively.
Since this exercise involves daily frequencies, figure 2.3 illustrates the exchange rate
puzzle in Kohlscheen (2014) from a different angle since the currencies of advanced
economies do exhibit persistence over subsequent days (Rosa, 2011b; Ferrari et al., 2017).
Meanwhile, figure 2.4 shows that the flattening of the yield curve highlighted before con-
28Note that there is no overlap between observations because the announcements are always more than
ten days—the maximum days used in the figure—apart from each other, see appendix 2.A.
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Notes: This figure plots the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the response
of the 2-, 5-, 10- and 30-year yield changes to policy rate surprises. Yield changes are calculated
from close of day t−1 to day t+k, where t is a day with a monetary policy announcement and
k = 0, 1, . . . , 10. The announcements are always more than ten days apart from each other, see
appendix 2.A. The sample includes all regular monetary policy announcements from January
2011 to December 2019.
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tinues in the days following a policy rate tightening. The response of 2- and 5-year yields
increases over time, while for 10- and 30-year yields the response is relatively more stable.
2.4 Solving the High-Frequency Exchange Rate Puz-
zle
This section argues that the apparent lack of response of the exchange rate to monetary
policy in emerging markets illustrated in table 2.3 is due to measurement error in the
daily returns of the exchange rate.
The key insight from comparing tables 2.2 and 2.3 is that one reaches different con-
clusions about the response of the exchange rate depending on the data frequency used.
With intraday data, the currency appreciates following a tightening, a response that
is consistent with standard open economy models and with the literature for advanced
economies. This finding is relevant given the importance of the exchange rate in the
transmission of monetary policy in small open economies. In contrast, the currency does
not respond to the policy rate when daily data is used, what Kohlscheen (2014) coined
as the high-frequency exchange rate puzzle in emerging economies. This phenomenon
indeed seems characteristic of emerging markets since the reaction of the currencies of
advanced economies can still be seen with daily data (Wright, 2012; Ferrari et al., 2017).
2.4.1 Validation Study
It is helpful to think about the puzzle from an errors-in-variables perspective. The avail-
ability of intraday and daily data allows me to conduct what is known as a validation
study (Bound et al., 1994). Intraday changes are treated as the true surprises, whereas
daily changes are seen as the pure surprises plus measurement error because they capture
all news happening during a day. From this perspective, the analysis using daily data
involves measurement error in both the dependent and independent variables. In the rest
of the analysis, the dependent variable is the exchange rate returns.
In the classical measurement error model, when only the independent variable is
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measured with error, the least squares estimator β̂1 is biased towards zero, commonly
referred to as attenuation bias; but when there is measurement error only in the dependent
variable, the estimator β̂1 is consistent albeit with a larger standard error. Here, the
‘noisy’ (daily) and ‘true’ (intraday) values for the dependent and independent variables
are observed, so the measurement errors can also be treated as observed and thus used
to test the traditional assumptions. The errors are calculated as the difference between
daily and intraday changes in the variables.
In the data, the measurement error in the dependent variable is larger than that in the
independent variable, as shown in appendix 2.D. Intuitively, monetary policy decisions are
the main event for swap rates during announcement days, and so the measurement error
in policy rate surprises is small. Meanwhile, a lot of factors other than monetary policy
decisions affect the exchange rate that even a daily frequency is not enough to avoid
their influence.29 Appendix 2.D also shows that the assumptions behind the classical
measurement error model are not satisfied in the data, and confirms that attenuation
bias is indeed small, given that the measurement error in policy rate surprises is small.
Table 2.4 sheds light on the puzzle by exploiting the two lengths for the event window.
Since the changes in the exchange rate and the 3-month swap rate are measured with
(daily) and without (intraday) error, there are four possible combinations of the variables
to estimate equation (2.1). The ideal case is when there is no measurement error in neither
of the variables, the opposite instance happens when there is measurement error in both.
These two cases are reported in the first columns of tables 2.2 and 2.3, respectively, and
are reproduced in table 2.4 for ease of comparison.
Table 2.4 shows that the main reason behind the puzzle is noise in the daily returns of
the exchange rate. In the first two columns, the dependent variable is measured without
error, whereas the independent variable is also measured without error in the first column,
and with error in the second. For the purpose of the validation study, the coefficient in
the first column is treated as the true parameter, it shows that a tightening leads to
29In line with this, regressing daily on intraday values gives an R2 of 0.96 for policy rate surprises and
of 0.14 for the exchange rate. Also, remember that the standard deviation of the exchange rate returns
almost doubles when the frequency goes from intraday to daily (see table 2.1).
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Table 2.4. The Response of the Exchange Rate to Policy Rate Surprises
Intraday FX Daily FX
PRS Intraday -1.85** -0.38
(0.89) (1.38)
PRS Daily -1.66** -0.080
(0.81) (1.34)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.18 0.15 0.00 0.00
Notes: This table shows the coefficient estimates in regressions of exchange rate returns (FX) on
intraday (PRS Intraday) and daily (PRS Daily) changes in the 3-month swap rate. The returns are
calculated with intraday data in the first two columns and with daily data in the last two. Daily
changes are calculated around monetary policy announcements; intraday changes are calculated
starting 10 minutes before to 20 minutes after an announcement. The sample includes all regu-
lar monetary policy announcements from January 2011 to December 2019. Figures are expressed
in basis points. No constant is included in the regressions. Robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses. *, **, *** asterisks respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
an appreciation of the currency, as discussed above. The second column meanwhile not
only confirms an upward bias (since the ‘true’ parameter is lower) but shows how much
measurement error in the independent variable biases the coefficient towards zero. One
can see that attenuation bias is relatively small. Thus, the effect of policy rate surprises
on the currency is significant and relevant even when they are measured with error.
In the last two columns of table 2.4, the dependent variable is now measured with
error. As can be seen, in both columns there is an upward bias in β̂, which is in fact
larger than the one in the second column. Moreover, the standard error increases by more
than 55%. So, measurement error in the returns of the exchange rate would lead one to
incorrectly conclude that there is no significant effect of the policy rate on the exchange
rate.
Pennings et al. (2015) suggest that the weaker response of the exchange rate in emerg-
ing markets relative to advanced economies could be driven by less liquid financial markets
or more noisy measurement of monetary policy surprises. The evidence in table 2.4 indi-
cates that, instead of measurement error in the policy rate surprises, the reason behind
the puzzle is measurement error in the returns of the exchange rate.
The explanation of the puzzle lies on omitted variables. In the data, the measurement
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error in the daily exchange rate returns is not systematically related to surprises in the
policy rate.30 Therefore, rather than being correlated with the independent variable,
the measurement error in the daily exchange rate returns is capturing the effects of
other variables influencing the currency, giving rise to a standard omitted variable bias.
Appendix 2.D extends the classical model to explain the inconsistency in the estimator
as a result of measurement error in the dependent variable.
2.4.2 Potential Omitted Variables
To understand the other factors influencing the daily returns of the exchange rate, it is
particularly important in the case of emerging markets to look at external—in addition
to local—events when considering omitted variable candidates. The U.S. dollar responds
significantly to different U.S. macroeconomic news (Faust et al., 2007). If those news
happen to be released on days in which Banxico announces monetary policy decisions,
daily returns of the peso per U.S. dollar exchange rate will reflect at least those two
events. As appendix 2.A shows, it is indeed common for Banxico’s monetary policy
announcements to coincide with releases of relevant U.S. macroeconomic news.
U.S. labor market data is a good example of an omitted variable for the daily returns
of the exchange rate. The change in nonfarm payrolls is released monthly by the U.S.
Department of Labor generally on a Friday at 8:30 a.m. ET. Between 2004 and 2014,
Banxico’s announcements coincided with releases of nonfarm payrolls on 13 occasions, in
four of them the average difference between the daily and intraday returns of the exchange
rate exceeded 115 basis points, compared to 48 basis points for the whole sample.31
Consider, for instance, the announcement on September 6, 2013, in which Banxico
unexpectedly cut its policy rate by 25 basis points. According to the estimation results
with intraday data, this would have depreciated the currency by close to 50 basis points,
but the peso actually appreciated 168 basis points during the day.32 On this regard, it
is worth noting that earlier that day, at 8:30 a.m. ET, nonfarm payrolls data for the
30In unreported regressions of the error on the surprises, the slope coefficient is not significant.
31Those dates are: March 8, 2013; September 6, 2013; December 6, 2013; December 5, 2014.
32In the 30-minute window around Banxico’s announcement, the peso appreciated only 15 basis points.
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previous month was released. Job gains were less than expected according to survey
forecasts (169,000 vs 180,000), which analysts interpreted as evidence that it would take
the Fed longer than previously anticipated to remove the monetary stimulus it suggested
earlier in the year—what is known as the taper tantrum. Asset prices in turn reacted as
if there was a loosening surprise in the U.S. policy rate, depreciating the U.S. dollar (and
appreciating the Mexican peso).
More generally, a lot of factors other than monetary policy decisions affect the ex-
change rate that even a daily frequency is not enough to prevent their influence. Using
intraday data—at least for the exchange rate—avoids this problem. Especially since the
timing change of Banxico’s announcements in 2015—from 10 a.m. ET Fridays to 2 p.m.
ET Thursdays—made their coincidence with U.S. macroeconomic releases a certainty.
Initial jobless claims in the U.S. are released every Thursday at 8:30 a.m. ET.
There are nonetheless other potential variables that can influence the exchange rate
within a day. For instance, controlling for surprises in initial jobless claims, nonfarm
payrolls and the unemployment rate in the U.S. calculated with data on survey expec-
tations from Money Market Services, the effect of policy rate surprises (measured with
and without error) on the daily returns of the exchange rate indeed increases in absolute
terms (the estimated values are further to the left than the ones reported in the last two
columns in table 2.4) and the standard error shrinks, but these changes are not enough
to detect a significant effect.
Summing up, measurement error in the daily returns of the exchange rate causes
not only imprecision in the estimation—as in the classical model—but also bias due to
omitted variables. Even if policy rate surprises are measured without error, the noise in
the daily exchange rate returns blurs the response of the currency to the policy rate.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper uses a new dataset to quantify the effects of monetary policy on the exchange
rate and bond yields in an emerging economy. Surprises in the policy rate have significant
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effects on asset prices. An unanticipated increase in the policy rate appreciates the
currency and flattens the yield curve. The currencies of emerging markets are thus no
different to those in advanced economies in terms of their responsiveness to the domestic
policy rate. Meanwhile, policy rate surprises have a larger influence on the yield curve in
Mexico than in the U.S., likely reflecting a relatively higher degree of long-term inflation
uncertainty in Mexico.
This paper finds that the lack of response of the exchange rate in emerging markets
found so far in the literature is the result of wide event windows. The response can only
be perceived using intraday data for the exchange rate. Notice that the sensitivity of the
response of the currency to data frequency does not mean that monetary policy is not
important. It means that surprises in the policy rate are small enough that their effect
on the exchange rate can only be seen in intraday windows. Banxico, like other central
banks, works hard to communicate information to the market ahead of time so that, by
the time of an announcement, most of it is already expected.
The results in this paper can be extended in different directions. Monetary policy
in advanced economies has more than one dimension since asset prices react not only to
surprises in the policy rate but also to changes in policy statements and asset purchase
programs (Gürkaynak et al., 2005; Swanson, 2018; Altavilla et al., 2019). A relevant
question is whether the multidimensionality of monetary policy in advanced economies
is a feature shared by emerging markets. Soĺıs (2021a) shows that monetary policy in
Mexico is indeed multidimensional. Nonetheless, more work is needed to see whether this
result is observed more broadly among emerging markets.
Understanding the transmission of monetary policy to financial markets is the starting
point. The ultimate goal is to understand the real effects of monetary policy. However, it
is hard to measure the persistence of policy surprises; Wright (2012) proposes a solution
by imposing parametric restrictions in a vector autoregression. Relatedly, the policy
rate surprises in this paper can be used as external instruments in a structural vector
autoregression (known as proxy-SVAR or SVAR-IV) to identify the effects of monetary
policy on macroeconomic variables (see Li and Zanetti, 2016; Stock and Watson, 2018).
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Appendix 2.A Calendar of Monetary Policy An-
nouncements
This appendix contains the calendar of Banxico’s monetary policy announcements along
with relevant macroeconomic data from Mexico33 and the U.S. released on the same dates.
Data releases are obtained from Bloomberg.34
Regarding the timing of the announcements, since 2007 the usual one-hour time dif-
ference between the capitals of Mexico and the U.S. widens to two hours during some
Daylight Saving Time (DST) days. Before 2007, the one-hour difference was constant
throughout the year because both countries followed the same DST arrangements. DST
in both countries began on the first Sunday in April and ended on the last Sunday of
October.35 Starting in 2007, the U.S.—but not Mexico—extended its usage of the DST
time, going from the second Sunday of March to the first Sunday of November.
When Banxico’s announcements are made between the second Sunday of March and
the first Sunday of April, and between the last Sunday of October and the first Sunday
of November, the relevant Eastern Time (ET) zone times are 11 a.m. (up until 2014)
and 3 p.m. (starting in 2015). Seven announcements happened in those weeks prior to
2015 (at 11 a.m. ET) and five afterwards (at 3 p.m. ET) for a total of 12 cases. It is also
more likely to observe those meetings in the Spring than in the Fall since there is a two-
to three-week gap in the former relative to a one-week gap in the latter. In fact, only 2
of the 12 cases fell in October.
On July 1, 2015, Banxico rescheduled the last four monetary policy announcements
of that year to one or two business days after the Fed’s announcements in anticipation to
the first increase in the U.S. policy rate since the start of the Great Recession. In 2020,
all Banxico’s policy meetings were scheduled one or two weeks after those of the Fed.
33Between 2007 and 2012, there was a shift in the time of macroeconomic releases in Mexico, most of
them were initially released during the afternoon, now they are released in the morning.
34The abbreviations and acronyms used in table 2.A.1 are as follows: ET is Eastern Time, GDP is
gross domestic product, UoM refers to University of Michigan, IGAE is the global economic activity
index, IP is industrial production, CPI is the consumer price index, PPI is the producer price index.
35The only exception is 2001, when lawmakers in Mexico shortened the duration of the DST period.
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Table 2.A.1. Calendar of Monetary Policy Announcements
Date ET Macroeconomic Data from Mexico and the U.S. Released on the Same Day
23-Jan-2004 10:00 MX: Trade Balance.
20-Feb-2004 10:00 MX: IGAE. US: CPI.
12-Mar-2004 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment.
26-Mar-2004 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment, Personal Income, Personal Spending.
23-Apr-2004 10:00 MX: Trade Balance. US: Durable Goods Orders.
27-Apr-2004 10:00 US: Consumer Confidence.
28-May-2004 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment, Personal Income, Personal Spending.
25-Jun-2004 10:00 MX: IGAE. US: GDP, UoM Sentiment.
23-Jul-2004 10:00 MX: Trade Balance.
27-Aug-2004 10:00 US: GDP, UoM Sentiment.
24-Sep-2004 10:00 MX: IGAE. US: Durable Goods Orders.
22-Oct-2004 10:00 MX: Bi-Weekly CPI, Retail Sales.
26-Nov-2004 10:00
10-Dec-2004 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment.
28-Jan-2005 10:00 US: GDP.
25-Feb-2005 10:00 US: GDP, Existing Home Sales.
23-Mar-2005 10:00 MX: Trade Balance. US: CPI, Mortgage Applications, Existing Home Sales.
22-Apr-2005 10:00 MX: Bi-Weekly CPI, Trade Balance.
27-May-2005 10:00 MX: Unemployment. US: UoM Sentiment, Personal Income, Personal Spending.
24-Jun-2005 10:00 MX: Unemployment. US: Durable Goods Orders, New Home Sales.
22-Jul-2005 10:00 MX: Bi-Weekly CPI, Trade Balance.
26-Aug-2005 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment.
23-Sep-2005 10:00 MX: Trade Balance.
28-Oct-2005 10:00 US: GDP, UoM Sentiment.
25-Nov-2005 10:00
09-Dec-2005 10:00 MX: Trade Balance. US: UoM Sentiment.
27-Jan-2006 10:00 US: GDP, New Home Sales.
24-Feb-2006 10:00 MX: IGAE, Current Account. US: Durable Goods Orders.
24-Mar-2006 10:00 MX: IGAE. US: Durable Goods Orders, New Home Sales.
21-Apr-2006 10:00 MX: Retail Sales.
26-May-2006 10:00 MX: Retail Sales, Current Account. US: UoM Sentiment, Personal Income, Personal Spending.
23-Jun-2006 10:00 MX: Trade Balance. US: Durable Goods Orders.
28-Jul-2006 10:00 US: GDP, UoM Sentiment.
25-Aug-2006 10:00 MX: IGAE, Current Account.
22-Sep-2006 10:00 MX: Bi-Weekly CPI, Retail Sales.
27-Oct-2006 10:00 US: GDP, UoM Sentiment.
24-Nov-2006 10:00 MX: Retail Sales, Current Account.
08-Dec-2006 10:00 MX: Trade Balance. US: Change in Nonfarm Payrolls, UoM Sentiment, Unemp. Rate.
26-Jan-2007 10:00 US: Durable Goods Orders, New Home Sales.
23-Feb-2007 10:00 MX: Trade Balance, Current Account.
23-Mar-2007 11:00 MX: Trade Balance. US: Existing Home Sales.
27-Apr-2007 10:00 US: GDP, UoM Sentiment.
25-May-2007 10:00 MX: Unemp. Rate, Current Account. US: Existing Home Sales.
22-Jun-2007 10:00 MX: Bi-Weekly CPI, Retail Sales.
27-Jul-2007 10:00 US: GDP, UoM Sentiment.
24-Aug-2007 10:00 MX: Unemp. Rate, Current Account. US: Durable Goods Orders, New Home Sales.
21-Sep-2007 10:00 MX: Unemp. Rate.
26-Oct-2007 10:00 MX: IGAE. US: UoM Sentiment.
23-Nov-2007 10:00 MX: Trade Balance, Current Account.
07-Dec-2007 10:00 MX: CPI, Gross Fixed Investment. US: Change in Nonfarm Payrolls, UoM Sentiment, Unemp. Rate.
18-Jan-2008 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment.
15-Feb-2008 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment, IP.
14-Mar-2008 11:00 US: CPI, UoM Sentiment.
18-Apr-2008 10:00 MX: Unemp. Rate.
16-May-2008 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment, Housing Starts.
20-Jun-2008 10:00 MX: Unemp. Rate.
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Date ET Macroeconomic Data from Mexico and the U.S. Released on the Same Day
18-Jul-2008 10:00 MX: Unemp. Rate.
15-Aug-2008 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment, IP.
19-Sep-2008 10:00 MX: Unemp. Rate.
17-Oct-2008 10:00 MX: IP. US: UoM Sentiment, Housing Starts.
28-Nov-2008 10:00
16-Jan-2009 10:00 MX: IP. US: CPI, UoM Sentiment, IP.
20-Feb-2009 10:00 MX: GDP. US: CPI.
20-Mar-2009 11:00 MX: Aggregate Supply and Demand.
17-Apr-2009 10:00 MX: IP. US: UoM Sentiment.
15-May-2009 10:00 US: CPI, UoM Sentiment, IP.
19-Jun-2009 10:00 MX: Aggregate Supply and Demand.
17-Jul-2009 10:00 MX: IP. US: Housing Starts.
21-Aug-2009 10:00 MX: Retail Sales. US: Existing Home Sales.
18-Sep-2009 10:00
16-Oct-2009 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment, IP.
27-Nov-2009 10:00
15-Jan-2010 10:00 US: CPI, UoM Sentiment, IP.
19-Feb-2010 10:00 US: CPI.
19-Mar-2010 11:00 MX: Aggregate Supply and Demand.
16-Apr-2010 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment, Housing Starts.
21-May-2010 10:00 MX: Retail Sales.
18-Jun-2010 10:00 MX: Retail Sales.
16-Jul-2010 10:00 US: CPI, UoM Sentiment.
20-Aug-2010 10:00 MX: GDP, IGAE.
24-Sep-2010 10:00 US: Durable Goods Orders, New Home Sales.
15-Oct-2010 10:00 US: CPI, UoM Sentiment, Retail Sales.
26-Nov-2010 10:00
21-Jan-2011 10:00 MX: Unemp. Rate.
04-Mar-2011 10:00 MX: Consumer Confidence. US: Change in Nonfarm Payrolls, Unemp. Rate, Factory Orders.
15-Apr-2011 10:00 US: CPI, UoM Sentiment, IP.
27-May-2011 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment, Personal Income, Personal Spending.
08-Jul-2011 10:00 US: Change in Nonfarm Payrolls, Unemp. Rate.
26-Aug-2011 10:00 US: GDP, UoM Sentiment.
14-Oct-2011 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment, Retail Sales.
02-Dec-2011 10:00 US: Change in Nonfarm Payrolls, Unemp. Rate.
20-Jan-2012 10:00 US: Existing Home Sales.
16-Mar-2012 11:00 US: CPI, UoM Sentiment, IP.
27-Apr-2012 10:00 MX: Trade Balance. US: GDP, UoM Sentiment.
08-Jun-2012 10:00 MX: Gross Fixed Investment.
20-Jul-2012 10:00 MX: Unemp. Rate.
07-Sep-2012 10:00 MX: CPI, Bi-Weekly CPI. US: Change in Nonfarm Payrolls, Unemp. Rate.
26-Oct-2012 10:00 US: GDP, UoM Sentiment.
30-Nov-2012 10:00 US: Personal Income, Personal Spending.
18-Jan-2013 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment.
08-Mar-2013 10:00 MX: Gross Fixed Investment. US: Change in Nonfarm Payrolls, Unemp. Rate.
26-Apr-2013 10:00 MX: Trade Balance. US: GDP, UoM Sentiment.
07-Jun-2013 10:00 MX: CPI, Bi-Weekly CPI. US: Change in Nonfarm Payrolls, Unemp. Rate.
12-Jul-2013 10:00 MX: IP. US: UoM Sentiment.
06-Sep-2013 10:00 MX: Gross Fixed Investment. US: Change in Nonfarm Payrolls, Unemp. Rate.
25-Oct-2013 10:00 MX: Trade Balance. US: UoM Sentiment, Durable Goods Orders.
06-Dec-2013 10:00 MX: Gross Fixed Investment. US: Change in Nonfarm Payrolls, UoM Sentiment, Unemp. Rate, Personal
Income, Personal Spending.
31-Jan-2014 10:00 US: UoM Sentiment, Personal Income, Personal Spending.
21-Mar-2014 11:00 MX: Retail Sales.
25-Apr-2014 10:00 MX: IGAE. US: UoM Sentiment.
06-Jun-2014 10:00 US: Change in Nonfarm Payrolls, Unemp. Rate.
11-Jul-2014 10:00 MX: IP.
05-Sep-2014 10:00 MX: Consumer Confidence. US: Change in Nonfarm Payrolls, Unemp. Rate.
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Date ET Macroeconomic Data from Mexico and the U.S. Released on the Same Day
31-Oct-2014 11:00 US: UoM Sentiment, Personal Income, Personal Spending.
05-Dec-2014 10:00 MX: Consumer Confidence. US: Change in Nonfarm Payrolls, Unemp. Rate, Factory Orders.
29-Jan-2015 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims.
26-Mar-2015 15:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims.
30-Apr-2015 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, Personal Income, Personal Spending.
04-Jun-2015 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims.
30-Jul-2015 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, GDP.
21-Sep-2015 14:00 US: Existing Home Sales.
29-Oct-2015 15:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, GDP.
17-Dec-2015 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims.
04-Feb-2016 14:00 MX: Gross Fixed Investment. US: Initial Jobless Claims, Durable Goods Orders, Factory Orders.
17-Feb-2016 12:17 (Omitted)
18-Mar-2016 15:00 MX: Aggregate Supply and Demand. US: UoM Sentiment.
05-May-2016 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims.
30-Jun-2016 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims.
11-Aug-2016 14:00 MX: IP. US: Initial Jobless Claims.
29-Sep-2016 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, GDP.
17-Nov-2016 14:00 US: CPI, Initial Jobless Claims, Housing Starts.
15-Dec-2016 14:00 US: CPI, Initial Jobless Claims, Manufacturing PMI.
09-Feb-2017 14:00 MX: CPI, Bi-Weekly CPI. US: Initial Jobless Claims.
30-Mar-2017 15:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, GDP.
18-May-2017 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims.
22-Jun-2017 14:00 MX: Bi-Weekly CPI. US: Initial Jobless Claims.
10-Aug-2017 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, PPI.
28-Sep-2017 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, GDP.
09-Nov-2017 14:00 MX: CPI, Bi-Weekly CPI. US: Initial Jobless Claims.
14-Dec-2017 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, Retail Sales, Manufacturing PMI.
08-Feb-2018 14:00 MX: CPI, Bi-Weekly CPI. US: Initial Jobless Claims.
12-Apr-2018 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims.
17-May-2018 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims.
21-Jun-2018 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims.
02-Aug-2018 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, Durable Goods Orders, Factory Orders.
04-Oct-2018 14:00 MX: Consumer Confidence. US: Initial Jobless Claims, Durable Goods Orders, Factory Orders.
15-Nov-2018 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, Retail Sales.
20-Dec-2018 14:00 MX: Retail Sales. US: Initial Jobless Claims.
07-Feb-2019 14:00 MX: CPI, Bi-Weekly CPI. US: Initial Jobless Claims.
28-Mar-2019 15:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, GDP.
16-May-2019 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, Housing Starts.
27-Jun-2019 14:00 MX: Trade Balance. US: Initial Jobless Claims, GDP.
15-Aug-2019 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, Retail Sales, IP.
26-Sep-2019 14:00 MX: IGAE. US: Initial Jobless Claims, GDP.
14-Nov-2019 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, PPI.
19-Dec-2019 14:00 US: Initial Jobless Claims, Existing Home Sales.
Appendix 2.B Exclusion of the Announcement on
Feb. 17, 2016
On January 20, 2016, the price of oil declined to 26 dollars per barrel (dpb), a level not
seen since 2003. By February 4, the day of the first regular monetary policy meeting of
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Banxico that year, the price recovered to 32 dpb. One week later, however, the price
declined again, now to 28 dpb, raising concerns about the current account in Mexico and
the fiscal position of the government, who relies considerably on oil exports. During that
week, the peso depreciated to 19.2 pesos per dollar—a level not seen before—which raised
concerns in Banxico about the exchange rate pass-through to inflation.
Shortly after 12 p.m. on February 17, the Finance Secretary and the Governor of
Banxico held a joint press conference to announce a series of measures intended to provide
confidence to market participants. The measures included a 50 basis point increase in the
policy rate. Although the decision was completely unexpected by market participants,
it was preceded and followed by other measures during the press conference, including
fiscal adjustments. As a consequence, the response of asset prices around this particular
monetary policy decision is likely to be contaminated by the other announcements; that
is, identification of the actual effects of the emergency meeting is not easy, even using
intraday data. Additionally, Banxico’s decision to tighten was mainly influenced by the
developments in the foreign exchange market in the previous days and, therefore, not
completely exogenous. Finally, the statement of Banxico’s emergency meeting that took
place the day before the joint press conference clearly indicates that the decision to raise
the policy rate ‘does not start a tightening cycle’. The announcement can therefore be
considered as a one-off policy rate surprise. For all these reasons the announcement of
February 17, 2016 is excluded from the analysis.
Appendix 2.C Policy Rate Surprises Based on the
TIIE28D
There are several considerations that need to be taken into account if the TIIE28D were
to be used to measure monetary policy surprises. First, it is calculated once a day and
thus daily changes are the highest frequency for which TIIE28D can be used, which is
relevant given the ‘high-frequency’ exchange rate puzzle (see section 2.4).
Second, there is a difference between the date of the calculation and that of the
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publication, which needs to be taken into account to compute the daily changes. The
relevant one is the calculation date since it reflects the available information in the market
at the time when banks submit their quotes to Banxico for it to calculate the TIIE28D.36
Given this timing difference, the data source for the TIIE28D matters. Bloomberg reports
the series for the TIIE28D using the calculation date, while Banxico reports the series
using the publication date.
One last consideration involves the timing change of Banxico’s monetary policy an-
nouncements from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. ET that started in 2015. The TIIE28D is calcu-
lated at 1 p.m. ET with quotes from at least six commercial banks.37 This time falls
in between the times of the monetary policy announcements preceding and following the
timing change. Therefore, the daily changes using the TIIE28D series need to take this
into account to ensure that they are correctly capturing the information before and after
each monetary policy announcement. Specifically, prior to 2015, the daily changes need
to be calculated as the difference in the series the day of the announcement relative to
the previous day, but starting in 2015, they need to be obtained as the difference in the
series the following day of the announcement relative to the day of the announcement.
The correlation between the policy rate surprises obtained from the daily change in
the TIIE28D and that obtained from the intraday change in the 3-month swap rate is 0.7.
Consistent with the explanation for the ‘high-frequency’ exchange rate puzzle in section
2.4, when policy rate surprises based on the daily change in the TIIE28D are used to
estimate equation (2.1), there is no effect on the exchange rate.
36Daily changes obtained using the date of the publication do not capture the event of interest (i.e.
surprises in monetary policy decisions) since they reflect information one day before the event.
37If less than six banks submit their quotes, the time for the calculation is delayed at most twice in
15-minute intervals. All these times increase by one hour during non-overlapping DST days between
Mexico and the U.S., see section 2.2.1.
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Appendix 2.D Derivation of Inconsistency in Slope
Estimator
This appendix derives the degree of inconsistency in the slope estimator when there is an
omitted variable, and measurement error in the dependent and independent variables.
Let µi, σ
2
i and σij denote respectively the expected value and variance of variable i,
and the covariance between variables i and j. For ease of exposition, I assume that the
dependent and independent variables in the following model have mean zero:
y∗ = βx∗ + ε,
in which the error ε is independent and identically distributed with zero mean, variance
σ2ε and uncorrelated with x
∗, so µε = σεx∗ = 0. While both y
∗ and x∗ are unobserved
variables, y and x are observed but measured with an additive error:
x = x∗ + u,
y = y∗ + ν,
in which the measurement errors have zero means and variances given by σ2u and σ
2
ν ,
plus they are uncorrelated among themselves and with the error term ε; that is, µu =
µν = σuν = σuε = σνε = 0. The estimated equation is thus:
y = βx+ τ = βx+ ε− βu+ ν,
in which τ mixes together the ‘true’ error ε, and the measurement errors u and ν.
The classical measurement error model assumes that there is only measurement error
in the independent variable, which is uncorrelated with the true dependent and indepen-
dent variables; that is, σ2u > 0 and σ
2
ν = σux∗ = σuy∗ = 0. Under these assumptions, the
classic result is that the least squares estimators for β and σ2ε , β̂ and σ̂
2
ε , are inconsistent.
In particular, the estimator β̂ is biased towards zero, commonly referred to as attenuation
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σν = 0 59.96
ρux∗ = 0 0.02 0.856
ρuy∗ = 0 0.10 0.407
Dependent Variable Only
σu = 0 1.70
ρνx∗ = 0 0.20 0.097
ρνy∗ = 0 −0.11 0.368
0 < λ < 1 0.956
Notes: This table compares the classic assumptions in measurement error models against the data. Mea-
surement errors are calculated as the difference between daily and intraday changes in the variables. σi,
σ2i and ρij denote the standard deviation and variance of variable i, and the correlation between variables
i and j, respectively. Although the assumptions in the models are expressed in terms of covariances, this
table reports correlations. The last column tests the null hypothesis of zero correlation. The attenuation






, where σx∗ = 7.93. The sample includes all regular
monetary policy meetings from January 2011 to December 2019.
in which λ is the attenuation factor, also known as the signal-to-total variance ratio.38
Since 0 < λ < 1, |plim(β̂)| < |β|. Hence, the extent of the bias depends asymptotically on
λ; the farther away it is from one, the larger the attenuation bias.39 Lastly, the estimator
for the asymptotic variance s of β̂ is also inconsistent.40
When there is measurement error in the dependent variable only, it is usually assumed
to be uncorrelated with the true dependent and independent variables; that is, σ2ν > 0
and σ2u = σνx∗ = σνy∗ = 0. These assumptions imply that the estimator β̂ is consistent
but with a larger standard error.
Validation studies provide evidence about the magnitude of the measurement errors
and permit one to asses the validity of the classic assumptions for the case at hand. Table
2.D.1 compares the classic assumptions in measurement error models against the data
for the exchange rate and the policy rate surprises.41
The measurement error in the independent variable is relatively small (σu is less than
38Notice that λ can also be defined as λ = σ2x∗/σ
2
x.
39When there is no measurement error in the independent variable, σ2u = 0, λ = 1 and β̂ is consistent.
40See Pischke (2007) for a derivation of plim (ŝ) = λs+ λ(1− λ)β2, so when λ = 1, ŝ is consistent.
41The null hypotheses µu = 0 and µν = 0 are not rejected. Also, the null hypothesis ρuν = 0 is not
rejected; the sample correlation between the two measurement errors is 0.13 with a p-value of 0.28. The
correlations of the measurement errors with the true error are not considered because a validation study
allows one to observe u and ν but never ε, as pointed out by Bound et al. (1994).
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2 basis points), so the attenuation factor is close to 1 and the attenuation bias is in turn
relatively small asymptotically.42 Most importantly, table 2.D.1 shows that the classical
assumptions are not satisfied in the data. In particular, the measurement error in the
dependent variable is quite high (σν is close to 60 basis points) and is slightly correlated
with the independent variable (ρνx∗ = 0.2 is significant at the 10% level).
The main reason behind the puzzle is then noise in the daily exchange rate returns.
The estimator β̂ can be biased either because the error ν is systematically related to the
independent variable—creating an endogeneity bias—or, more generally, because it cap-
tures the effects of other variables influencing the exchange rate—generating an omitted
variable bias. To address both cases, the measurement error model is extended as follows:
y∗ = βx∗ + γω + ε,
in which ω is the omitted variable (i.e. γ 6= 0) and it is assumed to be uncorrelated with
ε and with the measurement errors u and ν. The measurement error in the dependent
variable is now allowed to be correlated with the original independent variable; that is,









cov(x∗ + u, βx∗ + γω + ν + ε)
var(x∗ + u)
=

















= βλ+ γδωx + δνx. (2.2)
This result provides several insights. Now terms related to ω and ν also affect the
inconsistency in β̂.43 Notice that δωx and δνx are the slope coefficients from regressing
the omitted variable ω and the measurement error ν on the mismeasured covariate x,
respectively.44 Even without measurement error in the independent variable (λ = 1), the
estimator β̂ will still be biased whenever there is an omitted variable (γ 6= 0) and/or
the measurement error in the daily exchange rate returns is correlated with the policy
42Since the attenuation factor is shared among the dependent variables (exchange rate and bond
yields), there is also a relatively small attenuation bias in the estimated coefficients of the yield curve
when intraday changes in yields are regressed on daily changes in the 3-month swap rate.
43Similarly, additional terms related to ω and ν appear in the probability limit of ŝ.
44If there is no measurement error in x (σ2u = 0), ω and ν are regressed on x
∗ instead of x.
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rate surprises (σνx∗ 6= 0). An illustration of this result can actually be seen in the third
column of table 2.4. In that case, the second term in equation (2.2) would be a standard
omitted variable bias whose magnitude and sign would depend on both the influence of
the omitted variable on the exchange rate (γ) and the correlation of that variable with
the policy rate surprises (δωx). The third term in equation (2.2) would be an endogeneity
bias created because ρνx∗ 6= 0 (see table 2.D.1).
The second term in equation (2.2) cannot be assessed directly—because ω is
unobserved—but the third term can be estimated as part of the validation study of
section 2.4.1 and is indeed expected to be positive (since ρ̂νx∗ > 0 in table 2.D.1). One
can regress the error ν on the policy rate surprises (measured without and with error) to
test whether they are systematically related. The respective coefficients δ̂νx∗ and δ̂νx are
positive (obtained from the coefficients already reported in table 2.4), but not significant.
Therefore, rather than being correlated with the independent variable, the measurement
error in the daily exchange rate returns is giving rise to an omitted variable bias.
Moreover, the bias due to an omitted variable can be characterized because its sign
depends on the signs of γ and δωx. Assume β < 0 and σνx = 0 in equation (2.2). An
upward bias implies either γ > 0 and δωx > 0, or γ < 0 and δωx < 0. The first alternative
actually aligns with the response of the exchange rate on September 6, 2013, described
in section 2.4.2. In that case, the omitted variable (job gains) correlates positively with
the policy rate surprises but has an offsetting effect on the exchange rate. For instance,
when there is a surprise easing (x < 0) that depreciates the currency (β < 0), the omitted
variable falls (ω < 0 since δωx > 0) appreciating the currency (γ > 0).
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Chapter 3
Price and Quantity Effects of
Monetary Policy Actions and
Statements in an Emerging Economy
This chapter studies the effects of monetary policy actions and statements on the exchange
rate, the yield curve and portfolio flows in Mexico.
3.1 Introduction
Monetary policy in advanced economies has more than one dimension since financial
markets react to different types of information (e.g. changes in the policy rate, news about
the future path of the policy rate, adjustments in asset purchase programs) communicated
by central banks via policy statements. However, it is not yet clear whether monetary
policy in emerging markets also has more than one dimension.1 A lack of response
of financial markets to the different types of information communicated by emerging
market central banks would mean that they have less room to operate relative to their
counterparts in advanced economies.
This paper studies whether asset prices and portfolio flows respond not only to changes
1Blinder et al. (2008) review the literature documenting the influence of central bank communications
on financial markets mainly for advanced economies, although some evidence exists for emerging markets.
Su et al. (2019) use content analysis to classify those communications but it is prone to subjectivity.
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in the policy rate but to information about its future path communicated via policy state-
ments by Banxico, the Mexican central bank. Monetary policy surprises are identified
following the methodology proposed by Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and using a new dataset
of intraday changes in swap rates around monetary policy announcements from 2011 to
2019.2 Surprises in the policy rate and about its future path are henceforth referred to as
target and path surprises, respectively. To measure the effects on asset prices, intraday
changes over the same windows are also calculated for the exchange rate and bond yields.
To assess the effects on portfolio flows, the analysis looks at holdings of Mexican gov-
ernment securities disaggregated by type of investor available daily and at U.S.-Mexico
portfolio flows available monthly. The analysis quantifies the contemporaneous effects
as well as their persistence in the days following a monetary policy announcement using
an event study methodology and local projections, respectively. By now, event studies
with high-frequency data are a well-established approach in macro-finance to overcome
endogeneity concerns. Monetary policy is intrinsically endogenous, it reacts to different
macroeconomic circumstances, and so quantifying its effects is challenging. Event studies
overcome this by isolating the surprise component of policy decisions.3
The main finding in this paper is that path as well as target surprises are relevant
for asset prices and portfolio flows in Mexico. This means that, in addition to changes
in the policy rate, central banks in emerging markets also have the ability to manage
expectations via statements. Three implications are worth highlighting. First, the mul-
tidimensionality of monetary policy (Gürkaynak et al., 2005; Swanson, 2018; Altavilla
et al., 2019) is not exclusive to advanced economies. Second, by communicating informa-
tion about the future path of the policy rate, emerging market central banks can better
tame the spillover effects of monetary policy in advanced economies, which tend to be
larger on long-term yields (Obstfeld, 2015; Kearns et al., 2018). Third, central banks in
emerging markets would still have room to conduct monetary policy in case their policy
rate were to be constrained by the zero lower bound.4
2The swaps reference an interbank interest rate that closely follows the policy rate.
3Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) review approaches to measure the effects of monetary policy.
4Gürkaynak et al. (2005) reach a similar conclusion for the U.S. before the global financial crisis. When
the zero lower bound is binding, forward guidance about the policy rate is more explicit than under a
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The exchange rate only reacts to target surprises and the effect is not persistent.
The lack of response to path surprises seems characteristic of the Mexican peso because
the currencies of advanced economies do respond to path surprises (Rosa, 2011b; Ferrari
et al., 2017), and emerging market currencies other than the Mexican peso respond to U.S.
path surprises (Hausman and Wongswan, 2011). Future research can explore the extent
to which Banxico’s foreign exchange interventions to provide liquidity and to promote
orderly market conditions mute the response of the currency to path surprises.
Bond yields respond significantly to target and path surprises. In particular, medium-
and long-term yields react more to path than to target surprises, consistent with the
evidence for the U.S. reported by Gürkaynak et al. (2005) for a period when the U.S. policy
rate was not constrained by the zero lower bound. In this sense, Banxico’s influence over
longer-term yields improves the implementation of monetary policy in Mexico given that
medium- and long-term yields are more relevant to the spending decisions of households
and firms. Moreover, both types of surprises have a larger influence on the yield curve in
Mexico than U.S. surprises have on the U.S. yield curve. According to the expectations
hypothesis, this result suggests that long-term inflation expectations in Mexico are less
firmly anchored than in the U.S.;5 even though inflation expectations in Mexico are
anchored (De Pooter et al., 2014), it is likely that they are not as well anchored as in the
U.S. In addition, the larger reaction in Mexico can also reflect a larger effect of surprises
on term premia, which could be explained by the response of reach-for-yield investors
(Hanson and Stein, 2015); Mexican banks indeed exhibit this behavior as explained next.
Daily portfolio flows respond to both target and path surprises. Banxico collects daily
data on holdings of different types of Mexican government securities disaggregated by
type of investor. The most relevant type of bonds in Mexico are the long-term fixed-rate
ones known as bonos. The analysis shows that domestic and foreign investors rebalance
their portfolios of bonos following monetary policy decisions. Moreover, the rebalancing
done by domestic investors depends on their business model. For instance, banks exhibit
conventional approach (Kuttner, 2018). When other unconventional monetary policies are implemented
(e.g. quantitative easing), financial markets respond to other types of information (Swanson, 2018).
5Since prices are flexible in the long run, long-term expected real interest rates would not be affected.
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reach-for-yield behavior since they increase their purchases of bonos a few days after
a target easing surprise; their response supports the mechanism described by Hanson
and Stein (2015), in which monetary policy affects term premia due to yield-oriented
investors. More broadly, holdings data provides a broader picture of the effects of mone-
tary policy. Target and path surprises influence bond yields days after an announcement,
which is in line with gradual changes in bonos holdings. Indeed, pension funds and for-
eign investors take time to respond to the surprises. This evidence is consistent with
the slow-moving capital explanation proposed by Brooks et al. (2019) for how the yields
respond to monetary policy in advanced economies.
Some portfolio flows between Mexico and the U.S. also react to target and path
surprises. Inflows into non-U.S. stocks increase following a target easing surprise. This
means that the central bank in the destination country can trigger a reach-for-yield
behavior in U.S. investors. Meanwhile, inflows into U.S. agency bonds decrease after a
path easing surprise, which suggests that local investors use non-Mexican securities to
rebalance their portfolios in response to monetary policy decisions in Mexico. Lastly,
the evidence suggests that foreign non-U.S. investors are important players in the bonos
market. These results show that capital flows to emerging markets respond not only to
the monetary policy of the home country, as shown in the existing literature, but also to
the monetary policy of the destination country.
This paper contributes to the literature in two respects. First, it extends the analysis
in Gürkaynak et al. (2005) to an emerging economy in order to assess the extent to
which its path surprises impact, and for how long, asset prices as well as portfolio flows.
The study of the effects of monetary policy in emerging markets generally focuses on
target surprises (Kohlscheen, 2014; Soĺıs, 2021c). Second, this paper takes the perspective
of an emerging market economy to analyze the effects of its monetary policy on the
portfolio flows it faces. In contrast, the traditional approach in the literature takes the
perspective of the home country to study, for instance, the spillover effects of its monetary
policies. The literature based on the traditional approach documents significant inflows
into financial assets in emerging markets after the global financial crisis (Fratzscher et al.,
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2018).6 Hausman and Wongswan (2011) show that stock prices respond more to U.S.
target surprises, whereas exchange rates and long-term yields respond more to U.S. path
surprises; meanwhile, short-term yields respond to both types of surprises. Bowman
et al. (2015) and Fischer (2020) show that the effect of U.S. monetary policy surprises is
particularly relevant for local currency sovereign yields.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes how mon-
etary policy surprises are measured. Section 3.3 tests the number of monetary policy
factors and discusses their interpretation. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively analyze how
asset prices and portfolio flows respond to the factors. The last section concludes.
3.2 Identification of Monetary Policy Surprises
The Bank of Mexico, also known as Banxico, conducts monetary policy through a Gov-
erning Board comprised by the governor—who acts as the chair of the Board—and four
deputy governors. Banxico became an independent central bank in 1994 and adopted
an inflation targeting regime in 2001. The official inflation target is 3% with a range
of ± 1%. Before 2008, Banxico conducted monetary policy using something akin to a
target for non-borrowed reserves, and in 2008 it adopted the overnight interbank interest
rate as its monetary policy instrument. Soĺıs (2021c) discusses institutional details about
Banxico’s monetary policy and provides the dates and times of its announcements.
This paper uses swap rates to measure surprises in monetary policy decisions. The
swaps market in Mexico references an interbank interest rate denominated in local cur-
rency that serves as a benchmark for banking loans in the country and that closely follows
the policy rate, the 28-day interbank interest rate or TIIE28D.7 Banxico calculates the
TIIE28D once a day based on quotes submitted by commercial banks. The TIIE28D
3-month swap is the main local derivative. Soĺıs (2021c) uses this swap to capture sur-
prises in the policy rate. This paper extends his analysis by considering a broader sense of
6Curcuru et al. (2015) argues that this is due to allocations of new savings (a wealth effect) rather
than a reallocation toward assets in those countries since portfolio flows did not surge disproportionately
to emerging markets in response to unconventional monetary policies in advanced economies.
7The average difference between the TIIE28D and the overnight policy rate is around 30 basis points.
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monetary policy surprises given that the adoption of inflation targeting and well-anchored
inflation expectations arguably allowed Banxico to pursue more forward-looking policies.
I consider swaps with maturities up to one year. Like other central banks, Banxico
communicates information about its monetary policy outlook via statements. This infor-
mation might influence market expectations about future policy actions. Unlike in many
advanced economies after the global financial crisis, the policy rate in Mexico has so far
not been constrained by the zero lower bound. As a consequence, Banxico’s monetary
policy statements include information about future policy actions within a year out at
most, it does not need to commit to a predetermined path for the policy rate for longer
periods. Using swaps with maturities up to one year is consistent with the approach of
Gürkaynak et al. (2005) for the U.S. before the Great Recession.8
Monetary policy surprises are obtained as the difference in swap rates around windows
containing policy announcements.9 Intraday differences from 10 minutes before to 20
minutes after each announcement are calculated for swaps of 3, 6 and 9 months as well
as of 1 year.10 To measure the effects of the surprises, intraday differences over the same
windows are also calculated for the Mexican peso (MXN) per U.S. dollar (USD) exchange
rate and for yields of bonds issued by the Mexican government with maturities of 2, 5,
10 and 30 years.11 12 For yields, the change is calculated directly using quotes before
and after the announcements; for the exchange rate, 100 times log differences are used to
approximate the percentage change (or return) over the window. All the information for
the analysis comes from Bloomberg. The information to calculate the intraday differences
for the swap rates and the exchange rate is available since 2011, and since 2013 for bond
yields other than the 5-year yield for which the sample starts in December 2014.
8Swanson (2018) argues for including maturities of more than one year out when the policy rate is
constrained by the zero lower bound and the central bank uses unconventional monetary policy tools.
9See Soĺıs (2021c) for considerations about the timing of the announcements.
10When no data is available at any of those times, the next available quote is used to compute the
changes. In extreme cases, in which there are no quotes in wider windows for a day, the open and close
quotes are used to compute the differences. This only happens on a few days for some swaps.
11The Mexican government issued 10- 20- and 30-year fixed-rate local-currency bonds for the first time
in 2001, 2003 and 2006, respectively, following the implementation of a debt management strategy to
develop its debt market that started in 2000 (Jeanneau and Tovar, 2008; Abreu, 2014).
12All the results discussed below using tight 30-minute windows remain using wider 50-minute windows,
starting 20 minutes before and ending 30 minutes after each monetary policy announcement.
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3.3 Monetary Policy Dimensions
This section applies the methodology proposed by Gürkaynak et al. (2005) to Mexico
and shows that two factors in monetary policy decisions move asset prices. One factor
can be associated with surprises about the current policy rate and the other factor with
surprises about its future path communicated via policy statements. Subsequent sections
analyze how asset prices and portfolio flows respond to these factors.
3.3.1 Assessing the Number of Factors
The number of factors influencing asset prices is assessed using the matrix rank test
developed by Cragg and Donald (1997). Let X be a T × n matrix of asset price changes
around monetary policy announcements with T observations and n asset prices, and with
a factor structure given by:
X = FΛ + ζ, (3.1)
in which F is a T × k matrix with k unobserved factors, Λ is a k × n matrix of factor
loadings and ζ is white noise. For a given number of variables n, the Cragg–Donald
test assesses the null hypothesis that k0 factors (k0 < n) explain most of the variability
observed in the data. The test minimizes the distance between the covariance matrix of
the observed data and that obtained from all the possible models with k0 factors. The test
is a Wald statistic with an asymptotic χ2 distribution with (n− k0) (n− k0 + 1) /2 − n
degrees of freedom. Inference based on it requires that (n− k0) (n− k0 + 1) /2 > n.13
In addition to conducting the test for the exchange rate and bond yields, the test is
also performed for swaps with maturities up to one year because later on that helps to
give a structural interpretation to the estimated factors. Since n = 5 for the exchange
rate and the yields while n = 4 for swaps, k0 can be at most 2 and 1, respectively, to
satisfy the requirements of the test. To check robustness to the frequency of the data and
the sample period, the test is also performed using daily—besides intraday—changes in
asset prices around the announcements. Daily changes for all asset prices are calculated
13See Cragg and Donald (1997) and the appendix in Gürkaynak et al. (2005) for further details.
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since 2004, except for the 30-year yield which starts in October 2006.
Table 3.1 shows that two factors characterize the responses of asset prices in Mexico.
The null hypothesis of no factors is strongly rejected in all cases. Soĺıs (2021c) indeed
shows that asset prices in Mexico respond at least to unanticipated changes in the current
policy rate. The most interesting null hypotheses, however, involve one and two factors,
k0 = 1, 2. When the test is performed for the exchange rate and bond yields, the null
hypothesis of one factor is rejected at the 5% significance level, but the null of two factors
cannot be rejected even at the 10% level. This finding does not depend on the frequency
of the data nor the sample period. Therefore, asset prices in Mexico react to more than
just surprises about the current policy rate, they react to additional information Banxico
is providing. And they have done so even before Banxico adopted the overnight policy
rate in 2008, since daily data goes back to 2004. The multidimensionality of monetary
policy in advanced economies (Gürkaynak et al., 2005; Swanson, 2018; Altavilla et al.,
2019) is thus also observed in emerging markets.
The same conclusion is reached when the test is performed for swaps. The null of
one factor is also rejected at the 5% significance level, regardless of the data frequency.
Section 3.3.3 exploits this for interpreting the two factors.
3.3.2 Estimating the Factors
The factors F , as well as their loadings Λ, in equation (3.1) are estimated by applying
principal components to the matrix of asset price changes X. The two factors will be
the first two principal components of X. These factors are orthogonal to each other and
are linear combinations of the variables included in X. Yet the factors do not have a
practical interpretation, which is needed to understand their effects on asset prices.
For interpretation purposes, X is comprised of swaps—instead of the exchange rate
and bond yields—when estimating the two factors, F1 and F2. The factors are normalized
























Table 3.1. Tests of the Number of Factors in Monetary Policy Surprises
Frequency H0 : k = k0 Wald Statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value Observations
0 36.55 10 0.000 41
Intraday 1 11.62 5 0.040 41
Exchange Rate 2 0.04 1 0.851 41
& Yield Curve 0 35.24 10 0.000 120
Daily 1 14.60 5 0.012 120
2 0.01 1 0.933 120
Swaps
Intraday
0 26.47 6 0.000 72
1 7.47 2 0.024 72
Daily
0 25.57 6 0.000 155
1 9.49 2 0.009 155
Notes: This table reports the results from the Cragg–Donald test. H0 is the null hypothesis of k = k0 factors against the al-
ternative of k > k0 factors, where k0 = 0, 1, 2. The sample is all regular monetary policy announcements until December 2019,
the starting date varies based on data availability: for the exchange rate and the yield curve with intraday data is December
2014 (due to the 5-year yield) and with daily data is October 2006 (due to the 30-year yield); for swaps with intraday data is
January 2011 and with daily data is January 2004. The yield curve includes 2- 5- 10- and 30-year bonds. Swaps include 3- 6-
9-month and 1-year swaps.
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Let U be a 2× 2 rotation matrix for F such that
Z = F U, (3.2)
in which Z denotes the rotated factors, Z1 and Z2. Four restrictions are imposed on U to
uniquely identify it and being able to give an interpretation to the factors. The rotated
factors are required to be orthogonal to each other and to have unit variance. The final
restriction is set so that only Z1 mirrors the change in the 3-month swap rate, i.e. the
policy rate surprise, thus the loading of the 3-month swap rate on Z2 is zero.
14
To further ease the interpretation and to be able to compare the magnitudes of the
factors, they are rescaled so that Z1 moves one-to-one with the change in the 3-month
swap rate and Z2 affects the 1-year swap rate in the same magnitude as Z1 does. The
rescaling is done using data since 2013, when intraday data for bond yields becomes
available.15 Table 3.A.1 in the appendix verifies that changes in the 3-month swap rate
move (one-to-one) with Z1, whereas Z2 has considerable explanatory power for changes
in the 1-year swap rate.
Figure 3.1 shows that the estimation of the factors is not sensitive to the sample size,
the sample period nor data frequency. The figure compares the time series of Z1 and Z2
obtained with intraday and daily data since 2011 as well as with daily data since 2004.
The Z1 factors correlate among themselves around 0.98, whereas the Z2 factors around
0.74. Even though daily data yields longer time series, the core of the analysis relies on
the factors identified with intraday data because there are gains in precision during the
estimation and in terms of explanatory power, plus the effects on the exchange rate can
only be detected with intraday data (Soĺıs, 2021c).
14The loadings on Z1 and Z2 for all four swaps can be expressed in terms of the parameters in U
and the factor loadings Λ. To see this, substitute F from equation (3.2) into (3.1). The last restriction,
however, only uses the two loadings in Λ for the 3-month swap. See the appendix in Gürkaynak et al.
(2005).
15The rescaling does not affect the starting date of the factors, the first observation starts in 2011.
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Notes: This figure compares the evolution of the target and path factors obtained with intraday and
daily data. The solid lines are obtained with daily data from 2004 to 2019. The dash-dotted lines are
obtained with daily data from 2011 to 2019. The dashed lines are obtained with intraday data from 2011
to 2019.
3.3.3 Interpreting the Factors
The factors Z1 and Z2 are henceforth referred to as the target and path factors or surprises,
respectively. By definition, Z1 moves with surprises in the 3-month swap rate, and Z2
is aligned with surprises in the 1-year swap rate that are unrelated to changes in the
3-month swap rate.16 Accordingly, Z1 can be related to surprises in the current policy
rate, while Z2 can be associated with surprises about the future path of the policy rate.
The evidence presented below supports this interpretation.
Figure 3.2 compares the estimated target and path surprises for relevant dates over
the sample period. Even if there is no change in the policy rate, there can still be target
surprises if market participants expected a change. For instance, on April 27, 2012, the
average rate from survey expectations was lower than the existing level indicating that
16By construction, Z1 is essentially the same as the policy rate surprises in Soĺıs (2021c), the correlation
coefficient between the two measures is 0.998. Meanwhile, the correlation between Z2 and the residual
of a regression of the change in the 1-year swap on the change in the 3-month swap is 0.993.
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Notes: This figure plots the largest estimated target and path factors obtained from intraday data, as
explained in the main text. The sample is all regular monetary policy announcements from January
2011 to December 2019. The dates of the three unlabeled dots in the first quadrant are 25 Oct 2013
(bottom), 29 Jan 2015 (left) and 19 Dec 2019 (right).
some market participants expected a cut in the rate. Banxico, however, left the policy
rate unchanged, which was interpreted as a target tightening surprise as the figure shows.
Statements and Path Surprises
Statements convey information intended to influence expectations about future mone-
tary policy decisions and to reduce policy uncertainty. Table 3.2 summarizes Banxico’s
policy statements on announcement days in which, according to figure 3.2, their content
communicated important information about the future path of the policy rate.
The excerpts reported in table 3.2 are in line with figure 3.2. The announcements
on June 2017 and August 2019 suggested loose financial conditions ahead, while the
statements for the rest of the announcements signaled a tighter monetary stance going
forward. Moreover, the announcements on March and October 2013, January 2015 and

























Table 3.2. Summary of Statements in Selected Dates
Date Description
27-Apr-2012 Statement indicates that the balance of risks for economic growth has improved.
08-Mar-2013 Statement makes clear that the 50 basis point reduction in the policy rate ‘does not represent the
beginning of an easing cycle’.
25-Oct-2013 Statement highlights that ‘no further cuts in the policy rate are appropriate in the foreseeable future’.
29-Jan-2015 Statement notes the recent depreciation of the peso is an upward risk to inflation; the Board will
monitor U.S. monetary policy and exchange rate dynamics ‘to be able to take the necessary measures’.
17-Nov-2016 Statement announces that the balance of risks for inflation has deteriorated and removes ‘this incre-
ment in the policy rate is not the beginning of a tightening cycle’ from the previous statement.
09-Feb-2017 Statement highlights the effects of the tightenings in 2016 and ‘the ones required in 2017’ to counteract
inflationary pressures.
22-Jun-2017 Statement drops reference to do ‘the necessary tightenings ahead’ from the previous statement; the
balance of risks for inflation has shifted from moderately deteriorated to neutral.
15-Aug-2019 Statement notes that the negative output gap increased more than expected.
19-Dec-2019 Statement notes that headline and core inflation for 2020 might be ‘slightly higher’ than previously
expected due to a recent increase in minimum wages.
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Consider the tightening cycle that started in mid-2016 due to rising inflation risks as an
example of the association of path surprises with information contained in statements.
The 2016 U.S. presidential election generated uncertainty about the bilateral relation
of the two countries. Between early-November 2016 and mid-January 2017, the peso
depreciated by more than 14%. In addition, the minimum wage was raised and gasoline
subsidies ended in early-2017. By mid-2017, inflation had risen for 10 consecutive months.
On June and September 2016, Banxico raised its policy rate by 50 basis points, more than
had been expected according to surveys. These increases were followed by 6 consecutive
tightenings, three of 50 basis points followed by three of 25 basis points.17 In the statement
for the last hike on June 2017, Banxico indicated that it expected inflation to peak in the
near future, in addition to what is reported in table 3.2. This statement is relevant because
the hike was mostly anticipated by the market, so there was essentially no target surprise,
but the wording suggested the end of the tightening cycle, which can be interpreted as a
path easing surprise. In fact, the closest to a ‘pure’ path surprise in the sample.
Two dates are also worth reviewing due to the ‘lack’ of path surprises. According to
figure 3.2, the announcements on September 2013 and June 2014 contained large easing
surprises in the target but not in the path factor. A closer look at the statements for those
dates supports this interpretation. Contrary to survey expectations of no change in the
monetary policy stance, on September 6, 2013, Banxico announced a 25 basis point cut in
the policy rate but indicated that with ‘the lower policy rate, the monetary stance is in line
with inflation converging to the target.’ Similarly, while survey expectations indicated
no policy change on June 6, 2014, Banxico cut the policy rate by 50 basis points adding
that ‘no further reductions in the policy rate are expected in the foreseeable future.’ In
both decisions the policy rate was cut unexpectedly, but the statements portrayed them
as one-off cuts by signaling that no further movements in the rate were to be expected.
That is, they were both target but not path surprises.
These examples support the association of path surprises with unanticipated infor-
mation about the future path of the policy rate communicated via statements. Notice,
17The beginning of the tightening cycle might be dated as of November 2016 according to table 3.2.
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however, that the magnitude of the path surprises is lower than that of target surprises.
The largest path surprises in Mexico are also lower compared to the largest path surprises
for the U.S. reported by Gürkaynak et al. (2005), see their table 4. Two potential reasons
might explain this. First, international developments play a relevant role in the monetary
policy considerations of small open economies, and Mexico is no exception. In this sense,
it is harder to commit to a future path of the policy rate for extended periods of time
when there is high uncertainty abroad. Second, and most importantly, the possibility
of reaching the zero lower bound has not been an issue in Mexico, and so the need of
Banxico to rely on path surprises has been low.
3.4 The Effects of Monetary Policy on Asset Prices
The previous section shows that target and path surprises capture the responses of asset
prices to monetary policy decisions. This section documents the response of the exchange
rate and the yield curve to those surprises. The next section extends the analysis and
assess their effects on portfolio flows.
3.4.1 Contemporaneous Effects
The following event-study regression is used to measure the on-impact effects of the two
monetary policy surprises on the exchange rate and the yield curve:
∆yt = β0 + β1Targett + β2Patht + εt, (3.3)
in which ∆yt is the intraday change in asset prices around monetary policy announce-
ments, as described in section 3.2. The changes are expressed in basis points. Targett
and Patht are the two factors described in section 3.3.3. Positive values in either factor
indicate a tightening of the monetary stance and negative values represent an easing.
Finally, the error term εt captures variations in the dependent variables unrelated to the
two factors.
Table 3.3 reports the results. Since the target surprises in this paper are highly
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correlated with policy rate surprises in Soĺıs (2021c), the estimated coefficients for target
surprises in table 3.3 align closely with the responses of the exchange rate and the yield
curve reported by Soĺıs (2021c).
Response of the Exchange Rate
Table 3.3 indicates that the exchange rate only responds to target but not to path sur-
prises. This seems puzzling since rational and forward-looking investors are expected to
respond to changes in the future path of the policy rate. In fact, the currencies of ad-
vanced economies respond stronger to path than to target surprises (Rosa, 2011b; Ferrari
et al., 2017). The lack of response to path surprises seems characteristic of the Mexican
peso, however. For instance, other emerging market currencies respond to U.S. path sur-
prises, whereas the peso only reacts to U.S. target surprises (Hausman and Wongswan,
2011).
Two reasons might explain the lack of response of the currency to path surprises.
First, although the peso operates under a flexible regime, Banxico intervenes in the
foreign exchange market to provide liquidity and to promote orderly conditions. Even
though Banxico intervenes following a rules-based approach (Garćıa-Verdú and Zerecero,
2013),18 the interventions might unintendedly be muting the response of the currency
to path surprises. Consistent with this, Hausman and Wongswan (2011) find that the
currencies of countries with a more flexible exchange rate regime respond more to path
surprises (in the U.S.).
An alternative explanation involves an information channel, according to which path
surprises have different effects on the currency that offset each other. For instance, a
path tightening surprise would appreciate the currency due to a higher policy rate in
the future but could, at the same time, depreciate it if the surprise signals higher future
inflation. Gürkaynak et al. (2005) provide a similar explanation for the lack of reaction
of the stock market to path surprises.








































Table 3.3. Response of Asset Prices to Target and Path Surprises
FX 2Y Yield 5Y Yield 10Y Yield 30Y Yield
Target -1.89** -1.89** 0.67*** 0.68*** 0.35*** 0.27*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.30*** 0.30***
(0.77) (0.78) (0.086) (0.081) (0.10) (0.094) (0.086) (0.081) (0.079) (0.075)
Path -0.14 0.48*** 0.69*** 0.56*** 0.59***
(1.19) (0.089) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12)
Obs. 72 72 56 56 41 41 56 56 56 56
R2 0.20 0.20 0.80 0.86 0.24 0.60 0.53 0.69 0.35 0.59
Notes: The first column for each dependent variable shows the coefficient estimates in regressions of intraday yield changes or exchange rate returns
(FX) on target surprises; the second column adds path surprises as a regressor. Target and path surprises are obtained from intraday data, as explained
in the main text. Intraday changes are calculated starting 10 minutes before to 20 minutes after a monetary policy announcement. The sample for the
exchange rate is all regular monetary policy announcements from January 2011 to December 2019; for 2- 10- and 30-year yields, from January 2013 to
December 2019; and for 5-year yields, from December 2014 to December 2019. Figures expressed in basis points. All regressions include a constant.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** asterisks respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Response of the Yield Curve
Table 3.3 shows that, unlike the exchange rate, the yield curve responds to target and
path surprises. Information about the future path of the policy rate is expected to have
relatively more weight on the middle to long end of the yield curve.19 Indeed, table 3.3
shows that medium- and long-term yields respond more to path than to target surprises.
Moreover, comparing the R2 statistic of the regressions with one and two factors reveals
that path surprises explain 60, 25 and 40% of the variability in 5- 10- and 30-year yields,
respectively. The relevance of path surprises for medium- and long-term yields further
supports its association with policy statements.
The effects of path surprises on longer-term interest rates improves the implementation
of monetary policy. First of all, medium- and long-term yields are more relevant to the
spending decisions of households and firms. In addition, since the spillover effects of
monetary policy in advanced economies tend to be larger on long-term yields than on
short-therm ones (Obstfeld, 2015; Kearns et al., 2018), Banxico can better tame them by
communicating information about the future path of its policy rate.
In terms of magnitude, the 2- 5- and 10-year yields in Mexico respond stronger to both
surprises than U.S. yields do to the surprises constructed by Gürkaynak et al. (2005). On
average, a 25 basis point target tightening surprise in Mexico vs the U.S. rises the yields
for those maturities by 17 vs 12, 7 vs 7, 11 vs 3 basis points, respectively; while a 10
basis point path tightening surprise rises them by 5 vs 4, 7 vs 4, 6 vs 3 basis points.
According to the expectations hypothesis, this result suggests that long-term inflation
expectations in Mexico are less firmly anchored than in the U.S.;20 even though inflation
expectations in Mexico are anchored (De Pooter et al., 2014), it is likely that they are not
as well anchored as in the U.S. In addition, the larger reaction in Mexico can also reflect
a larger effect of surprises on term premia, which could be explained by the response
of yield-oriented investors (Hanson and Stein, 2015); Mexican banks indeed exhibit this
19By providing guidance about the future path of the policy rate, statements might be revealing central
bank’s information about the future course of output and inflation. For instance, a positive path surprise
might suggest that the central bank sees greater inflation ahead than previously expected, which would
lead to revisions in private forecasts. In relation to this, de Mendonça and de Deus (2019) show that
private forecasters in emerging markets update their expectations based on central bank forecasts.
20Since prices are flexible in the long run, long-term expected real interest rates would not be affected.
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type of reach-for-yield behavior as explained section 3.5.1.
3.4.2 Persistence
Monetary policymakers are not only interested in the initial reaction to the surprises but
on how persistent they are. While event studies capture the response to the surprises on
the day of a surprise, their persistence over subsequent days is assessed using local pro-
jections. Jordà (2005) proposes using local projections instead of vector autoregressions
to generate impulse responses that are robust to misspecification.
This exercise is only done for the yield curve because it involves daily frequencies.
Daily returns of the currencies of emerging markets do not react to surprises about the
policy rate (Kohlscheen, 2014) because daily exchange rate returns are noisy, so the
response can only be detected using intraday data (Soĺıs, 2021c). Unreported results
confirm that the daily exchange rate returns do not respond to target nor path surprises.
I run the following local projections for the daily changes in the yields:
yn|m − yt−1 = αh + β1h Targett + β2h Patht + η
′
hzt−1 + un|m, (3.4)
in which h indicates the horizon in days with h = 0, 1, . . . , 30. Targett and Patht are
equal to the target and path factors on announcement days and zero otherwise. By
construction, the factors are uncorrelated, but they are included simultaneously because
the estimation is more efficient. zt−1 is a vector of lagged variables to control for potential
drivers of the yields one day before an announcement. Since the factors are indeed
surprises, there is no need to control for other variables. In fact, all the results are
essentially the same when no controls are included.21 However, they are considered here
for comparison with the analysis in section 3.5.2 because it involves monthly data for
which it is reasonable to include the controls.
The controls included are the exchange rate, the daily return on the MSCI Mexico
stock market index, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield from the Federal Reserve’s H.15
dataset to account for global financial conditions, the Cboe’s volatility index (VIX) as
21The results reported from event studies do not include the controls given the relatively small number
of observations but when they are included (unreported), some effects are even stronger.
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a measure of risk aversion and economic uncertainty, the J.P. Morgan Emerging Market
Bond Index (EMBI) to capture developments in emerging market sovereign bonds, the
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil price given that the budget of the Mexican
government is closely tied to it as an oil exporter country, the rate on the 5-year credit
default swap (CDS) for Mexico to account for sovereign default risk, and the TED spread
as an indicator of credit risk in the global financial sector as well as the local version
calculated as the difference between the one-month interbank rate (TIIE28D) and the
one-month Mexican Treasury bill rate. These controls are similar to the ones considered
by Christensen et al. (2021) who study the liquidity premium in the Mexican bond market.
The parameters of interest are β1h and β
2
h. They measure the average response of the
yields to the factors at horizon h. The contemporaneous effect (when h = 0) on the yields
is indicated with an arrow in the figures below. All responses are assessed relative to a
one basis point tightening surprise.
Figure 3.3 shows the persistence of bond yields to target and path surprises. First, the
effects on the yields last days after an announcement. This post-announcement drift has
been identified in advanced economies and has been attributed to slow-moving capital
(Brooks et al., 2019). Big players like pension funds and foreign investors might take
time to respond to the surprises, as discussed in section 3.5.1. Second, the persistence
of the effect decreases with the maturity of the bond. Traditionally, central banks exert
relatively more control over the short end of the yield curve with conventional monetary
policies. Lastly, the effect of the path factor at all maturities more than doubles a few
days after a surprise. Gürkaynak et al. (2005) argue that financial markets may take
some time to digest the implications of path surprises. Figure 3.3 supports this view.
3.5 The Effects of Monetary Policy on Portfolio
Flows
The previous section analyzes the responses of asset prices to target and path surprises.

































































































































Notes: This figure plots the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for 1 basis point target and path tightening surprises for yield changes from close
of day t − 1 to day t + h, where t is a day with a monetary policy announcement and h = 0, 1, . . . , 30. An arrow indicates the contemporaneous effect (when
h = 0). The surprises are identified using intraday data around monetary policy announcements, as explained in the main text. The sample includes all regular
monetary policy announcements from January 2011 to December 2019. The 95% confidence bands are based on robust standard errors.
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(spillover) effects of monetary policy in advanced economies on portfolio flows to emerging
markets, this section takes the perspective of the destination country. The evidence shows
that both target and path surprises are relevant for portfolio flows.
3.5.1 Daily Flows
This section exploits the availability of daily data on bonos holdings to analyze how they
respond to target and path surprises. Banxico collects daily data on the value of holdings
of different types of Mexican government securities: Treasury bills (cetes), fixed-rate
bonds (bonos), floating-rate bonds (bondes), inflation-protected bonds (udibonos) and
bonds issued by the deposit insurer (bpas). The analysis focuses on the bonos given the
prominent role they play in the Mexican bond market (Abreu, 2014),
The data contains the holdings of bonos by domestic and foreign investors. Figure 3.4
compares the level of bonos holdings by residence along with the level of cetes holdings
for reference over the period from January 2011 to December 2019. Foreign investors are
the main players in the bonos market, their holdings increased substantially since bonos
were included in the Citigroup’s World Government Bond Index (WGBI) in 2010 (Abreu,
2014). Christensen et al. (2021) document the role of foreign investors in the liquidity
of the bonos market. Between late 2012 and early 2015, foreigners were also the main
holders of cetes but their share declined since then.
Banxico categorizes domestic investors into banks, mutual funds, pension funds, in-
surers and other or non-financial investors (firms and households). Figure 3.5 displays
the level of bonos holdings by domestic residents over the same period. As can be seen,
pension funds are the biggest player in the market. Recently, non-financial investors and
banks started accumulating a larger share of bonos. Meanwhile, insurers maintain the
smallest and most stable share of bonos among the different types of investors.
Changes in the nominal value of bonos holdings can reflect either a change in the
amount of bonos and/or a change in the value of the bonos. To adjust for valuation
effects, I deflate the nominal value of bonos holdings with a rate equal to the percentage
change in the price. The daily percentage change in the price of the bonos is approximated
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Notes: This figure shows the net holdings of Mexican Treasury bills (cetes) and fixed-rate
sovereign bonds (bonos) by the nationality of the investor from January 2011 to December
2019.





















Notes: This figure shows the net holdings of fixed-rate Mexican sovereign bonds (bonos) by
type of investor from January 2011 to December 2019.
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as minus the duration times the daily change in the yield. The duration of the bonos is
calculated using the par yields from the Bloomberg Fair Value (BFV) curve for Mexico
and the average maturity of the bonos reported by Banxico.22 In this way, a change in the
deflated value of bonos holdings only reflects a change in the amount of bonos regardless
of price movements. The adjustment makes little difference in the results though.
Contemporaneous Effects
Similar to the case of asset prices, the following event-study regression measures the
on-impact effects of target and path surprises on the flows of bonos:
∆Ht = β0 + β1Targett + β2Patht + εt, (3.5)
in which ∆Ht is the daily change in the (deflated) value of bonos holdings, i.e. the flows
into bonos, around monetary policy announcements. The rest is similar to equation (3.3).
The model is estimated for each category of investor. Table 3.4 reports the results.
Mutual funds, pensions funds, non-financial investors and foreigners adjust their bonos
holdings to at least one of the surprises on the day of a monetary policy announcement;
only banks and insurers exhibit no reaction. The responses are economically significant.
The most noteworthy ones are those displayed by pension funds to a target surprise and
by foreigners to a path surprise. Pension funds buy about MXN 8 billion worth of bonos
following a 25 basis point target tightening surprise, while foreigners buy about MXN
10 billion worth of bonos after a 10 basis point path tightening surprise. Therefore, in
response to a decline in prices (or a rise in yields) due to a tightening in the monetary
stance, as reported in table 3.3, the two most important players in the bonos market
increase their holdings.
22Every month, Banxico reports the average maturity of government securities outstanding, expressed
in days. For the calculation, the average maturity of bonos is expressed in years and rounded to the
nearest integer; the same value is used for all the days in a month. The change in the log price of the
bond, d log(P ), is approximately equal to −Dmod dy, in which Dmod is the modified duration. Each day,











































Table 3.4. Response of Daily Bonos Flows to Target and Path Surprises
Banks Mutual Pension Insurers Others Foreign
Target -0.065 -0.34* 0.32*** 0.0088 0.31* 0.32
(0.18) (0.19) (0.086) (0.030) (0.17) (0.21)
Path -0.29 0.90* -0.089 0.074 -0.36 1.03***
(0.53) (0.48) (0.24) (0.061) (0.56) (0.35)
No. of Obs. 72 72 72 72 72 72
R2 0.01 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.18
Notes: This table shows the coefficient estimates in regressions of different categories of bonos inflows on target and path surprises. Inflows are obtained
as the change in the holdings of Mexican bonds. All flows are expressed in billions of Mexican pesos. The surprises are equal to the estimated value
(as explained in the main text) if there was a monetary policy announcement in the respective month and zero otherwise. The lag order for each flow
category is selected using the Bayesian information criterion. The sample period is January 2011 to December 2019. All regressions include a constant.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** asterisks respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Persistence
As before, I use local projections to analyze the persistence of the effects. Specifically, I
run the following regressions:
Hn|m −Ht−1 = αh + β1h Targett + β2h Patht + η
′
hzt−1 + un|m, (3.6)
in which the dependent variable is the daily changes in the holdings of bonos. The rest
is similar to equation (3.4). Figures 3.6 and 3.7 display the impulse responses for bonos
flows.
As can be seen, the responses by pension funds to a target surprise and by foreigners
to a path surprise are persistent. The delayed adjustment in the bonos holdings of these
investors aligns with the post-announcement drift displayed by the yields in figure 3.3
and supports the slow-moving capital explanation discussed in section 3.4.2.
Banks also exhibit a delayed response to target surprises but in the opposite direction
to that of pension funds. These two types of investors have different investment profiles.
The average maturity of the bonos held by banks is less than 5 years relative to the more
than 10 years for pension funds (Abreu, 2014). The top left panel in figure 3.6 indeed
suggests that Mexican banks see bonos as riskier assets. The response is consistent
with a reach-for-yield behavior by banks, they buy bonos a few days after a target easing
surprise. Banks’ response supports the mechanism described by Hanson and Stein (2015),
in which monetary policy affects term premia due to yield-oriented investors.
3.5.2 Monthly Flows
A related research question is whether Banxico’s monetary policy also influences cross-
border portfolio flows, in addition to the effects it has on the changes of bonos holdings
of different investors.
The data on holdings collected by Banxico is unique because of its daily frequency. In
fact, one challenge in analyzing the effect of monetary policy surprises on international











































































































Notes: This figure plots the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for 1 basis point target and path tightening surprises for bonos flows from day
t− 1 to day t+h, where t is a day with a monetary policy announcement and h = 0, 1, . . . , 30. An arrow indicates the contemporaneous effect (when h = 0). The
surprises are identified using intraday data around monetary policy announcements, as explained in the main text. The sample includes all regular monetary








































































































Notes: This figure plots the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for 1 basis point target and path tightening surprises for bonos flows from day
t− 1 to day t+h, where t is a day with a monetary policy announcement and h = 0, 1, . . . , 30. An arrow indicates the contemporaneous effect (when h = 0). The
surprises are identified using intraday data around monetary policy announcements, as explained in the main text. The sample includes all regular monetary
policy announcements from January 2011 to December 2019. The 95% confidence bands are based on robust standard errors.
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broadly as (bond and equity) portfolio flows, foreign direct investment, and banking
flows; sometimes international reserves are included as another category. All those flows
are reported quarterly, the same frequency of the balance of payments accounts from
which they are obtained. However, other sources report portfolio flows more frequently.
Data
The U.S. Treasury International Capital (TIC) system is a monthly database of cross-
border securities transactions involving a U.S. counterparty, and is used as an input to
calculate the balance of payments accounts for the U.S.23 TIC data contains disaggre-
gated portfolio flows by country. For many emerging markets, including Mexico, portfolio
flows from and to the U.S. are among the most relevant ones. In the case of Mexico, in-
flows represent sales of securities by Mexican to U.S. investors, and outflows constitute
purchases of securities by Mexican from U.S. investors. Inflows and outflows are catego-
rized into six categories each: (1) U.S. Treasury bonds and notes,24 (2) U.S. government
agency bonds,25 (3) U.S. corporate bonds, (4) U.S. corporate stocks, (5) non-U.S. bonds,
(6) non-U.S. stocks. Although it does not hold exactly, non-U.S. bonds and stocks can
broadly be considered as local (or Mexican) securities. Finally, net flows are obtained by
subtracting outflows to inflows in each of the six categories.
Table 3.5 provides summary statistics for the different categories of TIC flows. The
sample starts in January 2011 and ends in December 2019. Transactions involving non-
U.S. bonds and Treasury-issued securities stand out as the most significant ones followed
by transactions on non-U.S. stocks and U.S. agency bonds.
To compare the effects on cross-border flows, changes in bonos holdings are calculated
at the monthly frequency. Table 3.6 summarizes those monthly flows. As mentioned
before, foreign investors are the main players in the bonos market; the two most important
domestic investors are pension funds and the non-financial sector.
23EPFR collects weekly and daily flows data from mutual funds and exchange-traded funds but it is
not as comprehensive as the balance of payments data and is not publicly available.
24Notes have maturities between 2 and 10 years, while bonds have maturities between 10 and 30 years.
25Bonds issued by U.S. government agencies are not guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury.
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Net Flows: T-Bonds, T-notes -0.02 2.87 -9.26 6.84 108
Net Flows: U.S. Agency Bonds 0.13 1.09 -2.73 6.15 108
Net Flows: U.S. Corp. Bonds 0.01 0.31 -0.98 2.05 108
Net Flows: U.S. Corp. Stocks -0.09 0.46 -0.95 1.38 108
Net Flows: Non-U.S. Bonds 0.88 2.08 -4.67 9.50 108
Net Flows: Non-U.S. Stocks -0.07 0.30 -0.71 0.73 108
Inflows: T-Bonds, T-notes 3.80 3.13 0.19 17.23 108
Inflows: U.S. Agency Bonds 1.63 1.07 0.08 7.97 108
Inflows: U.S. Corp. Bonds 0.28 0.30 0.07 2.24 108
Inflows: U.S. Corp. Stocks 2.76 0.63 1.30 4.49 108
Inflows: Non-U.S. Bonds 5.28 2.34 1.52 14.17 108
Inflows: Non-U.S. Stocks 2.62 0.74 1.43 5.12 108
Outflows: T-Bonds, T-notes 3.82 2.89 0.10 18.29 108
Outflows: U.S. Agency Bonds 1.50 0.63 0.36 3.76 108
Outflows: U.S. Corp. Bonds 0.27 0.21 0.07 1.37 108
Outflows: U.S. Corp. Stocks 2.84 0.60 1.72 4.98 108
Outflows: Non-U.S. Bonds 4.40 2.09 1.12 10.70 108
Outflows: Non-U.S. Stocks 2.69 0.74 1.47 4.95 108
Notes: Amounts expressed in billions of U.S. dollars. The sample period goes from January 2011
to December 2019. Net flows are inflows minus outflows. Inflows are sales of securities by Mexican
to U.S. investors. Outflows are purchases of securities by Mexican from U.S. investors.
Effects on Monthly Portfolio Flows
For each flow category, the following model is used to analyze the effects of target and
path surprises on portfolio flows at the monthly frequency:





zt−1 + νt, (3.7)
in which wt denotes the respective portfolio flow, and the lags wt−j up to order p capture
the persistence in flow data; the lag order for each flow category is selected using the
Bayesian information criterion. Targett and Patht are equal to the target and path
surprises identified with intraday data if there is a monetary policy announcement in the
respective month and zero otherwise.26 The control variables are the same as for equation
26In the few cases in which there is more than one announcement during a month, the monthly surprises
are equal to the sum of the values in the month.
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Cetes: Banks 0.47 18.42 -47.19 41.15 108
Cetes: Mutual Funds 0.24 19.02 -50.42 58.72 108
Cetes: Pension Funds 1.85 10.53 -28.03 53.81 108
Cetes: Insurers 0.30 3.52 -7.70 9.29 108
Cetes: Others 0.81 24.04 -59.52 57.62 108
Cetes: Foreigners 1.34 37.64 -75.63 145.17 108
Bonos: Banks 0.31 29.79 -65.72 108.77 108
Bonos: Mutual Funds -0.25 17.78 -44.88 55.60 108
Bonos: Pension Funds 1.19 12.06 -32.72 37.27 108
Bonos: Insurers 0.04 3.97 -11.45 9.75 108
Bonos: Others 1.54 29.11 -96.72 79.79 108
Bonos: Foreigners 12.89 28.46 -69.32 76.12 108
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the monthly flows of cetes and bonos by differ-
ent groups of investors. The flows are equal to the change in the value of holdings of government
securities. The value is net of valuation effects, as explained in the main text. Foreigners refer to
holdings by non-Mexican investors. Amounts expressed in billions of Mexican pesos. The sample
period goes from January 2011 to December 2019.
(3.3), with their value taken at the last day of the month and the return on the MSCI
Mexico stock market index computed monthly.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 respectively show that portfolio inflows and outflows between Mex-
ico and the U.S. do respond to target and path surprises. Nevertheless, the effects on net
flows are not significant (see Table 3.A.4 in the appendix).
The most significant effects of a target surprise are seen on non-U.S. stocks. A target
easing surprise increases inflows into non-U.S. stocks, which likely reflects more willing-
ness of U.S. investors to hold risky local assets. Relatedly, but from a home-country
perspective, Chen et al. (2014) find that easing surprises in the U.S. are associated with
higher portfolio equity flows into emerging markets. Tables 3.7 therefore suggests that
the central bank in the destination country can trigger a reach-for-yield behavior in U.S.
investors. Tables 3.8 shows that domestic investors also increase their purchases of non-
U.S. stocks owned by U.S. investors but in smaller magnitude, so net inflows into non-U.S.
stocks increase following a target easing surprise; the effect on net inflows, however, is











































Table 3.7. Response of Portfolio Inflows to Target and Path Surprises
T-Notes/Bonds Agency Bonds U.S. Corp. Bonds U.S. Corp. Stocks Non-U.S. Bonds Non-U.S. Stocks
Target -0.062 0.0055 -0.0036 -0.0014 -0.042 -0.019***
(0.054) (0.017) (0.0042) (0.0058) (0.038) (0.0040)
Path 0.13 0.073** 0.012 -0.015 0.091 0.0092
(0.17) (0.036) (0.010) (0.020) (0.10) (0.014)
Lags 0 1 3 2 1 3
Obs. 108 108 108 108 108 108
R2 0.15 0.27 0.36 0.30 0.26 0.67
Notes: This table shows the coefficient estimates in regressions of different categories of portfolio inflows on target and path surprises. Inflows are sales
of securities by Mexican to U.S. investors. All flows are expressed in billions of U.S. dollars. The surprises are equal to the estimated value (as explained
in the main text) if there was a monetary policy announcement in the respective month and zero otherwise. The lag order for each flow category is
selected using the Bayesian information criterion. The sample period goes from January 2011 to December 2019. All regressions include a constant.











































Table 3.8. Response of Portfolio Outflows to Target and Path Surprises
T-Notes/Bonds Agency Bonds U.S. Corp. Bonds U.S. Corp. Stocks Non-U.S. Bonds Non-U.S. Stocks
Target -0.017 0.0079 0.0035* -0.0048 -0.024 -0.013***
(0.032) (0.0085) (0.0021) (0.0093) (0.030) (0.0047)
Path 0.20 0.020 0.0021 -0.0080 0.0031 0.010
(0.13) (0.018) (0.0056) (0.016) (0.055) (0.016)
Lags 0 3 2 2 3 3
Obs. 108 108 108 108 108 108
R2 0.13 0.33 0.54 0.26 0.38 0.69
Notes: This table shows the coefficient estimates in regressions of different categories of portfolio outflows on target and path surprises. Outflows are
purchases of securities by Mexican from U.S. investors. All flows are expressed in billions of U.S. dollars. The surprises are equal to the estimated value
(as explained in the main text) if there was a monetary policy announcement in the respective month and zero otherwise. The lag order for each flow
category is selected using the Bayesian information criterion. The sample period goes from January 2011 to December 2019. All regressions include a
constant. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** asterisks respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Tables 3.8 indicates that inflows into U.S. agency bonds respond to path surprises.
They decline following a path easing surprise. This is better understood from the per-
spective of Mexican investors. According to the results in section 3.4, a path easing
surprise reduces sovereign bond yields in Mexico so, ceteris paribus, the spread between
bonos and the yield of U.S. agency bonds changes making the latter more attractive.
Mexican investors rebalance their portfolios by lowering their sales of agency bonds to
U.S. investors. This result suggests that local investors use non-Mexican securities to
rebalance their portfolios in response to Banxico’s monetary policy decisions.
In contrast to the results involving daily flows of bonos by foreign investors, the
bilateral flows on non-U.S. bonds do not respond to Banxico’s monetary policy. Two
potential reasons can explain this result. First, non-U.S. bonds could include corporate
Mexican bonds or even non-Mexican bonds. These other types of bonds might be less
sensible to target and path surprises. Nevertheless, even if that category exclusively
comprises bonds issued by the Mexican government, it mixes together at least cetes and
bonos. Tables 3.A.2 and 3.A.3 in the appendix show that cetes flows by foreign investors
do not respond to target nor path surprises. Second, the results in section 3.5.1 refer
to non-Mexican investors, while the TIC data captures transactions involving a U.S.
counterparty. The evidence thus suggests that foreign non-U.S. investors are important
players in the bonos market.
Table 3.9 reports the effects of target and path surprises on the monthly bonos flows.
Unlike the results with daily flows reported in table 3.4, significant effects are harder to
detect with monthly data. Even so, the effects on the bonos flows by foreigners to a target
surprise remain. This makes the results using TIC data more promising since, with access
to better data, there might be more significant effects than the ones reported in tables 3.7
and 3.8. Data on cross-border portfolio flows at higher frequencies (e.g. weekly, daily),
categorized by type of instrument and/or disaggregated by maturity could help to better
characterize the effects of Banxico’s monetary policy on cross-border capital flows.
Summing up, portfolio flows, even cross-border ones, react to target and path sur-











































Table 3.9. Response of Monthly Bonos Flows to Target and Path Surprises
Banks Mutual Pension Insurers Others Foreign
Target -0.86* -0.34 0.053 0.00021 -0.43 0.36
(0.47) (0.25) (0.15) (0.039) (0.34) (0.52)
Path -0.89 0.19 0.22 -0.17 0.38 1.90**
(0.92) (0.70) (0.46) (0.12) (0.81) (0.93)
Lags 3 1 0 2 1 0
Obs. 108 108 108 108 108 108
R2 0.33 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.23 0.12
Notes: This table shows the coefficient estimates in regressions of different categories of Mexican bond inflows on target and path surprises. Inflows are
obtained as the change in the holdings of Mexican bonds. All flows are expressed in billions of Mexican pesos. The surprises are equal to the estimated
value (as explained in the main text) if there was a monetary policy announcement in the respective month and zero otherwise. The lag order for each
flow category is selected using the Bayesian information criterion. The sample period goes from January 2011 to December 2019. All regressions include
a constant. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** asterisks respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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monetary policy of advanced economies (Chen et al., 2014; Curcuru et al., 2015; Fischer,
2020) but to that of the destination country.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper uses a new dataset to identify monetary policy surprises in an emerging
economy. The evidence indicates that surprises in the policy rate and about its future
path are relevant for both asset prices and portfolio flows. The multidimensionality of
monetary policy is therefore not restricted to advanced economies. By having the ability
to alter market expectations about the future path of the policy rate via statements,
central banks in emerging markets can influence medium and long-term interest rates,
which are the ones that ultimately transmit to the broader economy. Furthermore, they
have room to deal with the spillover effects from the policies implemented by central
banks in advanced economies as well as to conduct monetary policy in case their policy
rate were to be constrained by the zero lower bound.
Given the importance of statements documented here, emerging markets should con-
sider best practices in monetary policy communications, including brief, clear and concise
language without compromising the main message. References to non-monetary policy
issues (e.g. structural reforms) in statements should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
On this regard, Banxico committed to issue clear and concise statements and made its
guidelines publicly available in February 2020.27
The results in this paper can be extended in several directions. For instance, to further
understand how bond yields respond to monetary policy, one can analyze how target and
path surprises transmit to the expected future short rate and the term premium in bond
yields; the decomposition proposed by Soĺıs (2021b) for the yields of emerging markets
is relevant to address this issue. In addition, the destination-country perspective can be
relevant for emerging markets in connection with macroprudential policies. One could
study, for instance, the interaction of target and path surprises with different macropru-




dential policies, including capital controls given the response of portfolio flows to target
and path surprises documented here. Finally, more research is needed to assess the extent
to which the results reported here apply to other emerging markets.
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Table 3.A.1. The Response of Swap Rates to the Target and Path Factors
3M-Swap 1Y-Swap
Intraday Daily Intraday Daily
Intraday Target Factor 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.983*** 0.983***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.046) (0.013)
Intraday Path Factor 0.000 1.050***
(0.022) (0.038)
Daily Target Factor 1.001*** 1.001*** 0.942*** 0.942***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.065) (0.011)
Daily Path Factor 0.000 0.816***
(0.011) (0.019)
Constant -0.480*** -0.480*** -0.083 -0.083 -0.286 -0.286*** 0.062 0.062
(0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.435) (0.104) (0.501) (0.115)
Observations 72 72 155 155 72 72 155 155
R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.994 0.994 0.819 0.990 0.691 0.984
Notes: For the 3-month swap rate, the table shows the coefficient estimates in regressions of intraday and daily changes in the 3-month swap rate on the target
and path factors obtained from intraday and daily data, as explained in the main text. Similarly for the 1-year swap rate. Daily changes are calculated around
monetary policy announcements; intraday changes are calculated starting 10 minutes before to 20 minutes after a monetary policy announcement. The sample is
all regular monetary policy announcements until December 2019, with intraday data the sample starts in January 2011 and with daily data it starts in January
2004. All variables are expressed in basis points. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** asterisks respectively indicate significance at the























Table 3.A.2. Response of Daily Cetes Flows to Target and Path Surprises
Banks Mutual Pension Insurers Others Foreign
Target 0.019 -0.067 -0.027 -0.0066 0.069 -0.090
(0.12) (0.11) (0.051) (0.0083) (0.15) (0.12)
Path 0.087 -0.35 0.091 0.029 0.19 0.10
(0.38) (0.23) (0.20) (0.044) (0.55) (0.35)
No. of Obs. 72 72 72 72 72 72
R2 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: This table shows the coefficient estimates in regressions of different categories of Cetes inflows on target and path surprises. The inflows are
obtained as the change in the holdings of cetes. All flows are expressed in billions of Mexican pesos. The surprises are equal to the estimated value
(as explained in the main text) if there was a monetary policy announcement in the respective month and zero otherwise. The lag order for each flow
category is selected using the Bayesian information criterion. The sample period is January 2011 to December 2019. All regressions include a constant.























Table 3.A.3. Response of Monthly Cetes Flows to Target and Path Surprises
Banks Mutual Pension Insurers Others Foreign
Target 0.21 -0.14 0.076 0.026 0.25 -0.37
(0.22) (0.23) (0.11) (0.032) (0.32) (0.65)
Path -0.011 -0.61 -0.90*** -0.031 0.68 -0.97
(0.52) (0.51) (0.30) (0.14) (0.69) (1.00)
Lags 1 0 0 0 1 0
Obs. 108 108 108 108 108 108
R2 0.29 0.12 0.19 0.09 0.13 0.22
Notes: This table shows the coefficient estimates in regressions of different categories of Cetes inflows on target and path surprises. The inflows are
obtained as the change in the holdings of cetes. All flows are expressed in billions of Mexican pesos. The surprises are equal to the estimated value
(as explained in the main text) if there was a monetary policy announcement in the respective month and zero otherwise. The lag order for each flow
category is selected using the Bayesian information criterion. The sample period goes from January 2011 to December 2019. All regressions include a























Table 3.A.4. Response of Portfolio Net Flows to Target and Path Surprises
T-Notes/Bonds Agency Bonds U.S. Corp. Bonds U.S. Corp. Stocks Non-U.S. Bonds Non-U.S. Stocks
Target -0.051 -0.0031 -0.0076 0.0043 -0.014 -0.0055
(0.037) (0.017) (0.0053) (0.0065) (0.024) (0.0033)
Path -0.073 0.063 0.011 -0.0072 0.10 0.0017
(0.11) (0.045) (0.011) (0.016) (0.10) (0.0080)
Lags 1 1 0 0 0 2
Obs. 108 108 108 108 108 108
R2 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.29
Notes: This table shows the coefficient estimates in regressions of different categories of portfolio net flows on target and path surprises. Net flows are
inflows minus outflows. Inflows are sales of securities by Mexican to U.S. investors. Outflows are purchases of securities by Mexican from U.S. investors.
All flows are expressed in billions of U.S. dollars. The surprises are equal to the estimated value (as explained in the main text) if there was a monetary
policy announcement in the respective month and zero otherwise. The lag order for each flow category is selected using the Bayesian information crite-
rion. The sample period goes from January 2011 to December 2019. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*, **, *** asterisks respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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P. Soĺıs. Does the Exchange Rate Respond to Monetary Policy in Emerging Markets?
Evidence from Mexico. Working Paper, 2021c.
J. H. Stock and M. W. Watson. Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Causal Effects
in Macroeconomics Using External Instruments. Economic Journal, 128(610):917–948,
2018.
S. Su, A. H. Ahmad, and J. Wood. How Effective is Central Bank Communication in
Emerging Economies? An Empirical Analysis of the Chinese Money Markets. Review
of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, pages 1–25, 2019.
E. T. Swanson. Measuring the Effects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance and Asset
Purchases on Financial Markets. Working Paper, 2018.
P. Turner. The Global Long-Term Interest Rate, Financial Risks and Policy Choices in
EMEs. BIS Working Paper, (October):5–6, 2014.
J. H. Wright. Term Premia and Inflation Uncertainty: Empirical Evidence from an
International Panel Dataset. American Economic Review, 101(4):1514–1534, 2011.
J. H. Wright. What Does Monetary Policy Do to Long-Term Interest Rates at the Zero
Lower Bound? Economic Journal, 122(564):F447–F466, 2012.
J. Zettelmeyer. The Impact of Monetary Policy on the Exchange Rate: Evidence from
Three Small Open Economies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(3):635–652, 2004.
152
Vita
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